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I . STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the Geothermal Resource Permit
entered on August 8, 1989. A Notice of Appeal from the decision
was timely filed on September 14. 1989. the appeal was timely
docketed in this Court on November 2, 1989. This Court has
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to HRS 205-5.1(g) and the
Hawaii County Planning Commission Rule 12-12(a).
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.11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case begins with submission by the Hawaii Natural
Energy Institute and the Research Corporation of the
University of Hawaii to the Hawaii County Planning Commission
of the first application ever made for a Geothermal Resource
Permit.
I On February 17, notice of March 7, 1989 public
i
~...: hearing was mailed to property owners within 1000 feet of~<
project boundaries.
On February 19, 1989 a notice was published for the
March 7, 1989 Planning Commission public hearing.
On March 2, 1989, the Planning Director notified the
applicants that the public hearing of March 7, 1989 was
rescheduled by the Hawaii County Planning Department to
comply with the requirements of Chapter 343 HRS, relating to
environmental impact statements:
Except as otherwise provided, an environmental
assessment shall be required for actions which:
(1) Propose .•• the use of State or County funds •••.
On March 2, 1989, the Planning Commission issued a
press
89-1.
release for the notice of a rescheduled hearing on GRP
.~ On March 21, 1989 a notice was published for the
rescheduled public hearing for April 11, 1989.
On March 31, 1989 the Planning Director acknowledged
receipt of GRP 89-1 application, filing fee, and descriptions.
On March 31, 1989, the Planning Director requested
written comments on the application from various agencies.
On April 11, 1989, the public hearing on GRP 89-1 was
"-
-',,'
held. At that time, a request for mediation was submitted by
Harry Kim, Civil Defense Director of the County of Hawaii.
Also at that hearing, the Planning Commission voted to hold a
site inspection and continue the hearing.
On April 18, 1989 the Planning Commission notified the
applicant of a site inspection and continued hearing, time and
place not yet determined.
On April 21, the Planning Director notified the
applicant that the site inspection and hearing will be
continued to May 9, 1989.
On May 9, 1989, the public hearinq was continued. At
that time the Planning Commission voted to send the
application into mediation and close the public hearing.
On May 16, 1989 the Planning Commission notified the
applicant of mediation.
On May 23, 1989 the mediators were appointed and
sessions were held on June 7, 15, 16, 22, 23, 28, 29, July 5
and 6. The parties to the mediation included Christine
Batista, Jim Blakey, DBED, Civil Defense, W.R. Craddick,
Richard and Lou Ann Jones, Kapohb Community Association,
Kapoho Grown (Delan and Jennifer Perry), Fernando Javier, Dave
Laughlin, Alice Medeiros, Steve Philips, Gregory Pommerenk,
~
'.; Puna Community Council, Helene Shinde, Yoshio Shinde, Jane
Hedtke, and Pele Defense Fund. Pele Defense Fund left the
mediation because they felt the applicant was not mediating in
good faith, their walkout triggered by the grading of a road
through native forest that would service SOH 3 and 4. Jane
Hedtke left the mediation because she felt the discussion of
conditions would compromise the community's position.
On July 10, 1989, parties to the mediation submitted a
letter to the Planning Commission regarding the statement made
by the applicant on the last day of mediation that there will
be hydrogen sulfide emissions from the SOH wells. Also on
that date, the Kapoho Community Association requested a
contested case hearing.
On July 13, 1989 the Mediators Report was submitted to
the Planning Commission,
position by the applicants.
including the July 10 statement of
,-
On July 18, 1989, the Planning Commission, with the
give the commission opportunity to review the mediatorsI
r,·;
approval of
report.
the applicant, granted a 30 extension of time to
On August 8, 1989 the Planning Commission voted to
approve the application and grant the permit.
On August 15, 1989, the Planning Commission issued
-.- 53F'
written notification of permit approval.
On September 5, 1989, the applicant moved the site for
SOH 4 approximately 1000 feet toward Kaohe Homesteads.
7
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1. Time
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL
limit for presentation and speeding of pUblic hearing
Constitution, Article 1, Section 5:)
No person shall be deprived of life, nor be denied the
I·.
l-
I
i, .
I:ro .-
I
and limiting testimony. Objection is due process. (State
:.:..::.
equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of
the person's civil rights or be discriminated against in the
,./
exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or ancestry.
(Tr 5/9/89 @ 11,12,13,14; Tr 4/11/89).
2. No cross examination of applicant. Due process (ib) (Tr
4/11/89 @ 38, 39).
3. No Environmental Impact Statement was submitted and the
Environmental Assessment was deficient. Objection to violation
of Hawaii County Planning Commission Rule 12-3 (R#l, #2067
(Refer to Rule 12 in appendix).
~. Too strict time restraints on mediation process. Objection
to due process
12-5-1(g):
(ib) (Hawaii County Planning Commission
Mediation Conference. The initial mediation session
mediator. The mediator shall
shall be held within 15 days after the appointment of the
fix the time and place of each ~
subsequent mediation session. The conference shall be held
within the County of Hawaii unless all parties and the mediator
agree otherwise. The mediation period shall not extend beyond
thirty days after the initial mediation session, except by
order of the Planning Commission. Mediation shall be confined
to the issues raised at the public hearinq by the respective
party or parties requesting mediation.
5. Mediator to be chosen and costs to be born with no input
6. Public comments pertinent to procedure
from parties.
152,154,155)
Objection to due process (ib) (Tr 5/9/89 ~ 150,
not accepted.
objection to due process (ib) (Tr 5/9/89 @ 154, 157)
7. No mediator recommendation. Objection to violation of Rule
12-5-1(m) (R#176)
Recommendation of Mediator. The mediator shall submit a
written report containing recommendations to the Planning
Commission, based upon any mediation aqreement reached between
the parties or stating that no agreement was reached, for
consideration by the Planninq Commission in its final decision.
The written report of the mediator shall be filed with the
Planning Commission and served on all parties to the mediation
within 10 days of the close of the mediation conference.
8. Unilateral extension of time for mediation by mediators.
Objection to violation of Rule 12-5-1(g). (ib)
process (ib) and violation of agency discretion allowed in
new evidence by applicant not acted upon. Objection to due
public hearinq based on admission offor secondRequest9.
Rule 12-5-1(n):
Second Public Hearing. If there is no mediation
agreement, or if the mediation agreement does not resolve all
issues submitted for mediation, the ~lanning Commission may, in
within thirty (30) days after receipt of the mediator's report.
comment related to the unresolved mediation issues.
discretion, hold a second public hearing to receive
hearing, if to be conducted, shall be heldpublic
its sole
additional
The second
Within 10 days after the second public hearing, the Planning
Commission may receive additional written comment on the
unresolved mediation issues raised at the second public hearing
by any party.
10. Decision was made based on inadequate factual record.
Objection to violation of due process (ib) HRS 91-14(g), and
Rule 12-6 (R#183).
(HRS 91-14-g): Upon review of the record the court may affirm
the decision of the agency or remand the case with instructions
for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the
decision and order if the substantial riqhts of the petitioners
may have been prejudiced because the administrative findings,
conclusions, decisions, or orders are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
or /0
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of
! ~..
).
( 3)
( 4 )
( 5)
(6 )
the agency; or
Made upon unlawful procedure; or
Affected by other error of law; or
Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
Arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by abuse of
discretion or clearly unwarranted
discretion.
exercise of
Rule 12-6: Criteria for Issuance of Geothermal Resource Permit
The Planning Commission shall grant a geothermal resource
permit if it finds that the applicant has demonstrated that:
(a) The proposed geothermal development activities would
not have unreasonable adverse health, environmental, or
socio-economic effects on residents or surrounding
property; and
( b) The proposed geothermal development activities would
not unreasonably burden public agencies to provide
roads and streets, sewers, water, drainage, school
improvements, and police and fire protection; and
(c) There are reasonable measures available to mitigate
the unreasonable adverse effects or burdens referred to
above.
J \
'-~
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
1 • Error to be analyzed as relating to a decision of law.
2. Error to be analyzed as relating to a decision of law.
3. Error to be analyzed as relating to a finding of fact.
4. Error to be analyzed as relating to a decision of law.
5. Error to be analyzed as relating to a decision of law.
6. Error to be analyzed as relating to a decision of law.
7. Error to be analyzed as relating -to a decision of law.
8. Error to be analyzed as relating to a decision of law.
il-"
... 9. Error to be analyzed as relatinq to elo:cersizt? of
judicial discretion.
-j--.
10. Error to be analyzed as relatinQ to a findinq of fac t.
ld.
•STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Did Hawaii County Planning Commission err in only
allowing three (3) minutes for oral presentation.
2. Did Hawaii County Planning Commission err in not
allowing cross examination of SOH applicant.
3. Did Hawaii County Planning Commission err in accepting
deficient application.
4. Did Hawaii County Planning Commission Rule 12 err in not
allowing reasonable time for mediation.
5. Did Hawaii County Planning Co~mission err by not
accepting questions from the audience before close of the
hearing.
6. Did Hawaii County Planning Commission err in not
accepting comments pertinent to procedure after the close of
the public hearing but before issuing a decision.
7. Did the Hawaii County Planninq Commission err in
accepting mediators report without its recommendations.
8. Did the mediator err in extending time of mediation for
convenience of SOH applicant.
9. Did the Hawaii County Planning Commission err in not
calling a second public hearinq to accept new evidence.
10 •• Did the Hawaii County Planning Commission err in making
a decision based on an inadequate factual record where no
determination of fact had taken place.
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VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
to Hawaii County Planning Commission's Rule 12 has resulted in
by Act 378 SLH 1987 and the resulting amendments made
guarantees of
the State Legislature to amend Act
the permitting procedure for geothermal
Unfortunately the Constitutional
The attempts of
a streamlining of
development.
205.5.1
a f fec ted property owners to a due process have not been safe
to residencs, farms, nurseries, and other businesses.
guarded in the haste to permit development in close proximity
The Hawaii County Planning Commission Rule 12 as
interpreted during the public hearinq on appeal here was
further faulted by other Rules of Practice and Procedure that
did not allow for questioning or full comments by the
appellants.(Tr 4/11/89 @38, 39; 5/9/89 @ 154,157)
Further, the mediators report did not and could not make
the recommendation required under 12-5-1(m) that would have,
perhaps determined the factual record.
Thus the factual record has not been fully presented to
the Hawaii County Planning Commission by the mediator and that
commission did not have the full body of facts on which to
base any decision and could not reasonable have determined if
12-6 Criteria for Issuance of a Geothermal Resource Permit
were met.
I~
! :.
;
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VII. ARGUMENT
The first the property owners within 1000 feet knew
that their lives and livelyhoods had been targeted by the
principles of the SOH program was by notice mailed February
17, 1989 for a public hearing scheduled on March 7, 1989.
The public hearing was rescheduled to April 11, 1989.
This commenced a crash course in geothermal development in
general and the SOH project in particular for the affected
communities of Puna and the appellants. While many "neighbors
of the three locations for which SOH wells were proposed had
long known of the HGPA well and power plant, most were shocked
that the SOH would in'one project. su~~est and apply for a
permit to drill into far edges of the geothermal resource
subzone. For instance, those neighbors, including appellants
Delan Perry and Jennifer Perry, are located in the heart of
the best papaya orchard land in the world. SOH 2 is
surrounded by hundreds of acres of producing orchard.
Additionally agriculture. and specifically producing land has
been protected by Constitutional Amendment Article XI, Section
3:
,The State shall conserve and protect agricultural
lands, promote diversified a~riculture, increase
agricultural self-sufficiency and assure the
availability of a~riculturallv sitable lands ...
15
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The appellants in their study of the hi~hly technical
field of geothermal well development. determined the
existance of a multitude of problems. nuisances. and
possibilities of extreme dangers that the State Department of
Business and Economic Development. as supervising agency and
HNEI/RCUH as contractor were willing to ignore or discount.
Whereas appellants subscribed to the need for alternative
energy development. study of what wovld happen to persons and
property as far as three miles from a ventin~ well. whether
emissions were abated or unabated. could be a threat to
persons and property.
Appellants learned some of the major differences in
developing the Hawaiian Geothermal resource compared to those
in other areas of the world include:
1. Static shut in well head pressures in excess of 1500 psig;
2. H2S levels of 1200 ppm. two to three times fatal dose and
many times greater (Geyers average 200 ppm) than any other
development area;
3. Temperature at depths of in excess of 600 degrees
farenheit;
4. High levels of silica which clogs pipes.
As some of these impacts became known to appellants,
letters detailing their specific concerns were submitted to
the Hawaii County Plannin~ Commisison. (R 9. 11, 20,
23,24, 25,27.29,32,36,38,39,41.42.44.49.54.58.61.62,65.66,67,
I~
_....-s""R$tM ZrW"WF'
•68,69,71,73,81,83,85,99,101.106.108.110,112,114,118).
Prior to the first public hearin~ of April 11. 1989 the
appellants reviewed Rule 12 of the Hawaii County Planning
Commission. Rule 12 was mandated by HRS 205.5.1. Act 378 SLH
<-:.
".':':.:
1987 amended HRS 205.5.1 to replace citizens right to due
process by substituting a vague "mediation" procedure for
the contested case provisions of 'HRS 91-9, Administrative
Procedures Act, creating severe restraint for fact finding.
The contested case hearin~. although timely and expensive,
rema~ns a fair and equitable system for a substitute to a
civil trial. The ability to cross examine witnesses and the
preservation of arguments for the review body to assess are
key to the most basic citizen rights as included in the
Hawaii State Constitution Bill of Rights (Act 1, Section 5).
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. nor be denied the
.~ . equal protection of the laws. nor be denied the enjoy-
ment of the person's civil ri~hts or be discriminated
against in the exercise thereof because of race,
religion, sex or ancestry.
The reality of the mediation procedure that followed
bore out the appellants worst concerns that Act 378 SLH 1987
and the amendments to Rule 12 that were spawned by it, coupled
to the deficient rules on public hearin~s in the other rules
of the Hawaii County Planning Comission Rules of Practice and
tTl
.:J
Procedure denied due process for those whose health,
environment, and socio economics could be devasted by the SOH
proj ect.
The appellee HNEI/RCUH further de~raded the
procedures specified in Rule 12 by filing an incomplete
application not meeting the 16 sets of fact mandated by
12-3(b)(2). Specifically the application should not have been
accepted because it was deficient in providin~:
(B) a written statement describing the scope of
the planned activities and presenting the applicant's
reasons for requesting the permit
The application's response to (B) is "The SOHs are for
scientific observation purposes only... The SOHs, in
combination with exiting geothermal wells or geothermal wells
to be drilled by producers in the future. can be instrumented
to provide data relatin~ to reservoir productivity."
The intent of SB 2358 SLH 1988 was to appropriate
$3,000,000 ... "to finance the efforts of a consortium
involving the University of Hawaii. energy-related
organizations, and private industry to stimulate ~eothermal
resource developement throu~h confirmation of the geothermal
resource base and initiation of a ~eothermal technology
transfer program."
I~
--~~_._-._-~----~--------------------------------
,S.C. Rep 1627 SLH 1988 states the purpose of the bill
is to appropriate $3.000.000 to finance the efforts to
stimulate the development of ~eothermal ener~v and determine
the size of Hawaii"s ~eothermal reservoirs. "A consortium
involving the University of Hawaii, ener~y related
organizations and the private industry will make efforts to
develop a plan which could tri~~er more than $50 million in
private sector and Federal funds ~nd lead to a $2 billion
geothermal and deep cable program."
The scope of the application should have included the
legislative purposes to confirm the ~eothermal resource base,
stimulate geothermal development. and describe the
involvement of private industry, specifically Puna Geothermal
Ventures and True Geothermal who hold the mining leases to the
parcels being used for the drilling of the SOH wells in this
application. This impact should have been addressed in the
Environmental Assessment. Such an impact would have changed
the determination of the Agency. HNEI. in their issuance of a
Negative Declaration.
(c) a preliminary plot or site plan of the property
drawn to scale, showing all existing and proposed uses and
locations of structures including but not limited to, drill
sites, wells, access roadways. water sources, waste water
collection and disposal systems ....
No specific location within the huge parce Is was Iq
•designated as the site for the SOH. No metes and bounds were
included in the permit that was approved by the Hawaii County
Planning Commission. The site for SOH 4 was relocated after
permit approval at the applicants convenience without regard
to prior notification of residents and site changes (R 187,
189) and has materially altered who will be affected and the
degree of impacts.
On April 11, 1989, the public hearing opened and a new
set of due process violations occured.
1. The room chosen was far too small for the overflow crowd
of residents, property owners. and interested parties (Tr
4/11/89 @ 44,92 and unrec'orded- "voices").
2. All testimony, including that of the applicant was limited
to 3 minutes (Tr 4/11/89 @ 25,39).
3. No questions were accepted from the "audience" during the
presentation of testimonies (Tr 4/11/89 @38.39).
4. Some members of the Plannin~ Commission discovered only at
the end of the hearing that they had outdated copies of Rule
12 in their possession (Tr 4/11/89 @ 138).
5. The Chairman of the Plannin~ Commission wanted procedure
"speeded up" without thought to due process rights (Tr 4/11/89
@ 69). 10
_ "-,-,... nrz
•6. The Hediator was to be chosen without public input or
questioning (Tr 4/11/89 @ 71. 132).
7. The mediator was to keep no record of mediation
proceedings (Tr 4/11/89 @ 71).
8. The Chairman of the Commission sought summarized concerns
(Tr 4/11/89 @ 72).
9. The Chairman of the Commission tried to discourage
participation at the continued hearing and suggested limiting
public input further (Tr 4/11/89 @ 134).
In all~ 26 persons weathered the inconvenience, cramped
room and
project.
project.
shortened comment period to testify against the SOH
Only the applicants and one person spoke for the
- '"
The hearing was continued to Hay 9. 1989 to allow
for a site inspection and to appoint a mediator.
During this hearing. held in an appropriately sized
room this time. the Chairman attempted to limit further
testimony (Tr 5/9/89 @ 11.12~13) from anyone who had testified
for up to 3 minutes at the last hearing of April 11. 1989.
Further:
1. Testimony was limited to 5 minutes (Tr 5/9/89 @ 14) for
:11
7"!r!lttt!il<if!la'i
reasons of "expediency".
2. The vast majority of testimony was again for permit
denial.
3. Costs of participants of mediation was presented in an
attempt to discourage participation and estimated to be $2500-
$4000, with no selection of the mediator by parties involved.
(Tr 5/9/89 @ 150,152,154,155) "You're going to appoint a
mediator and we're going to pay for it" (Tr 5/9/89 @ 155).
4. Public comments pertinent to the procedures were not
accepted (Tr 5/9/89 @154.157).
And thus ended any direct input to the Planning
Commission.
A mediator was chosen by the Planning Commission from
the Center for Alternative Dispute Resolution, D.O. Letts,
with Kem Lowry U.H. Department of Urban and Regional
Planning, and Richard Spiegel, West Hawaii Mediation Service.
Mediation began on June 7, 1989 to a schedule cramped by the
30 requirements of Rule 12-5-1(g). The mediation procedure,
constrained by Rule 12-5-1 and in conflict with what the
traditional meaning and role of mediation has become, was able
to list community concerns, reiterate permittees arguments,
list some areas of agreements and disagreements, discuss
liability issues, and evaluate Rule 12. No attempt was made
to record statements,
validity.
assess the facts stated and their
Inadequate time did not allow for full distoVery and
no procedure was available to enforce discovery. The
mediation team did not attempt to meet requirements of Rule
12-5-1(m) to submit a recommendation that might have
summarized any findings of fact. Further, the mediators
chose to unilaterally extend the time of the mediation
procedure beyond 30 days for the convenience of the State and
the applicants to submit their statements, without review or
comment by other mediation parties. Also no provision was
made to allow mediants review of the whole mediation report
and it was submitted to the Planning Commission without such
review.
During mediation applicants admitted for the first time
information not included in their application or Environmental
Assessment that there would be H2S emissions (R#210).
This should have triggered a second public hearing as
well as an application for a Department of Health permit under
DOH Air Quality Regulation 11-60, Chapter 60. A letter
requesting such a hearing was sent to the Planning Commisison
(R @ 174).
At the Planning Commission meeting of August 8, 1989,
appellants tried to submit a tter dealing with the new
information that had come up during mediation as to H2S
emissions but said
Planning Commission
hea~ing was closed.
lette~
as it
was
was
~efused by the cle~k of the
testimony afte~ the public
The Planning Commission voted to app~ove the ~equest on
August 8, 1989.
TT7E5 ti e_ '"
VIII. RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL. STATUTORY AND OTHER PROVISIONS
1. Hawaii County Planning Commission Rule 12 as set out in
appendix.
2. HRS 205-5.1, Land Use Commission. Geothermal Resource
Subzones. as set out in appendix.
3. Hawaii State Constitution Article I Section 5, Due
Process and Equal Protection.
. .
No person shall be deprived of life~ liberty or property
without due process of law, nor be denied the equal
protection of the laws. nor be denied the enjoyment of
the person's civil rights or be discriminated against
in the exercise thereof because of race. religion, sex
or ancestry.
4. HRS 91-14, Administrative Procedures, as set out in
appendix.
5. HRS 343, Environmental Impact Statements, as set out in
appendix.
----------------------_._---
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APPENDIX
1. Decision of the Hawaii County Planning Commission,
GRP 89-1, August 15, 1989.
2. Hawaii County Plannin~ Commission Rule 12.
3. HRS 91-14, Administrative Procedures.
4. HRS 205-5.1, Land Use Commission, Geothermal Resource
Subzones.
5. HRS 343, Environmental Impact Statements.
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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS DELAN PERRY, JENNIFER PERRY AND NELSON HO
TO ANSWERING BRIEF OF HNEI, ET AL
He~ein a~e add~essed the arguments set fo~th by HNEI:
A. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE REQUIRES FAR MORE THAN THE PROC~DURE
UTILIZ~D IN GRANTING THIS PERMIT.
Appellants p~ope~ty and health inte~ests at stake he~2 a~E
fundamental Inte~ests p~otected by Federal and State Constitutional
Requi~ements of p~ocedu~al due p~ocess. The tWQ step analysi: of
due process claims in Aguiar v.Hawaii Housing Autho~ity, 522 P.2d
1255, 55 Haw.478 (1974) have been met by the appellants. 1. The
~P~~y~' real estate and business interests meet the level cf
interest rpgui~2d fo~ standing. Appellant Perry owns and leases
six parcels of property adjacent and in near proximity to the site
of SOH 2, ana is situated so that meteorological conditions would
cause geothermal emissions to tresspass onto their residence and
4/11/89 @ 52-56 that geothermal emissions, H2S, and noise will
Appellants allege as stated in the reco~d at Trf3.rm oper-atio:-l.
adversely impact their health, property valuation, and business
interests. They meet the tests for protection of the constitutional
'i·:
g~arantees and require the court's protection as in Mahuiki v
Plann~ng Com~is~ion 65 Haw 507 (1982) :
A proceeding before a county planning commission in which a
landowner seeks to have the legal rights, duties, and
priveleges relative to the development of his land decla~Ed
over the objections of other landowners and residents of the
area is a "contested case" within the meaning of HRS Chapt.91.
One whose legitimate interest is in fact injured by illegal
action of an administrative agency or officer should have
standing to appeal because justice requires that such a party
should have a chance to show that the action that hurts his
i~terest is illegal.
:::~
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Appellants interest parallel those of Town v Land Use
Commission 55 Haw 538, 524 P.2d 84 (1974) where the court ruled:
A case involving an amendment to district boundaries which is
challenged by an adjoining landowner having a property
interest in the outcome of said amendment is a"contested '=3.se"
The case at bar is distinguishable from Sandy Beach
Defense Fu~rl v.City Council of the City and County of Honolul.~
773d P.2d 250, 70 Haw. 361 (1989), where this court found that a
legislative-type public hearing afforded adequate prccedural due
process to the plaintiffs-appellants because the interests asserted
by the plaintiffs-appellants were aesthetic and environmental, not
property interests entitled to the protection of constitutionally
adequate procedural due process. Although this court stated in
dicta in Sandy Beach that the legislative-type hearing provided
adequate due process even if visual and environmental interests are
characterized as property, a number of factors distinguish the
they are arguable not "significant property interests""property",
situation in Sandy Beach First, whilefrom the case at bar.
interests might be characterized asand environmentalvisual
which mandate the constitutional minimum procedural due process
protections articulated in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)
Appellants Perry hold significant property interests very close
The California Supreme Court has recognized that land use
decisions which substantially affect the property rights of
the owners of adjacent parcels may constitute deprivations of
property within the context at procedural due process.
to the permitted parcel (SOH 2 well) which may be substantially
in footnote 10 of Sandy Beach. this court noted that:Second,
affected by the decision of the HCPC at issue here. Third, the
court noted that in the Sandy Beach proceedings there were no
less than sixteen separate public meetings of hearings and ~t no
-2-
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tim~ were tne plaintiffs-appellants denied the opportunity to
address the Councilor to ask questions of other witnes~es,~ By
contrast, in the case at bar all parties were denied the right to
question anyone (Tr 4/11/89 @ 38). Fourth the issues raised by
the plaintiffs-appellants in Sandy Beach were in the nature of
in=onvenience, whereas geothermal development is a complex new
technology which may directly threaten appellants' health and
property. Under some scenarios, such as a major geologic event or
a well blow-out releasing large amounts of poisonous
hydrogen-sulfide gas, appellants lives may be threatened by
respondent's permitted activities and temporary or permanent
~Yacuatior. of their property may be required.
The minimum procedural requirements to prob?ct a.ppellants
dLe process include ( In Re Kauai Elec.Div. of Citizpn~ Util. Co.
60 H~w 182 (1978), Goldberg v Kelly):
1. ample opportunity to obtain and present all their evidence
2. to present testimony both oral and written
3. to cross examine witnesses
4. to argue the issues on their merits
5. to produce a reviewable record
Appellants were denied "meaningful time" to present oral
arg~ments as defined in Mathews v. Eldridge, 4?4 U.S. 319 (1976).
Three minutes and five minutes in this case did not allo~ for
process up, including the reading of first and last paragraphs (Tr
presentation of evidence and argument in a reas~nable manner. The
examining the testimony of witnesses
is set forth in
(Tr 4/11/89 @55,60). The
presentation
The HCPC made many suggestions to speed the
to point out that they were not interested in
Kelly .Goldberg v.
requ~rement for adequate oral
4/11/89 @69),
opportunity to be heard implies to all points, and not for a
-3-
limited and restrictive time limit. The commission under its rules
is allowed to limit only testimony which is "unduly repetitious or
lengthy" (2-3c Rules of Practice and Procedure, HCPC). A time
limit did in the case of the GRP-l proceedings, restrict a
reasonable presentation of evidence.
It appears the HCPC expected and presumed mediation to
review the entire record (Tr. 4/11/89 @ 69-71). Such full review
by the mediator however was outside the bounds of Rule 12-5 and
even if the mediator had reviewed the whole record, would not have
fulfilled the requirement that appellants have adequate time for
presentation of evidence and argument. The oral arguments permitted
were not meaningful in the test of Mathews v. Eldridge.
Testimony of many individuals was directed at specific
be ~llowed as many individuals would be affected by similar
oc=urances and each need have his full reasons for denial expressed
Certain repetitiveness by different persons must
members of the KapohoIn fact,
areas of concern.
to preserve his own right.
Community Association met to divide responsibilities to present
specific points,but most were cut short in their presentations.
The HCPC should have been required to hear this testimony in full.
The report of the Senate Standing Committee on amending
HRS 205-5.1 (S.C. Report 1118, 1978 Senate Journal @ 1388) properly
sets the responsibility of assuring adequate due process in the
HCPC.
Thus a procedure that does not allow for obtaining
evidence is a violation of due process for these qualifying
?ppellants. Cross examination is a critical way to get accurate
o Bnd concise answers to questions bearing obtaining evidence and is
-4-
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obtain~ present and argue the issues on these merits, the burden of
Notwithstanding the HCPC's failure to allow appellants to
ma~datory cross examination in Gnldberg v. Kellv •
beyond the compelling circumstances ofrEquired and even goes
proof that adverse effects would not occur rests with the applicant
(Rule 12.6) In Rpynolds Metals Co.v YTurbid~, 258 F.2d 321--t195R )
~here a cattle ran~her brought action to recover for poisonir]
ema~ating from an aluminum reduction plant, the court ruled that:
In determining standard of reasonable conduct, actor should
recognize that his conduct involves a risk of causing invasion
on another's interest if a person possessing such superior
perception as actor himself has would infer that act creates
an appreciable chance of causing such invasion.
An inadequate discovery process, coupled with a) glaring
deficiencies of the application to meet the detailFd information
inability to address an ever changing project de~cription, led
that the process and record would be inadequate to protect the
of a full hearing are necessary for an accurate record by which
theby
The requirements
illusive replip~ of
appellants' sub~eg~pntand c)
b) vague and
on which the HCPC had no business
mediation that the HCPC added to Rule 12
it must not be encumbered
hea.ring ;the
constitutionally protected interests of the appellants
"mediation"
Appellants contend that a full adjudicatory hearing could
incomplete record
or
preserved these minimum due process rights.
rpguirements of Rule 12.3;
appellee during
but that are not part of HRS 205-5.1.
All these failures of procedure resulted in a guarantee
traditional trappings of
reaching a decision.
to an
ha.ve
case"
HCPC can base a decision. Whether this hearing is called "contested
fundamental
and inadequate for purposes of decision making.
-5-
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B. THE HAWAII COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION DID MAKE PROCEDURAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE ·ERROR IN GRANTING GRP-l.
Planning Department was in error in acknowledging
application as proper and complete (ROA 2). Even if the Environ-
mental Assessment is taken to be part of the application, hearing
participants and agencies concluded information contained in them
to be inadequate (Roa @57, Tr 4/11/89 A 41).
It would be reasonable for HNEI to provide information
on the consequences of exploratory drilling, for beyond the wells
the project itself drills, the SOH program specifically includes
actions by developers holding the exploratory leases on the same
lands. State sponsored exploration in an area heretofore devoted
to intensive agriculture, as the area surrounding SOH2,must account
for its full range of effects, not just a small part of the
appropriated $3 million for this effort with cost sharing from
M2lama Aina. 0 Koolau v Pacarro 4 Haw App 304 that "development"
such as was presented by HNEI. This court ruled in Hui
"The Hawaii State Legislature has
The industry side of the equation
The HNEI EA states
program,
privCl.te developers." (RDA 2(6)
includes that which is planned.
was never described to the HCPC.
Further some findings of the HCPC were erronious because
thE full scope and intentions of the SOH project were not
submitted as part of the application or mediator's report.
The siting of the SOH holes was never specific in the
application. The Answering Brief calls the HNEI plan "preliminary"
( P 24). The commission had they known that many changes would be
rna.de in the plan and application would and should have sent it
-6-
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tack until the application had some substance that co~ld ba
counted on to· base a decision.
The argument of too strict time restraint on mediation
proce~"s is offered by appellants not only as a violation of due
process but as a unanimous response of mediants and mediators (ROA
unwillingness of HNEI to cooperate freely with informational
@210) • In this case~ dLte to the complexity of issues i:l.nd
requEsts~ 30 days proved too short a time to obtain all the facts
sought and pertinent to an accurate assessment of the adverse
effects on appellants.
Appellee also misreads Mediator's Report as to
r2commendations. In a contested case hearing as before the HCPC,
~ recommendation is "setting forth findings of fact, conclusion of
and the reasons therefot-e and a recommended order •. II (Rules of
~~s made by mediator to recommend the set of conditions present~d
£ranted under any condition (ROA 210).
Howevel~ on I y one
This definition of
for mediation.
HCPC 4-29).
reasonableis
few ffiediants who were "emphatic" that the permit must not be
r:=occmmendation
by a.
agreement was reported reached between all parties, and no attemp~
P~actice and Procedure,
The Mediator's Report also devotes 2 pages to a critique
of Rule 1'"..L.~ • Many of these aspects should be included in revision
No accountability for statements made
1. Time constraints were too severe
2. No record of proceedings! nothing binding
These include:of Rule 12.
4. No subpoena power
5. No provision for the community to review the mediator's
report before it becomes finalized.
-7-
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statemeGts we~e submitted afte~ mediation closed without commission
app~oval o~ mediants' ~eview.
The ~eco~d does show (RDA 210) that DDED and HNEI
Appellants a~gument that a second publi r hea~ing was
requi~pd is based on Rule 12-5-1(n). HCPC may hold a hearing if
the~e we~e unresolved mediation issues, of which the~e ~Jere many.
But fu~ther, the HCPC is bound by the constitution to allow all
evidence to be hea~d. In this case, HNEI had admitted during
medi2.ticn, cont~ary to its application and EA that there would be
emissions of H2S and other non condensible gases. Furthe~, the
effect of these emissions will be a seve~e detriment to
appellants. Unde~ the crite~ia for issuance of a GRP (12-6) the
HCPC should have pe~mitted a hearing on these effects and de~anded
a demonstration by the applicant that emissions would not have
unreasonable adverse health, environmental, or socio-economic
in the belief it was substantive and would have been in violation
questi~n to their attention but was denied acceptance of her letter
may have acted in a void of inadequate knowledge of this new
to be substantive but to let the HCPC know they had an
(See Mahuiki v Planning Commission gene~ally). The HCPCeffects.
Appellant JEnnife~ P2r~y attempted to bring this p~ocedural
evid2nc2 if they had not carefully read the mediators ~epo~t.
intended
cf accepted p~ocedu~es fo~ public hearings (Apppndix 1). It was not
obligation to hea~ all new evidence and we~e obligated to allow
appellants a hea~ing in which to present and a~gue this evidence.
Appellants see a resulting abuse of discretion because
HCPC was not willing to spend any more time listening to
-:-~.. appellants p~esent more evidence. Such lette~ presented but not
-8-
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accepted by the clerk of the HCPC was unconstitution~lly rejEcted.
There could, have been a review procedure to determine if it w~s
substantive or procedural. Denial of its acceptance and thus
denial of a second hearing were serious errors tc the detriment of
~ppellants.
The Mediator by accepting the July 10 letters (RDA 210)
ad~itted new evidence into the record in violation of rule 12 and
HCPC rules of Practice and Procedure. This letter states a
contradiction to the application and to applicants' testimony
presented at the public hearing. To wit:
1. Regarding emissions:
"There .~i 11 be no gaseoi..ls emissions, II (Tr 4/11/89 @33); v.
" ••• to restrict all emissions from the holes, to the greatest
degree possible, after drilling that will allow us to obtain
monitoring information from the well," RDA 210
2. Regarding project scope:
"This is a stand alone project .. (Tr 4/11/89 @37)~ v.
"The immediate objectives of the program are ••• to stimulate
ccml1·,el-ci.,s.l development of Hawaii's geothermal reSOL\rCes," ROA 210.
3& Regarding time limitations:
"The impact of the program will be temporary •••
be flo ... tested" (Tr 5/9/89 @ 122), v.
The holes will not
" ••• can be monitored throughout the development life of the field
and will permit regulatory agencies to evaluate the long term
irr,p.~:::ts of fluid wi thdrawal frcm or reinj ection in to the f ield ~ "
ROA 210
Further~ some of the information contained in t~ese
illegally admitted statements contain new information. This court
should find these two documents in ROA 210 were received after the
close of the public hearing thereby not giving appellants the
chane: to rebut the new substantive changes to the application, in
-9-
violation of appellants due process as required in Waikiki Shore
Inc.v Zoning Board of Appeals 2 Haw.App.43, 6?5 P.2d 1044 (1981)
Appellants do not expect this court to sift through the
re=ord. We believe this should have been done by the HCPC
staff to arrive at an accurate finding of fact and conclusion of
restrictive time constraints of HRS 205 and the abuse of
1c:.w. But through the deficiencies of Rule 12, the overly
discretion in dealing with new inportant information, the record
has come up to this court seriously deficient.
CONCLUSION
The appellants seek to have the record remanded to
1. acquire full disclosure of applicants intentions and technical
aspects of this project;
2. to be able to adequately present their own testimony c:.nd argue
a~pellee's points; and
In order to accomplish this, Rule 12 procedures will have
significant interest of appellants, or by rewriting the procedure
Rule 12 to the HCPC with directives as to truly preserving the
This can be accomplished by remanding theto be changed (amended).
3. to produce a reviewable record.
in this court.
Dated: Hi 10 ~ Hawa i i _-,;l:"-"'f,d~rs-."-:T-ffi..J.-~""-- _I 7
.!:•• -
-.';"
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KAPOHO GROWN
P.O. BOX 537
Pahoa, Hawaii 96778
808-965-8699
.July lE:, 19E:9
-h~ mediator's report
'..11-'; C";;.'. h'". t..",n 1:: i <). t.pej rn03.n y 0 f
you "".rE\
tho:;: HNE I' 5
reviewinq ha~"",
s te;. t.emen t s •
left
f"E:'1" ·1.- of t.he n=-'-:::\~::;on fDt- this is t.hc.t the Stab? arid HI\IEI' ,=; " s t.<'.,t.'='ll,,·::.;r·,t,"S c'i
pc:,,:;i.tiDn" ~'j(0t-o,", s;ut.rmit.ted 2.fter· t.he iTH?di.·':-ltion r:we,cess end€:.;d 0.-, ,Jul"! ~:.
'··ht:·.':""'::? ·:=:.t;·:'.t.t:;ITH·?n·t:s v4et-e int.ended "'-'IS:; t.he la'=';1:: l'iOI-d -"'rid c.. t-ebutC:l.l 0"" tr-,t"
C:Qmlllu.rlit.y'~::. re,:\SCiilS -for deni.al (which l.Alet-e distributed to <:\11 pdy"j-..:ies.
(11...Ir-~.n;J iflf.?d:i..:\t.:!.l.:m) ~ bU.t l'li:::.'n? put fOt--I-J,:,rd so mediat.ion p03.r-tic}.pE:•. n·;--<::.
c: c.u. 1 ,j ,'.0 t. l·'(':!\.' i el-J t h(;?tT1 •
Yhose statements should not be part of the report and the community
~;hDLl.ld be given thf? opportunity tCJ discu.ss w.i.t.h 1:h~? F'l.:.'tnning [:()mmiss.i(jr'
·'·!·IC:'; bt'::lt:.L~ .=.:i.ncl HNEl' s Ilm.i.st.~'.t2rnents" '::Ind othet- i telfrS l'lhic.h ."!''''t-,,? left
':1\..1: 0 f -1... he. t"r:::' po Y- t .
We u~derstand the difficulties you face in your decision making and ask
th~~ you deny the rermit application in view of the commu.nitips reason~
-j:or- ,jen :i.;:~.1 sl_\bmi t f..:t:>d in thf.? illed iE:ltors r'E·'port •
.~--------_.----
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the points not argued .
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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS DELAN PERRY,JENNIFER PERRY, AND NELSON HO
TO ANSWERING BRIEF OF HAWAII COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION
A. DUE PROCESS WAS IN FACT DENIED BY HAlrJAI I COUNTY PLAt·mINI:.:
COMMISSlnN PROCEDURE AND HRS 205-5.1.
Appellants have argued they meet the two step test of
Aqu;ar v. Hawaii Housing Authority, 522 P.2d 1255, 55 Haw 478
(1974) to establish their qualification for due process protecticn
of their residence and farm business and the procedures violated in
their Reply Brief to HNEI and will not repeat them here. Appellants
affirm they have a significant property interest in six parcels
adjacent to and in near proximity to the SOH 2 site. These property
i~tere5ts are part of the record at Tr 4/1/89 @ 51-57, ROA 208 and
others. These interests go far beyond those referred to in Sandy
B~Arh D~fpnse Fund v. City Council of the City and County of
Honnlulu. 70 Haw 361, 773 P.2d 250 (1989) and amount to their and
their employees economic, health, safety and well being as well as
aesthetic and environmental reasons.
The procedures which violated due process are:
1. Time restraints at hearing did not allow full oral presentation
or arguments;
2. Inability to obtain all evidence from applicant; and
substituted for a contested case hearing.
substitute a mediation process for a contested case process, the
In seeking to institute HRS 205-5.1 amendments to
in the issuance of GRP-1 were
The Rule 12 procedures used by the Hawaii County Planning
Commission (hereinafter HCPC)
3. No record of mediation made to preserve an adequate record.
HCPC did not preserve the substantial rights of appellants.
-1-
hRS 205-5.1 broadened the scope of standing to
participate in the procedure to "any party who sub~itt=d COMmeGt ~t
the public hearing." The process was given time r-estrictior.s which
could be e:: tended by the HCPC. However, the Rule 12 procedures
that were adopted failed to incorporate the principals of due
process that they replaced~ including that substantial rights of
petitioners have been prejudiced, decision was made upon unla~ful
procedure, and that not all the evidence was presented.
Some part of this Rule 12 needed to address the rights
of appellants with significant property interests. As such, th?
whGle pu.blic hearing and mediation components must be in concert
to .;.11 Ol'J all the facts in the matter to be presented to the
Commission. The combination of grossly limiting testimony
by interested parties with specific property rights and th~n net
<3.1 lowing their full presentations made during mediation to be made
via not allowing an accurate record of mediation to bE' ~:.ept
{1.2-5-!-1,m) caused an undue burden to fallon the mediator. The
~2diator was not to impose a settlement on the parties (12-5-1-h).
The mediator was required, ~ith no aid of an accurate record to
make a recommandation (12-5-1-m) based on any mediation agreeffients.
The only agreements ever made with all pa.rties was (RDA 210) that
t~e County should develop an enforcement program. The statements
that the public hearing was not intended to allow all facts to be
agreement which could have been presented as a recommendation.
by various
those represented an
the Planning Commission acknowledged
the mediators report were submittedin
The Chairman of
presented
individuals and groups and none of
presented by asking for summaries, reading of first and last
-2-
~aragraphs, speed it up (Tr 4/11/69 @ 55, 60, 69).
The mediation process was expected to find areas of
agreement &nd disagreement 6mong various groups and individuals.
closing of mediation on July 7, 1989.
discussions and was never the comprehensive document it sho~ld
~umerous points ffiediants had asked the mediator to include i~ the
they were expecting it to.
No review of the document was made prior to
the mediator's report only highlighted various
-aport were omitted.
However~
have been to present to the Planning Commission the missing facts
(recommendations and agreements)
The ~CPC limited time in anticipation that the
mediator's report would fill the void of what is an extremely
complex and potentially devastating project: geothermal
dev2lopment of the hazardous Hawaiian resource in close pro>:imity
to neighboring homes and businesses and farms.TR 5/9/89 @ 26,
TR 4/11/89 @69.
B. THE HAWAII COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION DID ERR BY ACCEPTING AN
APPLICATION WHICH WAS PRELIMINARY, DEVOID OF DETAIl AND HAS
SUBSEQUFNTLY BEEN CHANGED BY HNEI.
The HCPC recognizing the technical complexity of the
SOH project should have required substantially more detail than the
often one sentence statements made in order to address the many
details required of Rule 12-3. Some of these points have still not
been submitted to the Planning Commision even after drillinJ has
begun such as pre-exploration meteorological and ambient air
quality measurements (Rule 12-3-1).
Additionally Appellee HNEI never submitted an accurate
.~
statment of project scope (12-3-B) which, had it been submitted,
would have required far more information as to the adverse effects
-3-
of project noise, air emissions and groundwater contamination on
neighbors.
The HCPC should have rejected the application
initi~lly. The HNEI attempted to hide the true s~ope of its project
in order to avoid submission of proper information as well as to
avoid Department of Health permit procedures.(TR 5/9/89 @137-141)
The HNEI project is iutended to open up new areas to geot~errnal
developmert that will adversely affect the property intere=ts of
3.;:lpellants.
Whether or not the Environmental Assessment m2t the
requirments of HRS 343-5a(1), the more stringent requirements of
12-5-3 should have been met and were not.
The lack of the details in the application th~t should
have been a part of the application has allowed HNEI to
5ignificantly move the sites of wells, change drill rigs, nat g=t
~OH approval of its air quality and waste water controls, all
~fter the permit was granted. All of these have affected
~eighbor's property interests and will affect apellants' property
Lntarests when HNEI drills SOH2.
C. THE RECORD ON WHICH THE HAWAII COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION
GRANTED GRP-l WAS INADEQUATE.
The purpose of mediation was to report agreements and
~pplicant speaker at the first public hearing was known fro~ the
non agreements of parties and develop a recommendation (12-5-!-m).
to be a part of the 3RP-1
which was requested by the first nonMediation,
begginning of the public hearing
procedure.
tiRS 205-5.1 clearly states that mediation is an integral part of
the information gathering process preceeding a decision. I' •.• the
-4-
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information thus developed in mediation must be submitted as part
,;:,.ppropriate request for mediation from any party •••• (205-5~1e)" The
county authority shall conduct a public hearing. Upon
of the report, in order that the HCPC could conclude that "the
desired use would not have unreasonable adverse health,
surrounding property
environmental or socio-economic effects on residents and
(205- 5.1-e-1)." The requirements of
12-5-I,K,j,i clearly compromise the mediator's ability to prepare
a report that can adequately answer ·the tests of 205-5-e-1. Thus
HCPC rules made it impossible that the record would be aedequate
and complete. In fact, many arguments, points, and some expert
witness's statements were not included. Their inclusion would
have caused the HCPC to rule the appellant had nat demonstrated
undue advers2 effects.
mediator's report would have led to a different determination.
cannot conclude that the conditions attached to GRP-1 adequately
Missing information contained in theprotect appellants rights.
Answering Brief of appellant County of Hawaii (p.14)
In fact, HNEI,through their admission in mediation (RDA
210, Community Statement) admitted that there will be gaseous air
emissions in violation of GRP-1 condition #8 that "unabated open
venting of geothermal steam shall be prohibited" (RDA 183). This
new evidence was crucial in that it was the first realization and
confirmation of gaseous emissions as not stated anywhere in the
record and contrary to previous admissions of the applicant.
-5-
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p. THE MEDIATION PROCEDURE WAS VIOLATED BY THE HAWAII COUNTY
PLANNING COMMISSION.
Contrary to Answering Brief @16, the Medi~tor's report
makes no recommendation. In fact it clear1f states in several
plac2s that "all community members in these discus5ions (on
cond i tic.ns) livere emphatic that the permit should not be granted
under any condition (Sec 2 ROA 210) There was only one general
The lack recommendation demonstrates the failure of Rule
represe~ted all those who filed for mediation.
agreement. This agreement did not become a permit condition:
which listed reasons fer denial w~ich
list of agreements to condition was the wcrk
to sit in jUdgement of the information gathering and
subset of mediants and should not detract from ~he
The other
Ii fTied i.,3 t~r II
That the County should develop an enforcement program within
six months for geothermal. Said program to be developed in
consultation with the community and developers.
the mediation procedure. Such inability of a traditionally defined
12 to properly judge the points of fact that were brought out in
"CGffiiTLlni ty statement"
of a small
assessment process may have caused the HCPC to discount the report,
diminishing the value of the only avenue open to ap~ellants to
gather irformation albeit the appellees did their best not to
answer any questions put to them. In fact, the madi?tior's rEport
de~ot2s 2 ~ag2s to criticizing Rule 12 (ROA 210)
The Answering Brief of HCPC makes no challenge to the
appellants statement of question #8 that the mediator did extend
~ the time of mediation in violation of 12-5.1g by allowing the HNEI
-:t
",,:'
;,.;.-
and state opportunity for unrefuted rebuttal after the close of
=:-
mediation bu.t included in mediator's report as "St';.te's Position
-6-
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:oJ~y the SOH Project Should be Approved", and HN::::I' s "Statemer,t of
Position on Scientific Observation Holes" submitted on July 10,
1989). Such unilateral granting rebuttal to the appellees after the
close 0f mediation on July 6, 1989 served to undermine appellants
statements and discredit their conclusions. Such inclLsion was
objected to an July 6, 1989 by appellant Delan Perry to the
mediators. The rebuttal in fact included new information on H2S
emissions, project life, use of data by regulatory agencies, and
flaw testing.
E. THE HAWAII COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION DID ERRONEOUSLY REFUSE
TO ACCEPT PUBLIC COMMENTS
At the August 8, 1989 meeting of the HCPC with a duly
published agenda item relating to GRP-l appellants did try to
bring to the attention of the commission that there WctS new
information available, gained during mediation, that necessitated
a se~ond pwblic hearing. Appellants had authority to raise such
procedural questions as a court must answer a motion. No other
means was open to bringing up the possibility of procedural error
by affected parties.
F. THF HAWAII COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION WAS IN ERROR IN NOT
NOT HOLDING A SECOND PUBLIC HEARING AFTER MEDIATION.
The HCPC having learned, via the community statement of
the ,nediator's report and the illegally admitted State and HNEI
statements of position, that HNEI had admitted there would be H2S
emissions, should have held a second public hearing.
The adverse effects of H2S emissions on surrounding
property values, crops, human health, and employee satisfaction is
~ell documented. The appellant should have been required, during a
second public hearing to prove that there would be no adverse
-7-
effects from these emissions. No demonstration was made that H2S
emissions would not have unreasonable effects and thus, the
Commission's refusal
discretion.
to hold a second public hearing abused their
Among other consequences of the admissions of emission,
HNEI would have been required to obtain an Authority To Construct
permit from the DOH.
The reasoned conclusion of the Commission required
evidence that H2S emisisons as well as a project life to
monitoring the SOHs throughout the development life of the fields
(30years) would not adversely affect appellant's substantial
interests. No such showing was made. The burden of this showing Nas
on the applicant (HRS 205-5.1,e). In Mahuiki v.Planning
Commission 65 Haw 511 (1982) this court ruled that:
The Planning Commission made no finding that the development
would "not have any substantial adverse evnironmental or
e::ological effect", or that the adverse effect was "clearly
oLltweighed by public health and safety" prior to approval.
Appellants do not expect this Court to comb the reccrd
?t hand. Appellants allege that the record is inadequate ~o
support the findings and decision of the HCPC. See American Can
Co v Davis, 28 Or.App.207~216, 559 P.2d 898,905(1977) • Kilauea
Neighbnrhnod v Land Use Commission 751 P.2d 1031 (1988)
Agency's findings must be sufficient to allow reviewing CGurt
to tract steps by which agency reached its decision. HRS 91-14
CONCLUSION
Procedural error, invalidity of portions of Rule 12, and
.~. loss of due process in protecting their substantial property
interests were committed by the Commission. Therefore appellants
Delan Perry, Jennifer Perry and Nelson Ho requests this court to
-8-
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~emand the Commissions issuance of GRP-l and promulgate new rules.
Dated Hila, Hawaii __~~=~~~__I_~_I_/~9_1__0 __
DELAN PEFcRY, pr
J~~e
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On December 14, 1989, Respondent Hawaii County Planning
Commission received a copy of the Motion to Remand filed by
Appellant Pele Defense Fund dated December 11, 1989. Respondent
Hawaii County Planning Commission asks that this motion be
denied, because it is premature.
The present appeal is brought directly t~ the Hawaii
Supreme Court pursuant to HRS §205-5.l. Appellant seeks to
overturn the decision by Respondent Hawaii County Planning
Commission to grant a geothermal resource permit to Respondent
Hawaii Natural Energy Institute. In aadition to the Motion to
Remand, Appellant Pele Defense Fund, on December 4, 1989, filed
a Motion to Extend Time to File Opening Brief. In support of
this Motion to Extend Time to File Opening Brief, Appellant Pele
Defense Fund filed an affidavit by its attorney, Anthony L.
Ranken, which stated, in part:
Both appeals will RLin~ipally focus upon ~
proc~~icienciesof HRS §2QS-S.l the statute
providing for the issuance of geothermal resource
permits. (emphasis supplied)
Assuming that Appellant Pele Defense Fund intends to argue
that §205-S.l is defective, the Motion to Remand is premature.
If the case were remanded to the Hawaii County Planning
Commission for the taking of more evidence, the decision on the
permit would still be controlled by HRS §20S-5.l. If the permit
were granted, Appellant would still be able to appeal to the
Supreme Court, still alledging defects in the statute.
Therefore, it would be a misuse of time to remand for further
hearings while the constitutionality and legality of HRS
§20S-S.1 is in question. A decision on the constitutionality
and legality could possibly render the motion to remand moot.
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This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to HRS
§ 20S-S.1(g). HRS § 20S-S.1(g) provides for direct appeal to
this Court from the decision to issue a geothermal resource
permit made by the Hawaii County Planning Commission.
After a hearing on August 15, 1989, conducted in
accordance with the procedures set forth in HRS § 20S-S.1(e)
and (f) and Rule 12, Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Hawaii County Planning Commission, the Hawaii County Planning
Commission granted a geothermal resource permit to Hawaii
Natural-Energy Institute (HNEI), The University of Hawaii, and
The Research Corporation of the University of Hawaii (RCUB).
AppeLlant timely filed a Notice of Appeal with the Hawaii
2
-:,;
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County Planning Commission on September 14, 1989, which was
docketed in this Court on September 25, 1989.
Appellant contends in this appeal that the
provisions of HRS §§ 205-5.1 and Rule 12, Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Hawaii County Planning Commission are
unconstitutional because they do not require that a contested
case hearing be conducted by the Hawaii County Planning
Commission prior to the issuance of a geothermal resource
permit. Further, appellant claims the Hawaii County Planning
Commisslon made various procedural and substantive errors in
the decision to grant the permit. HNEI proposed to conduct a
Scientific Observation Hole program to evaluate the geology,
hydrology and sub-surface thermal regime in the Puna District
of the Island of Hawaii within the Geothermal Resource
Subzones of the Kilauea Middle and Lower East Rift Zones by
the drilling of four exploratory wells. The wells were to be
instrumented to take measurements and provide data of the
geothermal resource and are not designed as production wells
to produce fluids, or to be flow tested. RA 1 and 183.
Because exploration is defined as a "geothermal development
3
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activity· under HRS § 20S-S.l(a), HNEI was required to obtain
a geothermal resource permit for its project. This case
arises from the issuance of a geothermal resource permit to
Hawaii Natural Energy Institute, University of Hawaii, and The
Research Corporation of the University of Hawaii by the Hawaii
County Planning Commission.
HRS §§ 20S-5.l(e) and (f) set forth the procedure to
be followed by the Hawaii County Planning Commission in the
issuance of a geothermal resource permit:
1. The Commission must conduct a public
hearing after the receipt of an
application.
2. Mediation may be requested by any party
who submitted comment at the public
hearing. This request must be made
within five days after the close of the
hearing.
3. In the event a request for mediation is
made the Commission must appoint a
mediator within five days after receipt
of the request for mediation.
4. The Commission must give notice to any
person who submitted a request for
mediation of the date, time, and place of
mediation conference. This notice must
be mailed no later than ten days before
the commencement of the mediation
conference. The conference is required
to be held on the island where the public
hearing is held.
4
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s. The Commission shall require the parties
to participate in mediation.
The mediator must not be an employee of
any county agency or its staff.
7. The mediation period must not extend
beyond thirty days after mediation has
commenced unless approved by the
Commission.
8. Mediation must be confined to the issues
raised at the public hearing by the party
requesting mediation.
9. The mediator will submit a written
recommendation to the Commission, based
upon any mediation agreement reached
between the parties for consideration by
the Commission in its final decision.
10. If there is no mediation agreement, the
Commission may conduct a second public
hearing to receive additional comment
related to the mediation issues. Within
ten days after the second public hearing,
the Commission may receive additional
written comment on the issues raised at
the second public hearing from any party.
11. The Commission shall consider the
comments raised at the second hearing
before rendering its final decision.
12. The Commission shall then determine
whether a geothermal resource permit
shall be granted to authorize the
geothermal development activities
described in the application. The
Commission shall grant the permit if it
finds that the applicant has demonstrated
that:
5
a. The desired uses would not have
unreasonable adverse health,
environmental, or socio-economic
effects on residents or surrounding
property;
b. The desired uses would not
unreasonably burden pUblic agencies
to provide roads and streets,
sewers, water, drainage, school
improvements, and police and fire
protection; and
c. That there are reasonable measures
available to mitigate the
unreasonable adverse effects or
burdens referred to above.
13. The Commission must make a decision on
the application within six months of the
date a complete application was filed.
The time limit may be extended by mutual
agreement between the applicant and the
Commission.
The Record shows that the Commission complied with
the requirements set forth in HRS §§ 205-5.1(e) and (f).
Application for the permit was filed with the Hawaii County
Planning Department, RA 1. As part of its normal review
procedure, comments from cooperating agencies were requested
by the staff of the Hawaii County Planning Commission. RA 3
and 5. Such comments noted how the proposed use would affect
the public agencies providing services such as roads and
streets, sewers, water, civil defense, and other public
6
Record also shows that numerous comments were received from
as required by Rule l2-5(c}, (d) and (e), Rules of Practice
services. RA 4,6,7,11,12,13,14,15,17,34,41,56 and
59. Also, upon receipt of the Negative Declaration for the
--
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project, the staff requested comments from cooperating
agencies, RA 46, which noted how the proposed use would affect
the health, environment, or community. RA 55, 57 and 63. The
the community. All of these comments were utilized in forming
the staff recommendation to the Planning Commission. RA 207.
Prior to the hearing, notice of the public hearing
and Procedure of the Hawaii County Commission, was given to
all property owners within 300 feet of the affected property,
all residents within 1,000 feet of the perimeter boundary of
the affected property, and all owners of all property
described in the permit application. Published notice was
also provided. RA 8, 16, 18, 19, 31, 139 and 145. Appellant
received notice of the hearing. RA 31 (p. 33). Before
proceeding to a hearing, the Planning Department acknowledged
that the application was a proper and complete application
which included supporting data. RA 47.
The Hawaii County Planning Commission conducted a
public hearing on April 11, 1989. RA 212. Testimony from
7
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approximately 29 witnesses was received. RA 212. Written
testimony was also received. RA 208, Appendix B-3. Upon
reaching the "end of the list of people who had signed up to
speak," RA 212, p. 127, 11.12-13, the Hawaii County Planning
Commission voted to continue the hearing and to view the site.
RA 100 and 212, p. 140, 11.23-25, p. 141, 11.1-17.
When the hearing reconvened on May 9, 1989, further
testimony, both oral and written, were received.
Approximately 45 witnesses testified. RA 213, 208, and
Appendix B-. The Hawaii County Planning Commission
accommodated some of the same witnesses who had testified at
the April hearing by permitting them time to testify at the
continued hearing in May. Among such witnesses, Appellant was
permitted to testify twice. RA 212, p. 51; RA 213, p. Ill.
(His wife, Jennifer Perry was also allowed to testify at both
hearing times. RA 212, p. 57; RA 213, p. 108.) The hearing
was closed on May 9, 1989. RA 213, p. 148, 11.6-11. The
first of several requests for mediation (RA 209; RA 212, p.
40, 11.3-5) was made during the hearing by Harry Kim, Civil
Defense Director, County of Hawaii, as part of his testimony.
RA 98 and 212, p. 40, 11.3-5. Dee Dee Letts, Program on
Alternative Dispute Resolution, The Judiciary, State of
8
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Hawaii, and Dr. Kim Lowry, Department of Urban and Regional
planning, University of Hawaii, were appointed mediators. RA
166 and 168. The mediators were assisted by Richard Spiegel,
West Hawaii Mediation Services. RA 176 and 210 (p. 5).
Mediation meetings ~ere held on nine days from June 7, 1989 to
July 7, 1989. RA 176 and 210 (p. 5). Appellant participated
in the mediation. RA 176 and 210 (Appendices, p. 28). A
report was submitted by the mediators, reflecting areas of
agreement and of no agreement. RA 176 and 210 (pp. 16-21).
Requiring additional time to consider the report submitted by
the mediators, the Hawaii County Planning Commission obtained
an agreement to extend the time within which to make a
decision on the application. RA 178 and 180. At the action
meeting on August 8, 1989 the Hawaii County Planning
Commission approved the permit, RA 181, and issued GRP No.1
to HNEI, and RCUH on August 15, 1989. RA 183. The permit
imposed 26 conditions to control and mitigate any adverse
effects, RA 183 (pp. 4-11). Condition No. 25 provides for a
public hearing -to gather additional input regarding the
impact of the activities at SOH 4." RA 183 (p. 10). Work on
..
SOH 4 is to commence first. Condition No. 25 also provides
for status reports to be submitted to the Hawaii County
9
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Planning Commission, which will review them in order to verify
compliance with the conditions. RA 183 (p. 10).
The applicable standard of review is set forth in
HRS S 205-5.1(g) which provides for an appeal directly on the
record, governed by HRS § 91-14(b) and (g), notwithstanding
the lack of a contested case hearing. HRS § 91-14(g) provides
that the decision of an agency, after a review of the record,
may be reversed or modified if the substantial rights of the
petitioners have been prejudiced because the administrative
findings, conclusions, decisions, or orders are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or
statutory provisions; or
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or
jurisdiction of the agency; or
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(4) Affected by other error of law; or
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the
reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary, or capr icious, or
characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion.
10
•Further, a review of the decision of an agency includes
the recognition that:
In order to preserve the function of
administrative agencies in discharging
their delegated duties and the function
of this court in reviewing agency
determination, a presumption of validity
is accorded to decisions of
administrative bodies acting within their
sphere of expertise and one seeking to
upset the order bears 'the heavy burden
of making a convincing showing that it is
invalid because it is unjust and
unreasonable in its consequences.'
In_Le-Ha~aii_~le~tLi~_~i~ht_CQ£L_In~£,60 Haw. 625,
630, 594 P.2d 612, 617 (1979) (quoting r~g~Lal_eQ~eL
CQmmiQQiQn_YA_HQQ~_HatULal_GaQ_CQ£,320 u.s. 591, 602 (1944).
Under the clearly erroneous standard of review of
administrative decisions in the Hawaii Administrative
Procedure Act, a reviewing court will not reverse the decision
of. the agency unless examination of the complete record leaves
the court with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made. A~Qal~g_~~_~ee, 66 Haw. 425, 664 P.2d 734
(1983). Findings of fact are reviewable for clear error;
conclusions of law are freely reviewable. Kila~~a
Hei~hQQLhQQd_AQQ~n£-Y£_~Qng_UQe-CQmmiQQiQn_Qf_th~_StQt~_Qf
Ha~Qii, 7A Haw. App. 11884, 751 P.2d 1031 (1988). The
11
standard of review employed by an appellate court in reviewing
constitutional and statutory issues is the right/wrong
standard. SGM_fQ~tn~rab1Q_~_H~laQn,5 Haw App. 526, 705 P.2d
49 (1985).
A. Is HRS S§ 205-5.l(e) and (f) on its face in
violation of the due process clause of the state and federal
constitutions?
B. Are there valid claims of procedural and
substantive error in the decision by the Hawaii County
Planning Commission requiring an order of remand by this
Court?
v• ARGUt1~HI
A. The due process clause does not require more
process than the provisions for two hearings
Qnd-ID~d12t1Qn_1n_RRS_ii_~[~=~~li~l_Qnd_if~_
Appellant contends that because HRS S 205-5.1 did
not require the Hawaii County Planning Commission to conduct a
contested case proceeding prior to issuing a geothermal
resource permit to HNEI, his constitutional right to
12
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procedural due process under article I, section 5 of the
Hawaii Constitution was violated. Among his chief complaints
with the permit process received appear to be the imposition
of time constraints in connection with the hearing and the
mediation, and the inability to conduct cross examination of
the applicant. Appellant's Br. at 8, 14 and 17 •
This court follows the traditional two-step analysis
for procedural due process claims enunciated by the u.s.
Supreme Court in applying the Fourteenth Amendment. Under
this test, this Court considers whether the particular
interest which the claimant seeks to protect by a hearing is
property within the meaning of the due process clauses, and,
then, if so, what specific procedures are required to protect
it. SanQ~_a~akn_o~f~n~~_E~nQ_Y~_'1~~_'Q~nk1l_Qf-tb~-C1t~_anQ
'Qun~~_Qf_HQnQlulu, 70 Haw. 361, 773 P.2d 250 (1989) (citing
AgU1at_Y~_Ra~a11_RQu~1ng_AutnQt1t~,55 Haw. 478, 495, 522 P.2d
1255, 1266 (1974». As part of this Court's discussion as to
the level of interest which qualifies as "property" within the
meaning'of the constitution required in order to assert a
right to procedural due process, this Court quoted aQatQ_Qf
Begent~_Y~~Qtb, 408 u.s. 564, 577, 92 s. Ct. 2701, 2709, 33
L. Ed. 2d 548, 561 (1972):
13
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•To have a property interest in a benefit, a
person clearly must have more than an abstract
need or desire for it. He must, instead, have
a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.
70 Haw. at 377. (citation omitted.)
Appellant expresses some vague concerns that his
property and physical well-being may possibly be threatened.
Appellant's Br. at 16. "Procedural due process protects only
against a deprivation of liberty or property interests." See,
raE,li_L-ll'llt-.tel.a.r 713 P. 2d 943, 956 (Haw. 1986) (also ci t1ng
a~g~d_~f_BegentQ_Y~-B~tb,408 U.S. 564 (1972». Moreover, he
does not develop an argument to support the requisite property
interest entitled to invoke procedural protection consistent
with due process in the jUdicial sense. For example,
Appellant merely expresses fear of possible danger associated
with geothermal wells but fails to elaborate and to articulate
a basic need of which he had been deprived.
The fact that a party may be "specially, personally
and adversely affected by the agency's action, Life_~f_tbe
LgndL_rn~£_Y~_L'lnd-UQe-C~mmiaQi~n,61 Haw. 3, 8, 594 P.2d 1079
(1979) , "has no bearing on whether for Due Process purposes one
has "a legitimate claim of entitlement." Moreover, "[T]he
opportunity granted abutting landowners and aggrieved persons
to appeal decisions of planning and zoning commissions is
14
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purely procedural and does not give rise to an independent
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." E~~~Q_~
S~Q~~_Qf-CQnn~~~1~~~, 815 F.2d 201,205-06 (2d eire 1987).
In order to present a "property interest" warranting
protection as a matter of procedural due process, a litigant
claiming a potential government benefit must present
"plausible arguments" or "arguable issues" justifying the
granting of that benefit. Cl~Y~lQng-aQQtQ-Qf_~g~~Q~1Qn_~
ILQ~g~tm111, 470 u.s. 532, 544, (1985) (analyzing "process due"
prong). Process does not exist for its own sake, and "[a]n
expectation of receiving process is not, without more, [a]n
interest protected by the Due Process Clause." Q11m_Y~
~Q~1n~~QnQ' 461 u.s. 238, 250 n. 12 (1983). Appellant cites
no authority that the interest he has rises to the level of
"property" meriting due process protection. Even if we
assume, Qtg~~nQQ, that Appellant's interest (however
characterized) constitutes "property" within the meaning of
the due process clause, no valid claim, requiring that a
contested case proceeding be conducted prior to the issuance
of a geothermal resource permit, can be presented.
In SanQ~-a~Q~b_Q~f~n~~-E~nQ_Y~-C1~~_CQun~11_Qf_~b~
C1~~_and_CQunt~_Qf_aQnQlul~,70 Haw. 361, 773 P.2d 250 (1989),
15
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this Court discusses at length the process due a claimant
demonstrating "a legitimate claim of entitlement." This Court
states:
Due process is not a fixed concept
requiring a specific procedural course in
every situation. "[D]ue process is flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands." MQ~~iQQe~
y~_a~e~~~, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 s. Ct. 2593,
2600, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, 494 (1972). The full
rights of due process present in a court of
law, including presentation of witnesses and
cross-examination, do not automatically attach
to a quasi-judicial hearing. S~e GQQQ~
L~~~~, 419 U.s. 565, 95 s. Ct. 729, 42
L. Ed. 2d 725 (1975); A~n~tt_~_K~nneQ~, 416
U.S. 134, 94 s. Ct. 1633, 40 L. Ed. 2d 15
(1974). The basic elements of procedural due
process of law require notice and an
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner before governmental
deprivation of a significant property
interest. MQtth~~Q_Y~~lg~igg~, 424 U.S. 319,
333,96 s. Ct. 893, 902, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18,32
(1976); H~~th-G~Q~giQ-finiQbingL-In~~_Y~
Oi~CbemL_In~~, 419 u.s. 601, 605-606, 95
s. Ct. 719, 722, 42 L. Ed. 2d 751, 756-57
(1975) •
Determination of the specific procedures
required to satisfy due process requires a
balancing of several factors: (1) the pr ivate
interest which will be affected; (2) the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures actually used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or
alternative procedural safeguards; and (3) the
governmental interest, inclUding the burden
that additional procedural safeguards would
entail. Mathe~Q_y~_~lg~idg~, 424 u.S. at 335,
16
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96 s. Ct. at 903, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 33; SilY~~
YA-CQ~tl~-M~mQ~iAl_BQ~Qitgl,53 Haw. at 484,
497 P.2d at 571. 5snQ~-a~Q~b, ~~Q~Q' 70 Haw.
at 378.
Although the Commission did not conduct a contested
case proceeding, the Record supports the fact that the
requirements of due process, notice and an opportunity to be
heard, were satisfied by the procedure actually provided by
the Commission. The Record substantiates the fact that notice
by mail was given to all property owners within 300 feet of
the affected property, all residents within 1,000 feet of the
perimeter boundary of the affected property, and all owners of
all property described in the permit application. Published
notice was also provided in the Hawaii Tribune Herald on
March 21, 1989. RA 8, 16, 18, 19, 31, 139 and 145. Appellant
received notice of the public hearings, RA 31 (p. 33).
The Record substantiates the fact that opportunity
to be heard was afforded since the hearing, conducted on two
days, permitted both oral and written testimony to be
received. RA 212, 213 and 208. Appellant participated on
both days, presenting both oral and written testimony. RA
212, p. 51; RA 213, p. Ill. The Commission heard testimony
from his wife, Jennifer Perry at both days of hearing. RA
17
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212, p. 57; RA 213, p. 108. Also, both Perrys presented
written testimony. RA 208. Thus, notice and an opportunity
to be heard were provided by the actual procedure which
adequately meets the minimum due process requirement to a
litigant in Appellant's position as articulated in the Sand~
a~a~b case and no additional safeguard would appear necessary
to protect Appellant's level of interest.
HRS S 205-5.1 was amended in 1987 to delete the
requirement of a contested case proceeding in the issuance of
a geothermal resource permit. The accompanying committee
reports manifest an express intent that permitting agencies
provide procedural due process even though contested case
proceedings were eliminated:
Your Committee realizes that the
effectiveness of the procedures established in
this amended bill rests with the
administrative agency involved. Therefore,
your Committee has directed the affected
agencies to take responsibility for the
rUlemaking that will assure due process is
served and provide for an adequate record for
jUdicial review. These procedures should
include, but are not limited to, notice to
interested parties, transcripts of
proceedings, and an adequate opportunity for
interested parties to be heard.
The public hearing and appeal procedure
is well settled in the federal sector, where
18
•agencies involved in important decision
making, as is the case here, utilize the
public hearing process to obtain opinion and
comment on proposed actions. For example,
under the Clean Air Act, 42 USC Sections 7604
and 7607, appeals are taken directly from the
record of a public hearing to a circuit court
of appeal. The judicial review procedure
proposed in this bill has passed
constitutional scrutiny in the federal courts.
It is already utilized in Chapter 343, Hawaii
Revised Statutes.
Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1118, in 1978 Senate Journal, at
13ij8. The Commission, having provided notice, transcript of
proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, has complied with
HRS § 205-5.1. There is no violation of procedural due
process requiring a" remand as Appellant requests this Court to
do, and therefore the decision of the Commission to grant a
geothermal resource permit to HNEI should be affirmed.
The applicable standard of review of the decision of
the Commission is contained in HRS § 205-5.l(g):
:~--~.
B. The Hawaii County Planning Commission made no
procedural or substantive error in the
ae~i2iQn_tQ-S~ant_tbe-2e~mit~ ~ _
Upon review of the record the court may
affirm the decision of the agency or remand
the case with instructions for further
proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the
19
•decision and order if the substantial rights
of the petitioners may have been prejudiced
because the administrative findings,
conclusions, decisions, or orders are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or
~~~-;' statutory provisions; or
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or
jurisdiction of the agency; or
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
.£"5:
"0 (4) Affected by other error of law; or
""
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the
"".;.:..
:;:~ reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence on the whole record; or
(6) Arbitrary, or capricious, or
characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of
discretion.
Appellant contends in point 1 that the "time limit
for presentation and speeding of public testimony and limiting
of testimony," Appellant's Br. 8, is objectionable because it
is a violation of due process rights based upon article I,
section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution.
There is no authority to permit unlimited time for
testimony to be given. In fact, the u.s. Supreme Court
expressly rejected the notion that oral testimony of any sort
is a necessary component of Due Process. "There is no
inexorable requirement that oral testimony must be heard in
20
•every administrative proceeding in which it is tendered. R
E~d~~gl~~~Q~it_ln~~~Qn~~_CQ~QA_~_MQll~nL 108 s. Ct. 1780,
1791, (1988) (citing CglifQnQ-YA-IQmQ~g~i, 442 u.s. 682,
(1979». This is especially applicable where, as here, the
Commission provided the opportunity to present both oral and
written testimony. Further, one might infer that the reason
for limiting time on testimony was due to the volume of
repetitive evidence presented. S~~ Q~tQQQ~-Ci~~l~_~_ag~Qlg
K~_LA-CQatl~_I~~~t_~~tQt~,4 Haw. App. 633, 643, 675 P.2d 784
(1983). A review of the testimony on record demonstrates that
much of the same or similar testimony was repeated by each
person coming up to testify or sUbmitting written testimony.
There 1S no evidence that anyone was denied an opportunity to
participate either orally or in writing.
In point 2, Appellant complains of the lack of cross
examination of the applicant as a violation of due process.
Appellant's Br. 8. As discussed above, even though the
provisions of §§ 205-5.1(e) and (f) do not provide for cross
examination of the applicant, the actual hearing conducted
comported with the requirements of due process. SQng~-a~Q~b
Q~f~na~_E~nd_Y~_Cit~_CQ~n~il_Qf_tbe_Cit~_Qnd_CQ~nt~_Qf
HQnQl~l~, 70 Haw. 361, 773 P.2d 250 (1989) noted that without
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a showing of a ·property· interest within the meaning of the
due process clause in the state and federal constitution,
notice and an opportunity to be heard adequately satisfy
minimum due process requirements.
In point 3, Appellant contends that Rule 12-13 was
violated because there had been no environmental impact
statement and the environmental assessment was deficient.
Appellant's Br. 8. Rule 12-3, Rules of Practice and Procedure
of the Hawaii County Planning Commission, does not require the
submission of an environmental impact statement. Appellant
cites no authority to support a violation of Rule 12-3.
Reliet for this objection is in HRS, Chapter 343, and may not
be sought in this appeal. S~~, M~G1Qn~-Y£_InaQa, 64 Haw. 27,
636 P.2d 158 (1981). This issue is improperly raised because
this Court lacks jurisdiction. Further, Appellant did not
follow the procedure as provided in HRS § 343-7, and any
challenge to the determination of a negative declaration would
be untimely.
Specifically, Appellant argues that the deficiencies
in the application are failures to comply with Rule
l2-3(b) (2) (B) and (C). Rule l2-3(b) (2) (8) requires a
description of the scope of the planned activities and the
22
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reasons tor requesting a permit. He argues that the scope and
reason should be broadened to indicate future geothermal
development as a result of the SOH project. While the
development of production wells is a probable likelihood, the
project itself does not involve production wells and it would
be unreasonable for HNEI to provide information for actions or
projects of others over which HNEI exercises no control.
Nonetheless, review of the staff recommendation, AR 207, and
the permit, AR 183, show extensive recommendations and
findings, respectively, concerning environmental issues.
Moreover, HRS § 205~5.l(e) lists criteria which the permit
methodically addresses, providing the reasons supporting the
conclusions of the Commission. RA 183 (pp. 1-4). In
addition, in issuing the permit, the Planning Commission
imposed condition 25, among others, to provide for monitoring
of compliance with the permit and a reservation of right to
call a public hearing for the purpose of gathering input
regarding the impact of the project. RA 183(10).
Rule l2-3(b) (2) (C) requires a preliminary plot or
site plan showing, among other things, locations of structures
such as drill sites. Appellant contends that the plan lacked
a metes and bounds description which permitted applicants to
23
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move the site of SOH 4 after permit approval, resulting in a
material alteration of "who will be affected and the degree of
impacts." Appellant's Br. 20.
A study of the letters at RA 187 and 189 do not
support the contention of a material alteration. The letters,
however, reflect the preliminary nature of the plan and the
agreement of HNEI reached during mediation, RA 176 and 210 (p.
17), approved by the Commission to accommodate one of the
residents near SOH 4. Work on SOH 4 is addressed in condition
25 of the permit, providing for monitoring and a reservation
of right to call a pUblic hearing for the purpose of gathering
input regarding the impact of the project. RA 183 (p. 10).
There is no evidence of non-compliance with Rule 12-3.
points 4-8 relate to complaints with the mediation
process. HRS §§ 205-5.1(e) and (f) in pertinent part provide
for mediation as follows:
••• Upon appropriate request for mediation
from any party who submitted comment at the
public hearing, the county authority shall
appoint a mediator within five days. The
county authority shall require the parties to
participate in mediation. The mediator shall
not be an employee of any county agency or its
staff. The mediation period shall not extend
beyond thirty days after mediation started,
24
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except by order of the county authority.
Mediation shall be confined to the issues
raised at the pUblic hearing by the party
requesting mediation. The mediator will
submit a written recommendation to the county
authority, based upon any mediation agreement
reached between the parties for consideration
by the county authority in its final decision.
If there is no mediation agreement, the county
authority may have a second public hearing to
receive additional comment related to the
mediation issues••••
* * *
(f) Requests for mediation shall be
received by the board or county authority
within five days after the close of the
initial public hearing. Within five days
thereafter, the board or county authority
shall appoint a mediator. Any person
sUbmitting an appropriate request for
mediation shall be notified by the board or
county authority of the date, time, and place
of the mediation conference by depositing such
notice in the mail to the return address
stated on the request for mediation. The
notice shall be mailed no later than ten days
before the start of the mediation conference.
The conference shall be held on the island
where the public hearing is held.
In point 4 Appellant complains of "too strict time restraints
on mediation process," Appellant's Br. 8. The Commission
complied with the time requirements of HRS §§ 205-5.l(e) and
(f) and Rule l2-5-l(g) which is nearly identical to the
statutory provision. No authority is presented in support of
any right to a different procedure. Appellant had notice and
25
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an opportunity to participate in the mediation, which is
indicated in the mediator's report. RA 176 and 210. Minimum
due process requires no more than notice and an opportunity to
be heard, as discussed above. Appellant has not shown that he
is entitled to more than what is required by the statute and
the rule. Also, as argued above, there is no right to
unlimited time to enable Appellant to do everything he desired
to do. Appellant did in fact participate in the mediation.
The mediator's report reflects 9 days of meetings and active
participation. Agreements were reached and mediation was
completed within the 30 day time requirement. The mediator's
report does not reflect that the mediation could not be
completed within the time required. Therefore, Appellant
fails to present any valid claim of error or violation of due
process. RA 176 and 210. In point 5, Appellant objects to
the selection of a mediator by the Commission, and in point 6,
he complains that "[P]ublic comments pertinent to procedure
not accepted." Appellant's Br. 9.
In selecting a mediator, the conduct of the
Commission was consistent with HRS § 205-5.1 which provides
that the Commission appoint a mediator after request for
mediation is made. Input from the parties in the selection of
26
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a mediator is not required by HRS 205-5.1. Further, Appellant
does not challenge the qualifications of the mediators
appointed nor does he argue that they were unsuited to serve
as mediators due to bias or conflict of interest. No
authority is cited by Appellant in support of any right to
participate in the selection process. Therefore, there is no
error requiring this Court to remand the decision back to the
Commission.
In point 7, Appellant contends that there is no
mediator recommendation as required by Rule 12-5-1(m)
Appellant's Br. 9. However, the Record shows that a
mediator's report, containing certain prop6sals, which had
been agreed to by the parties, for the imposition of various
conditions to the permit, was made to the Commission. RA 176
and 210. A comparison of the proposed conditions in the
mediator's report with those imposed by the Planning
Commission, shows that the mediator's report had been
considered because many of the agreements were adopted as
conditions of the permit. RA 176 and 210 (pp. 17-19), and
183. No violation of Rule 12-1-5(m) has been established and
therefore, no valid error has been shown to support the relief
requested by Appellant.
27
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The next objection, Point 8, Appellant's Brief at 9,
is related to an extension of time of the mediation procedure
beyond the 30 day limit under Rule l2-5-l(g). The rule
closely follows the statutory provisions related to time
limitations. HRS S 205-5.1 requires that such an extension of
time be ordered by the Commission. No other person is
required to approve such an extension. The Record does not
show any extension of time of the mediation procedure beyond
the 30 day limit. In fact, mediation commenced on June 7,
1989 and ended on July 6, 1989, RA 176 and 210 (p. 5) as
required under HRS § 205-5.1 and Rule 12-5-l(g). Further, the
mediator's report was submitted within the requirement of 10
days after the close of the mediation conference in compliance
with Rule l2-5-l(m). RA 176. The mediation procedures under
HRS S 205-5.1 and Rule 12-5-1 have been fully complied with as
evidenced by the Record. No error has been demonstrated by
Appellant.
Appellant complains that the mediation report was
not submitted for review by the parties prior to its submittal
to the Commission. Appellant 3 Br. 23. No requirement for
this procedure is found in HRS § 205-5.1 and no authority is
referred to in support of such procedure. Moreover, this
28
Court will not search the record to discover what evidence
(1977) •
supports the finding allegedly based upon insufficient
evidence. A~~Q~1Qt~g_~ng1n~~t~_i_CQntta~tQtQL-ln~A-Y£_Stat~,
58 Haw. 187, 567 P.2d 397, t~b. g~n. 58 Haw. 322, 568 P.2d 512
••
Appellant in point 9 complains that the Commission
was required to hold a second public hearing which is an error
based upon a violation of due process and upon an abuse of
discretion by the Commission. Appellant's Br. 10. HRS §
205-5.1 and Rule 12-5-1(n) do not require the Commission to
conduct a second he~ring unless there is no mediation
agreement. Further, the language states that the mediator's
report must be based upon "Qn~ mediation agreement reached
between the parties." (Emphasis supplied.) There were
agreements which were reflected in the mediator's report.
Therefore, a second hearing did not become necessary.
Moreover, the language of the statute with respect to the
initial hearing is mandatory, "shall conduct." However, the
use of "may" with respect to having a second hearing supports
an interpretation that unless there is an abuse of discretion,
the decision to have a second hearing should not be overturned
29
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(citations omitted). The Record does not reflect that the
litigant.'" I1tl~_G~Q~Qnt~, ~U~~Q' 2 Haw. App. at 270
Commisslon exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules
of law or practice. In fact, the Record clearly shows that a
decision 'clearly exceeded• •burden of showing that the •
on appeal. I1tl~-G~Q~Qnt~-£~~~Q~-S~~Yi~~~L-ln~~_Y~-£Q~l~~,2
Haw. App. 265, 270, 630 P.2d 642 (1981). "Appellant bears the
the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law
or practice to the substantial detriment of a party
substantial amount of evidence was received by the Commission
during the hearing. Moreover, it considered also its staff's
report and the mediator's report. RA 178 and 180.
Further, there was no abuse of discretion by the
Commission in excluding the letter by Jennifer Perry as
testimony submitted after the close of the public hearing.
Evidence received after the close of a hearing results in
reversible error. S~~ HQi~i~i_SbQ~~L_lU~~_Y~_~QUiUg-BQQ~Q
Qf-ALlLl~Ql~, 2 Haw. App. 43, 45, 625 P.2d 1044 (1981) (citing
IQ~U_~~QUQ-llQ~_CQmmi~~iQu,55 Haw. 538, 524 P.2d 84 (1974).
Therefore, there is no violation of due process or error based
upon an abuse of discretion.
30
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Appellant claims the decision is based upon an
inadequate factual record in Point 10, Appellant's Brief 10,
citing a violation of due process, HRS § 91-14(g), and Rule
s~~ CQ~ta~-S~nn, 5 Haw. App. 419, 697 P.2d 43, ~~~t. d~n. 67
Haw. 685, 744 P.2d 781 (1985) (citing In-L~-Kaana~al1_~at~~
CQ~~A' 5 Haw. App. 711, 678 P.2d 584 (1984)).
r--.
••
The decision of an administrative agency, acting
within their sphere of expertise, is accorded a presumption of
validity, and one seeking to find error bears a heavy burden
of making a convincing showing that the decision is invalid.
As this Court has noted, "an appellate court is not
required to sift through a volumious record for documentation
of a party's contentions," Int~~nat1Qngl-aLQth~LbQQd_Qf
tl~~tL1~al_~QLk~~~L_LQ~al_ll~1_YA_Ha~a11an_I~l~~bQn~-CQA' 713
P.2d 943, 956 (Haw. 1986). Appellant does not bring forward
facts to support his contentions in order to justify a finding
of error.
Unless the findings of an agency are incomplete and
insufficient to provide a basis for jUdicial review, the
remand of an agency decision is not appropriate pursuant to
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HRS § 91-14(g). Id. Moreover, remand would be proper if the
court finds as a result of error of law, the agency failed to
make appropriate findings. M~~~Q_YA_aQa~d_Qf_I~~Qt~~Q-2f
tmR1Q~eeQ~-Reti~ement-S~Qtem,704 P.2d 902 (Haw. 1985).
The Record shows that both oral and written
testimony were received by the Commission at a public hearing
on which to base a decision. Also, its staff presented a
recommendation. The mediator's report was considered •
Further, a review of the permit readily supports the fact that
the findings are based upon substantial evidence. HRS
§ 205-5.I(e) lists criteria which the permit addresses.
Reasons are provided by the Commission to support its
conclusions. Further, 26 conditions are imposed upon HNEI,
providing for the mitigation measures, if necessary, for
adverse effects such as noise, traffic congestion, emergency
situations (monitoring), air pollution, lighting interference,
safety measures, etc.
Further, there is no requirement that all the
evidence support the decision. S~e, f~Qte~t_Ala_Wal_St~lln~
HQnQl~l~, 6 Haw. App. 540, 735 P.2d 950 (1987). Moreover, the
mere quantity of the same evidence does not support any
32
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•contention that the decision is not supported. Therefore,
Appellant's contention cannot stand because it fails to
demonstrate any basis for error.
VI. BELEYAHt_SIAIUIES_AHO_BUL~S
See Appendix A.
VI • CQHCLUSIQH
Based upon the failure to establish any valid claim
to procedural due process in the requirement of a contested
case hearing prior to the issuance of a geothermal resource
permit pursuant to HRS § 205-5.1 and a failure to establish
any procedural or substantive error pursuant to HRS § 9l-l4(g)
in the decision to issue said permit, HNEI and RCUH urge this
court to affirm the decision of the Hawaii County Planning
Commission. While it is appreciated that the SOH project has
raised deep-felt public concerns, the applicable law to this
appeal does not afford the vehicle for resolving these
33
838 (1985).
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, January __~,_, 1990.
r--,
•
Attorney for Hawaii Natural
Energy Institute, The University
of Hawaii, and The Research
Corporation of the University
of Hawaii
WARREN PRICE, III
Attorney General
State of Hawaii
•
"profound differences."
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STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
No other pending related case except for No. 14197,
f~l~-O~f~na~_E~ng_YA~~nQ-G~Qtb~~mQl~Y~nt~~~,Supreme Court,
State of Hawaii, docketed December 12, 1989. The case
involves the same parties and the same or closely related
issues as a result of the approval by the Hawaii County
Planning Commission of a second geothermal resource permit.
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LAND USE COMMISSION
Only !be subsecuons amended are compiled in this Supplemenl...359G.... 1... n:ferred ID ia lUI. is
repealed.
•••
(am L 1986. c 93. §I; am L 1987. c 336. 11: am L 1988. c 3S2. t21
U05·5.1 GflKbermai re50Urce subzooes. (a) Geothennal resource sub-
zones may be designated within the urban. Nral. agricultural. and conservation
land use districts established under section 20S-2. Only those areas designated '15
geothermal resource subzones may be utilized for geothermal development activities
in addition to those uses permitted in each land use district under this,daiipcer.
Geothenna.l development activities may be permitted within urban. rural. qricul.
rural. and conservation land use districts in accordance with thil chapter. "Oeoch-
ennaJ development activities" means the exploration. development. or production
of electricaJ energy from geothermal resources and direct use applications or geoth.
ermaJ resources: provided that within the urban. rural. and agricultunl land use
districts. direct use applications of geothennaI re~s ~ permitted bodl widtift
and outside of ~a.s designated as geothermal reso~e subzones pursuant to section
2OS·5.2 if such direct use applications are in conformance with aU other appUcable
stare and county land use regulations and are in conformance with this chapter.
(b) The board of land and natural resources shaJl have the responsibility for
designating ~as as geothermal resource subzones as provided under section 205·
S.2: except that the total area within an agricultural district which is the subject of
a geothermal mining lease approved by the board of land and natunl resources.
any part or all of which area is the subject of a special use pennit issued by the
county for geothermaJ development activities. on or before May 25. 1984. is des-
ignated as a geothermal teSOW'te subzone for the duration of the lease. The des-
ipatioa of geothermal reSOUJCe subzones shall be governed exclusively bf tHis
section and section 20~.s.2. except IS provided therein. The board shall adopc.
amend. or repeal Nles related to its authority to designate and regulate the use of
JeOthermal resource subzones in the manner provided under chapter 91.
The authority of the board to designare geothermaJ resource subzones sMD
be an exception to those provisions of this chapter and of section 46-4 authorizing
the land use commission and the counties to establish and modify land use distrieu
and to regulate uses therein. 1be provisions of this section shall not abrogare nor
suPersede the provisions of chapters 182 and 183.
(c) 1be use of an aru for geothermal development activities within a geoth·
enna.I resource subzone shall be governed by the board within the conservation
district and. except as herein provided. by stare and county statutes. ordinances.
and Nles noc inconsistent herewith within agricultural. rural. and urban districts.
except tha1 no Land use commission approval or special use pennil procedwes under
section 20S-6 shall be requin:d fer the lISe of such subz.ones. In the absence of
provisions in the county general plan and zoning ordinaDoes spec1ficaUy re1aling
to the use and location of geothetmal development activities in an~.
rural. or uroan district. the appropriate county authority may issue a
resource permit to allow geothennaJ development activities. "Appropri.ale aoaDty
:..~.
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205·5.1 PLANNING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMEST
authority" means the county planning commission unless some other agency or
body is designaled by ordinance of the county council. Such uses as are pennilled
by county general plan and zoning ordinances. by the appropriate county authority.
shall be deemed to be reasonable and to promote the effectiveness and objectives
of this chapter. Chapters 177. 178. 182. 183. 20SA. 226. 342. and 343 shall apply
as appropriate. If provisions in the county general plan and zoning ordinances
specifically relate to the use and location of geothennal development activities in
an agricultural. rural. or urban district. the provisions shall require the appropriate
county authority to conduct a public hearing on any application for a geothennal
resource pennit to detennine whether the use is in confonnity with the criteria
specified in subsection (el for granting geothennal resource pennits: provided that
within the urban. rural. and agriculturaJ land use districts. direct use applications
of geothennal resources are pennitted without any application for a geothennal
resource pennit both within and outside of areas designated as geothenn31 ,resource
subzones pursuant to section 205-S.2 if such direct use applications are in con·
fonnance with 311 other applicable state and county land use regulations and are in
confonnance with this .chapter. ",
(d) If geothenn31 development activities are proposed within a conservation
district. with an application with all required data. the board of land 'and naturaJ
resources shall conduct a public hearing and. upon appropriate request for mediation
from any party who submitted comment at the public hearing. the board sh31l
appoint a mediator within five days. The board shall require the parties to participate
in mediation. The mediator shall not be a member of the board or its staff. The
mediation period shall not extend beyond thirty days after the date mediation started.
except by order of the board. Mediation sh31l be confined to the issues raised at
the public hearing by the party requesting mediation. The mediator will submit a
written recommendation to the board. based upon any mediation agreement reached
between the parties for consideration by the board in its final decision. If there is
no mediation agreement. the board may have a second public hearing to receive
additional comment related to the mediation issues. Within ten days after the second
public hearing. the board may receive additionaJ written comment on the issues
raised at the second public hearing from any party.
The board shaJl consider the comments raised at the second hearing before
rendering its finaJ decision. The board shall then detennine whether. pursuant to
board rules. a conservation district use pennit shall be granted to authorize the
geothennaJ development activities described in the application, The board shall
grant a conservation district use pennit if it finds that the applicant has demonstrated
that:
(I) The desired uses would not have unreasonable adverse health. environ-
mentaJ. or socio-economic effects on residents or surrounding propeny;
and
(2) The desired uses would not unreasonably burden public agencies to
provide roads and streets. sewers. water. drainage. and police and fire
protection: or
(3) There are reasonable measures available to mitigate the unreasonable
adverse effects or burdens referred to above.
A decision shall be made by the board within six months of the date a complete
application was filed: provided that the time limit may be extended by agreement
between the applicant and the board.
Ie) If geothennal development activities are proposed within agriculturaJ.
rural. or urban districts and such proposed activities are not penni lied uses pursuant
to county generaJ plan and zoning ordinances. then after receipt of a properly filed
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and completed app(ication, including all required supporting data. the appropriate
county authoritY~COnducta public hearing. Gpon appropriate request for me·
diation from an PaJ'tl' who submitted comment at the public hearing. the county
authority shall a . t a mediator within tive days. The county authority shall
require the panies to panicipate in mediation. The mediator shall not be an employee
of any county agency or its staff. The mediation period shall not elttend beyond
thirty days after mediation staned. eltcept by order of the county authority. Me-
diation shall be confined to the issues raised at the public hearing by the pany
requesting mediation. The mediator will submit a written recommendation to the
county authority. based upon any mediation agreement reached between the panies
for consideration by the county authority in its final decision. If there is no mediation
agreement. the county authority may have a second public hearing to receive ad-
ditional comment related to the mediation issues. Within ten days after the second
public hearing, the county authority may receive additional written comment on
the issues raised at the second public hearing from any party.
The county authority shall consider the comments raised at the second hearing
before rendering its final decision. The county authority shall then determine whether
a geothermal resource permit shall be granted to authorize the geothermal devel·
opment actiyities Clescribed in the application. The appropriate 'county authority
shall grant a geothermal resource permit if it finds that applicant has demonstrated
that: .
( I) The desired uses would not have unreasonable adverse health. environ-
mental. or socio-economic effects on residents or surrounding property;
(2) The desired uses would not unreasonably burden public agencies to
provide roads and streets, sewers. water, drainage. school improvements.
and police and fire protection; and
(3) That there are reasonable measures available to mitigate the unreasonable
adverse effects or burdens referred to above.
Unless there is a mutual agreement to extend. a decision shall be made on
the application by the appropriate county authority within six months of the date a
complete application was filed; provided that the time limit may be elttended by
agreement between the applicant and the appropriate county authority.
<0 Requests for mediation shall be received by the board or county authority
within five days after the close of the initial public hearing. Within five days
thereafter. the board or county authority shall appoint a mediator. Any person
submitting an appropriate request for mediation shall be notified by the board or
county authority of the date. time. and place of the mediation conference by de-
positing such notice in the mail to the return address stated on the request for
mediation. The notice shall be mailed no later than ten days before the stan of the
mediation conference. The conference shall be held on the island where the public
hearing is held.
(g) Any decision made by an appropriate county authority or the board
pursuant to a public hearing or hearings under this section may be appealed directly
00 the record to the supreme court for final decision and shall not be subject to a
contested case hearing. Sections 91-14(b) and (g) shall govern the appeal. not-
withstanding the lack of a contested case hearing on the matter. The appropriate
county authority or the board shall provide a court reporter to produce a transcript
of the proceedings at all public hearings under this section for purposes of an appeal.
(hl For the purposes of an appeal from a decision from a public hearing.
the record shall include:
(I) The application for the permit and all accompanying supporting docu·
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PLANNING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
ments. including but not limited to: repons. studies. affidavits. state·
ments. and exhibits.
Staff recommendations submitted to the members of the agency in con-
sideration of the application.
Oral and written public testimony received at the public hearings.
Written transcripts of the proceedings at the public hearings .
The written recommendation received by the agency from the mediator
with any mediation agreement.
A statement of relevant matters noticed by the agency members at the
public hearings.
The written decision of the agency issued in connection with the appli-
cation and public hearings.
Other documents required by the board or county authority. [L 1983. c I
296. pt of §3: am L 1984. c IS I. §2: am L 1985. c 226. § I: am L 1986. .
c 167. §\, c 187, §I and c 290. §I: am L 1987. c 372, §§2. 3 and c
378. §I) f',
Noce
::-:
:-.::
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Chapcen 177 and 178. referred to in tellt. are repealed effective July J. 1989.
1205-5..2 Designation or areas as geothermal n!SOurce subzone5. • ••
(d) After the board has completed a county-by-county assessment of aU areas
with geothermal potential or after any subsequent update or review. the board shall
compare all areas showing geothermal potential within each county. and shall
propose areas for potential designation as geothermal resource subzones based upon
a preliminary finding that the areas are those sites which best demonstrate an
acceptable balance between the factors set forth in subsection (b). Once such a
proposal is made. the board shall conduct public heariogs pursuant to this subsection.
notwithstanding any contrary provision related to public hearing procedures. Con-
tested case procedures are not applicable to these hearings.
(I) Hearings shall be held at locations which are in close proximity to those
areas proposed for designation. A public notice of hearing. including a
description of the proposed areas. an invitation for public comment. and
a statement of the date. time. and place where persons may be heard
shall be published and mailed no less than twenty days before the hearing.
The notice shall be published on three separate days in a newspaper of
general circulation statewide and in the county in which the hearing is
to be held. Copies of the notice shall be mailed to the depanment of
business and economic development. to the planning commission and
planning depanment of the county in which the proposed areas are
located. and to all owners of record of real estate within. and within
one thousand feet of. the area being proPosed for designation as a geoth·
ermal resource subzone. The notification shall be mailed to the owners
and addresses as shown on the current real propeny tax rolls at the
county real propeny tax office. Upon such action. the requirement for
notification of owners of land is completed. For the purposes of this
subsection. notice to one coowner shall be sufficient notice to all coown·
ers.
(2) The hearing shall be held before the board. and the authority to conduct
hearings shall not be delegated to any agent or representative of the
board. All persons and agencies shall be afforded the opponunity to
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armcy may incorporate its findinp and rulinp
in its d«Woo.• H. API', 633. 675 P.2d 7104.
§91.13 ~DJultatioa by otftdalJ or qeaey. No official of an a,ency
who renders a decision in a contested case shall consult any penon on any issue
of fact except upon notice and opponunity for all panies to panicipate, save to
the extent required for the disposition of ex parte matlen authorized by law. [L
1961, c 103. §13; Supp, §6C·13; HRS §91-13)
§91.14 JudJdaI renew of coaterted cues. <a) Any penon agrieved by
a final decision and order in a contested case or by a preliminary rulin, of the
nature that defernJ of review pendin. entry of a subsequent finaJ decision would
deprive appel.1aDt of adequate relief is entitled to judicial review thereof' under
this chapter; but nothinl in this section sball be deemed to prevent reson'to
other means of review, redress. relief, or trial de novo. includin. the right of trial
by jury, provided by law. ~i
(b) Except as otherwise provided herein, proceedjnp for review Ihall be
instituted in the circuit court within thirty days after the preliminary ruIin, or
within thirty days after service of the certified copy of'the finaJ decision and
order of the a,ency punuant to rule of court except where a statute provides for
a direct appeal to the supreme court. which appeal shall be subject to chapter
602, and in such cases the appealsball be in like manner as an appeal from the
circuit court to the supreme court, includin. payment of the fee prescribed by
section 607-S for filin, the notice of appeal (except in cases appealed under
sections 11-SI and 40-91). The court in iu discretion may permit other
interested penons to intervene.
(c) The proc:eedinp for review sball not stay enforcement of the aaency
decisions; but the reviewin, court may order a stay if the foUowin. criteria have
been met:
(I) There is likelihood that the subject penon will prevail on the merits
of an appeal from the administntive procecdin. to the court;
(2) Irreparable clamqe to the subject penon will result if a stay is not
ordered;
(3) No itrepuable damqe to the public will result from the stay order;
and .
(4) Public interest will be lerIed by the stay order.
(d) Within twenty days after the determination of the conteDU of the
record on Ippeal in the manner provided by the rules of court, or within such
further time u the court may allow. the Ileney sball transmit to the review,
coun the record of' the proc:eedin, under review. The court may require or
permit subsequent correctioOl or additions to the record when deemed desirable.
(e) 1f, before the date set (or hearing, application is made to the court (or
leave to present additional evidence material to the issue in the case, and it is
ihOWD to the aatiJfaction of the coun that the additional evidence is material
and that there were ,ood reuoos (or failure to present it in the proceedin,
before the aaeney. the court may order that the additional evidence be taken
before the aaency upon such conditions u the court deems proper. The agency
may modify iu findings, decision, and order by reason of the additional evidence
and shaU file with the reviewin, court, to become a pan of the record. the
additional evidence, together with any modifications or new findings or decision.
(I) The review ,hall be conducted by the appropriate court without I jury
and &h&1J be confined to the record. except that in the cues where a trial de
APPENDIX A-2
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novo. including trial by jury. is provided by law and also in cases of alleged
i.rregu.larities in procedure before the agency not shown in the record. testimony
thereon may be taken in court. The court shall. upon request by any party, hear
oral arguments and receive written briefs.
(g) Upon review of the record the court may affirm the decision of the
agency or remand the case with instructions for further proceedings; or it may
reverse or modify the decision and order if the substantial rights of the
petitionen may have been prejudiced because the administrative findings.
conclusions. decisions. or ordel'J are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; or
(2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or
(3) Made upon unlawfuJ proc«lure; or
(4) Atrected by other error of law; or
(5) Clearly erroneous in view or the reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence on the whole record; or I ;
(6) Arbitrary. or capricious, or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. . .
(h) Upon a trial de novo. including a trial by jury u provided by~raw, the
court shall transmit to the .gency its decision and order with instructipns to
comply with the order. [L 1961, c 103, §14; Supp, §6C-14; MRS §91-14; am L
1973, c 31, §5; am L 1974, C 145, §1; am L 1979, c Ill, §9; am L 1980, c130. §2;
am L 1983, c 160, §1]
AttoneJ GeMnI~
Colt of record transmitted to the reviewiq c:owt it bortlC by the 1ItDCJ. An. OeD. Op. 64-4.
Ltw J.......... RnWwI
StaDdin,to Cba1Ia1It Administrative Actioa ill the Federal IUld HawUiaD Coutu. I HBJ 37.
.~--
",.'-.
.~-;"
Sectioa coataiDed appropriate statute atllmi-
tatioaa (or State to fUe ICtioa ill (ederal coun
uDdu Educ:atioD Por All Hlodialpped Child.nlD
Act. 695 P.2d 1154.
Review atdeciIioa at civlJ IeI'Vice commjMjon
is oa the record. 41 H. 211. 391 P.2d 155.
QueItioa wbether proviIioa (or appeal at
prelimiJ:wy naliD, overridel proviIionI at spe-
ciI\c statuta penliq tdmiDiatrative~
railed but DOt decided. 50 H. 22., 421 P.2d 41t.
Proc:edun appUcabIe to II'Ult at IWIUIW'Y
judpDeDt Ifter IJlI*l to Qmajt COW't. 'C) H.
169. 4).4 P.2d 312.
5ublectioa (J) niemd to: 50 H. 426, 442
P.2d 61.
Wbere z.ooiq variaDce illI'Ulted after public
beuma. OWMI' at1aDd IdjoUUn, the property
subject to vlri&oce it "penoa agrieved." S2 H.
'II, 479 P.2d 796.
"Penoo . ed", to be mtitJed to judicial
review. mUSl~ beeD Ulvolved Ul the aJOlSC·
ed cue. S3 H. 431, 4" P.2d IIBO.
Tell uDdu "c1arly erTOIIeOUI" standard it
whether appel.\lte c:owt Iw a firm IDd definite
coavictioa mistake ... !DAde. 56 H. SS2. ,.5
P.2d 692; 4 H. API'. 26, 6'9 P.2d 77.
Where te1Iure beuiD, DOC required. app\ic:a.
tiOD did IIOt create "coatelted cue". S6 H. 680,
S4& P.2d 253.
Oeputmeot at education wu DOt a "penoa"
with staodin to appeal adminiItrative aetioa.
65 H. 219, L, P.U 1140.
"Penoa agrieved." 56 H. 260, S35 P.2d
1102; 64 H. 451, 643 P.2d 13.
"Clearly erTOIIeOUI" studatd appliel to re-
view at1..lbor IDd Industrial Re1atiODl AppeaJa
Boerd decisioaa. " H. 296. '" P.2d 155.
Nature at appeal to c:imUt c:oun WIder thiI
sectiOII diJcuued. 51 H. 291. 561 P.2d III'.
Appeal (rom decWoo 01 adminittntive ..eo-
cy aaiq without jwUdiction coolers· DO juril-
dictioD oa appellate court. 60 H. 6', sa7 P.2d
301.
Pltqrlpb (J) cited u .uthority to rem.llld I
C8U1e to the public utilities com.misIioa to make
appropriate findinp to suppon iu order. 60 H.
166, j90 P.2d S24.
"Clearly erroneous" stlDdard 01 review dis-
CUlled. 60 H. 166. ~90 P.ld S24; 66 H. 401. 6M
P.2d 127; 67 H. 212.68' P.ld 794; 2 H. App.
421. 633 P.2d S64.
Final order melJ1S an order mclin, the pre>
c:eediDp. AppeUee', actions were Dot clearly
erroaeouI or arbitrary aDd capricious wbere
.ppellant's filin, 01. p'ievanu wu untimely. 60
H. '13. S91 P.ld 62\.
Studatd or review under subsection {J) (or
dedsiotu of administnllve ..mcies actin, ,nth-
495
Ha..oIApl~~
Timelinela 0{ awe-!. 79 HLJl 79~3
in epbere 0{ espertiK. 60 H. 62'. '94 P.ld 612;
, H. App. 71. 671 P.ld '14.
Orplliutioa oppoIinl recLuaifteatioa of
propertis IDd wlUch it compelled 0{ _ben
who live in v1cinity 0{ properUet it I "'penoa
agricved" UDder .ublectioD (.). 61 H. 3, '94
P.ld 1079.
"Participatioa in coat.ested cue"~
61 H. 3, '94 P.ld 1079.
Timelyawe-!. 61 H. 3. '94 P.ZeI 1079.
Men failure to iDelude name 0{ qeoc:y
(wlUeh n:Ddered deciIioa beiDl appealed) in
c:aptioa 0{ DOtice 0{ appeal doeI IlOt reodu
awe-! dd'ective. 62 H. 444, 616 P.ld 1361.
P'mality 0{ order, wbat determineL 63 H. 15,
621 P.ld 361.
1.aDd Ole commjeMn, ruW order. 63 H. '29,
631 P.ld , ...
So Ioq • requi.reme!ltl 0( aublectioD (.) are
met. the c:ireuit court it vested with juriIdictioD
to hear appal. 63 H. 15, 621 P.ld 361.
Court did IlOt abuK diIcretioD in ntuIiDa to
a.Uow expert witDeMeS to testily' 111 coart, or
niuIiDa to require InDKript 0( oral commeata
Wore apacy. 64 H. 27, 636 P.ld 1,..
Dec:iIioD 0{ Idminittntive IpIICY ... cleuly
errooeoua. 65 H. 146, 648 P.ld 1107.
OnDtiDa 0{ tpedaI lIWIAIanerJt area permit
~ .. :..
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by COWIty pIannina c:ommiuioa. 6' H. 506. 654
P.ld 174.
Apocy'. deciIioo to reduce welfare beuefitl it
~Ieoaly by appal under thia tectioa 1M
Dot by dec.laratory judamau 1CtioD. 66 H. 4&"
666 t.ld I Ill.
AJeac:y'. procedural iJTep1aritiee did DOt
prejudice lppd1aDt', aublwltial riP'" 67 H.
342. 616 P.ld 13 J.
Cited ill reviewiq deciIioa 0( the labor IDd
iDdUItriaJ relatioal awe-! board. I H. App. 350,
619 P.ld 516.
III overt\U"Diq aaeocY', order, court ..
required to make deWJed ftDdiDp 0( fact IDd
CODclUlioal 0{ law. 2 H. App. 91, 626 P.ld 199.
P'ma1ity 0{ order. 2 H. App. 219, 629 P.ld
125.
Order 0{ board Dot I "ftDaI order" where it
reawada I cue to detenDiDe~
*ue. 4 H. App. '26. 669 P.ld 631. ,
StaDdatd UIed by appellate court wbeD reo
~ c:ireuit ooun'. I'e"iew 0{ ded-
IioG. 4 H. App. 633, 67' P.ld 714;5~. 59,
671 P.ld "6; , H. App. 32'. 690 P.2d 21.
Ileview 0( 'Ieocy deciIioa ooaftDed to. iIIueI
properly railed in record 0{ prooeedinp '-diq
up to deciIioa. , H. App. II 5, 671 P.ld llOJ. .
Cited: 47 H. \, 24, 314 P.ld '36; 50 H. 172.
435 P.ld 21.
.~.
.~:.' .
. ";~
,.:.-
'91-15 Appeals. Review of any final judgment of the circuit court
under this chapter shall be governed by chapter 602. [L 1961, c 103, §IS; Supp,
§6ClS; MRS §91·1S; am L 1979, c 111, §10]
An adminittrative aaeocY it "an agrieved party" from • judpDerJI which oYertumI I decisioa 0(
the Ifl!DCY with reepect to implemeatatioa 0{ tep1atioa. 60 H. 436. 591 P.ld 113.
SWIdard UIed by ~te COW1 whell teYiewiDa c:ireuit court', review 0(~ dec:iJioo. 4 H.
App' 633, 675 P.ld 'Ti4.
No awe-! by adminittnJive Ifl!DCY 0{ an advene deciJioD. 79 HLR 79~73.
'91·16 SnerabWty. U any provision of this chapter or the application
thereof to any penon or circumstance it held invalid. the invalidity shall not
affect other provWOD.I or applicatiODl of the chapter which can be given effect
without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of
this chapter are declared to be severable. [L 1961, c 103, §16; Supp, §6C-16;
MRS §91·16]
'91·17 Fedual aid.. The proVWODl of section 91·14 shall not be
applicable where such applicability would jeopardize federal aid or grants of
uaistance. [L 1961, c 103, §19; Supp, §6C17; HRS §91·17]
191.11 Sbort dtle. Th.i.s chapter may be cited as the Hawaii Adminis-
trative Procedure Act. (L 1961, C 103, 120; Supp, §6C.18; fiRS 191·18)
4H
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'91.12 Decisions and orders.
Cue :"lotes
Does nOI require nollces of tv <l5sessmenl be accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions of
law. 6 H. App. INo 10762),718 P1d 1112.
.:.-
;,.:
'91.13.1 Administrative review of deniaJ or refusal to issue license or
certif1cate of registration. Except as otherwise provided by law. any person
aggrieved by the deniaJ or refusaJ of any board or commission listed in section
Z6H·4 to issue a license or cenificate of registration. shall submit a request for a
contested case hearing pursuant to chapter 9 I within sixty days of the date of the
refusal or denial, Appeal to the circuit court under section 91·14. or any other
applicable statute. may only be taken from a board or commission's final order,;:
[L 1986. c 18 t. § I)
There is likelihood that the subject person will prevail on the merits of
an appeal from the administrative proceeding to the court;
Irreparable damage to the subject person wilJ result if a stay is not
ordered;
No irreparable damage to the public will result from the stay order; and
Public interest witt be served by the stay order.
(3)
(4)
•••
§91·14 Judicial review of contested cases. ... , ,.,.
(c) The proceedings for review shalt not stay enforcement of the agency
decisions or the contirmation of any fine as a judgment pursuant to section 92-
17(g); but the reviewing court may order a stay if the following criteria have been
met:
(\)
[am L 1986. c 274. § IJ
Revisioa :"l0lt
Only the subsection amended is compiled in Ihls Supplemenl.
la" Journals and Rcv~ws
Appcllale Slandards of Review in Hawaii. 7 lJH L. Rev. 173. (See also 7 LH L. Rev +J9 I
Cue NOles
Standard used by appcllale COUM when reviewing clrcuil ,OUM'S re"le"" of agency d':cl~lon. ,en.
denied. 67 H. 3.677 P1d 9M.
Board's denial of a lllOlion for reconsiderallon IS a "final order". 67 H. 6QJ. 6Q9 P :d :6.
Police chief is .. "pcnon" with .. standing 10 appcal CIVil servIce commiSSion'; ruling 68 H 11'010.
10792).718 P2d 1076.
Apprenticeship commlnee W<l5 nOI "pcnon agl!neved" by labor director', rel.:ctlon of 'IS recomm.:n·
dallon; apprenuce denied back \,"3!!es and anomey's fo:o:s and Co,l; upon rO:ln,tato:mo:nl .... .0 "p.:r~on
aggrieved" 68 H. INo. 10933l. 7~3 P ~d 753.
L'nincorporated aSSOCIation was "pcnon aggneved" by deCISion 10 gnnl ,pcclal managemo:nt ;uea
pcrTllit. bul aSSOCIation did /10( panlclpate 10 a "conlesled case". 69 H. I No. II 2:!8l. ~)-l P 2d 161.
Judicial review of ill agency delerTll103UOn musl be contined 10 ,ssues properly ral>.:d In the record
of the adnuntstratlve proceedings. 69 H. INo. 11312l. 736 P 2d 1~71
Public employen directly JI'fected by a!!ency's order '"'ere "aggne\ed per~ons" and IhO:lr tiling of
amICus bnefs with agency W<l5 sufficlenl "advenary panlClpatlon" ,Iandard u,o:d !'I\ appellate ,oun
when re't'lewmg CircUlI coun's reView of agency decision. 5 H. App. 5D. "OJ P:d '1(7.
Does not require WI all eVIdence before agency suppon lIS lindmgs: >ufliClenl If find lOgs -;upponed
by reliable. probauve. and ;ubslilltlal evidence. 6 H. App. INo. IIJ IJ l. ~ J5 P 2d ~50.
69
•
PLANNING CO~~ISSION
COUNTY OF HAWAII
•
~:... 12.1
RULE 12. GEOTHERMAL RESOURCE PERl-tITS
Purpose and Authority
:~..
12.2
This rule governs geothermal resource permit procedures pursuant
to authority conferred by section 205-5.1, Havaii Revised
Statutes, as amended, upon the Planning Commission to determine
whether proposed geothermal development activities should be
allowed. The Planning Commission is the issuing authority for
geothermal resource permits in geothermal resource subzones
located within Agricultural, Rural and Urban State Land Use
Districts in the County.
The Planning Commission's approval of an application for a
geothermal resource permit shall not in any way abrogate nor
supercede the provisions of Chapters 182 and 183, HRS, and rules
promulgated thereunder.
Definitions
12.3
As used herein, "geothermal development activities", whether for
research or commercialization purposes, means exploration,
development, or production of electrical energy from geothermal
resources, or as otherwise defined in Hawaii Revised Statutes,
Section 205-5.1.
Contents of Apolication
....
Any person who desires to conduct geothermal development
activities on land that is located within a geothermal resource
subzone and located within either the Agricultural, Rural or
Urban State Land Use Districts shall apply to the Planning
Commission for a geothermal resource permit. An application for
a geothermal resource permit shall be filed in the Planning
Department's office and shall include the following:
(a) Non-ref~n~able filing and processing fee of one thousand
dollars.
(b) Original and twenty-five copies of:
(1) Application form;
(2) Written and appropriate graphic descriptions of the
property and the proposed geothermal development
activities including, but not limited to:
(A) A description of the prooerty for which a permit
is being requested to include the property's real
property tax map key designation and a
APPENDIX A-3
description of the property's location within the
County.
(B) A written s~atement describing the scope of the
planned activities and presenting the applicant's
reasons for requesting the permit.
(E) The proposed locations and elevations and depths
of all superstructures and drilling rigs, bottom
hole locations, casing program, proposed well
completion program, size and shape of drilling
sites, and location of all existing and proposed
access roads.
•
.....
•
(e) A preliminary plot or site plan of the property,
drawn to scale, showing all existing and proposed
uses and locations of structures including, but
not limited to, drilling sites, wells, access
roadways, water sources, waste water collection
and disposal systems, the geothermal stearn and/or
brine collection and disposal systems, power
plant(s) and electrical power distribution
systems.
(D) Preliminary elevation drawings of the proposed
temporary and permanent structures.
(F) Areas of potential temporary and/or permanent
surface disturbance, including, but not limited
to, excavation and grading sites, the location oJ
camp sites, airstrips, and other support
facilities, excavation and borrow pits for roads
and other construction activities.
(G) A written description of the methods for
disposing of well effluent and other wastes.
(H) A geologist's report on the site and surrounding
area's surface and subsurface geology, nature and
occurrence of known or potential geological
hazards and geothermal resources, surface and
ground water resources, topographic features of
the land, and drainage patterns.
(I) Pre-exploration meteorological, ambient air
quality and noise level measurements that
demonstrate the potential effects on surrounding
properties through air quality and noise impact
analysis.
(J) A written description of the ~easures proposed to
be taken for protection of the environ~ent,
-2-
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• •including, but not limited to, the prevention
and/or control of:
( i)
(ii)
(i i i)
(iv)
( v)
(v i)
(vii)
(viii)
Fires,
Soil erosion,
Surface and ground water contamination,
Damage to fish and wildlife or other
natural resources,
Air and noise emissions,
Hazards to public health and safety,
Socio-economic impact(s), and
Impact(s) on public infrastructure and
services.
(K) Statement(s) addressing how the proposed
development would mitigate or reconcile:
( i) Any effects to residents or surrounding
properties in the areas of health,
environment and socio-economic activities;
(ii) The burdening of public agencies to
provide support infrastructure such as
roads, sewers, water, drainage, school and
related services and police and fire
protection.
(L) Preliminary provisions and/or plans for the
monitoring of environmental effects such as noise
and air and water quality during each proposed
....
phase of the project (exploration, development
and production) demonstrating how the applicant
intends to comply with this rule, the rules of
the State's Department of Health, and the rules
of the State Board of Land and Natural Resources.
(M) A preliminary plan of action for emergency
situations which may threaten the health, safety,
and welfare of employees and other persons in the
vicinity of the proposed project site including,
but not limited to, procedures to facilitate
coordination with appropriate Federal, State and
County officials and the evacuation of affected
individuals.
(N) Preliminary tirnetable(s) and/or schedulers) for
each proposed phase of the project.
(0) Method(s) of presenting timely progress reports
to the Planning Commission.
(P) Other pertinent information or data such as an
archaeological survey which the Planning Director
-3-
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may require to support the application for the
utilization of geothermal resources and the
protection of the environment.
(c) Graphic representations suitable for both staff analysis
and pUblic presentation, including the depiction of the
project boundaries, reference points (roadways, shoreline,
etc.), existing and proposed structures and appurtenances.
Graphics for public presentation shall be a minimum of 2
feet by 3 feet in dimension, drawn to scale on a map or
maps of 1:24,000 scale, or larger when required by the
Commission.
Properly Filed Apo1ication
12.5
Within twenty days of receipt of an application, the Planning
Director shall review it to determine if it is complete in that
it includes the supporting data required pursuant to
Section 12.3 of this rule. An application that is determined to
be complete shall be officially accepted within twenty days of
receipt of the application and the applicant shall be so
notified in writing.
Hearing and Notification
(a) The Planning Director, on behalf of the Planning
Commission, shall set a date for a public hearing to be
held within a period of ninety days from the date of
official acceptance of a properly filed and completed
application.
(b) The Planning Commission shall conduct a public hearing
(and]. (u]UEon appropriate request (a contested case
hearing pursuant to the Planning Commission rules
pertaining to public and contested case hearings.) for
mediation from anv party who submitted com~ent at t~
public hearing, the Planning Commission shall order the
requesting party or parties, the applicant and the
aooropriate agencies to submit to the mediation process
outlined in Section 12.5.1 of this rule.
(c) Promptly after the Planning Director fixes a date for the
public hearing and at least 15 days before the date of the
public hearing, the applicant shall mail a notic~ of the
hearing to owners of interests in properties, as shown on
the current real property tax rolls at the County Real
Property Tax Office, within a minimum of three hundred feet
of the perimeter boundary of the property for which a
permit is being requested (or as deter~ined by the Planning
Director), and to other interested persons or groups as may
be determined by the Planning Director. The applicant
shall also ~ake a reasonable attemot or best effort in
notifying residents within one tho~sand fe~t of the
-4-
•perimeter boundary of the property of the public hearing.
Such notice shall state:
(1) Name of the applicant;
(2) Precise location of the property involved;
(3) Nature of the proposed geothermal development
activities; and
(4) Date, time, and place of the hearing.
(d) If the notification requirement set forth in section 12.5
(c) has not been met, the Planning Commission shall not
conduct a hearing and further action on the application
shall be deferred until the notification requirement is met.
(e) In addition to said notice and at least fifteen days prior
to the date of the hearing, the Planning Commission shall
publish notice of the hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation in the County which includes the information
provided under section l2.5(c) (1-4) of this rule.
12.5.1
(d)
Mediation
Persons Entitle to Request Mediation. Any person,
including interested government agencies, who submitted
co~~ent at the pUblic hearing may, upon aSProEriate
request, seek medIatIon of Issues ralsedy that person at
the initial ublic hearing. U on receipt of an a pro riate
request, the PlannIng Commission s a require t e parties
to oarticipate in mediation. All appropriate requests for
mediation shall be consolidated in a sinale mediation
conference. The Planning Commission shall not be a party
to the mediation, and shall not be permitted to attend
mediation conferences. The Planning Department may be a
party to the mediation if it makes an appropriate request.
Re uests for Mediation. A re uest for mediation shall be
made In writing to t e Panning ommlSSlon, S a contain a
brief statement of the issue or issues raised oy that
person at the public hearing, and shall contain the name,
address, phone number and si nature of the erson
reqUeS~lng me latlon.
Time for Submission of Reouest. The oriainal and ten (10)
copies of the request for "mediation shali be filed with the
Plannina Co~~ission within five days after the close of the
initial public hearing and one copy of toe request shall be
served on the apPlicant •
.
Appointment of a Mediator. Within five days after receipt
of" a timely request, the Planning CommiSSion shall appoint
-5-
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• •
No shall
dis ute in which that erson
lnancla or persona lnterest In t e resu tot e
mediation, except by the written consent of all parties to
the mediation. Prior to accepting an appointment, the
prospective mediator shall dIsclose any Clrcumstances
likely to create "a presumption of bias'or prevent the"
prompt completion of the mediation. Upon receipt of such
information, the Chairperson shall either replace the
mediator or immediately communicate the information to the
parties for their comments. In the event the parties are
unable to agree as to whether the mediator shall serve, or
in the event the a ointed mediator becomes unable or
unwIlllno to serve, the Chair erson wIl ap OInt another
me lator. T e meolator s a no De an em 0 ee 0 anv
County agency or Its sta
Notice of Mediation Conference. The applicant and any
person submitting a timely resuest for mediation shall be
notified bv the Planning CommIssion of the date, time, and
place of the first mediation conference by depositino such
notice in the mail to the return address stated in the
application and in the reguest for mediation. The notice
shall be mailed no later than ten days before the start of
tne medIatIon conference.
Mediation Conference. The initial mediation session shall
be held within 15 days after the appointment of the
mediator. The mediator shall fix the time and place of
each subsequent mediation session. The conference shall be
held within the County of Hawaii unless all parties and the
mediator agree otherwise. The mediation period shall not
extend beyond thirty days after the initial mediation
session, except by order of the Planning Commission.
Mediation shall be confined to the issues raised at the
public hearing by the respective party or parties
requesting mediation.
JEl Authority of Mediator. The mediator shall attempt to help
the parties reach a satIsfactory resolution of their
dispute, but shall not have authority to impose a
settlement upon the parties. The mediator may conduct
joint and separate meetings with the parties and make oral
and written recommendations for settlement.
ill Mediation sessions shall be orivate. The oarties
representatives sna nave tne rignt to attena
mediation sessions. Other pl?r:-_sons may attl?no
-6-
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ill
only with th~ permission of all parties to the mediation
and the consent of the mediator.
Confidentiality. Confidential information disclosed to a
mediator by anv party in the course of the mediation shall
not be divulgea by the mediator to anyone, lncludlng other
parties to the mediation. All records, reports, or other
documents received b a mediator while servin in such
capacitv s al be con ldentla. The meolator s a not be
compelled to divulQe such records or to testifv in regard
to the mediation in any administrative proceedings or
judicial forum.
The parties shall maintain the confidentiality of the
mediation and shall not rely on, or introduce as evidence
in any arbitral, judicial, administrative, or other
proceeding:
views expressed or suggestions made by any other
party with respect to a possible settlement of
any disputed issue:
i.
I.: (i i i)
statements or admissions made by any other party
in the course of mediation proceedings:
proposals made or views expressed by the mediator:
the fact that the other party had or had not
indicated willingness to accept a proposal for
.settlement made bv the mediator.
l!L Steno ra hic Record. There shall be no steno ra hie record
or electronic recordatlon 0 the me latlon process.
(m) Recommendation of Mediator. The mediator shall submit a
written report containing recommendations to the Planning
Commission, based upon any mediation agreement reached
between the parties or stating that no agreement was
reached, for consideration by the Planning Commission in
its final decision. The written report of the mediator
shall be filed with the Planning Commisslon and served on
all oarties to the mediation within 10 days of the close of
the mediation conference.
~ Second Public Hearina. If there is no mediation a reement,
or 1 tne me latlon agreement Goes not reso ve a lssues
submitted for mediation, the Planning Commission may, in
its sole discretion, hold a second publlC hearlng to
receive additional comment related to the unresolved
mediation issues. The second pUblic hearing, if to be
conducted, shall be held within thirty (30) days after
receipt of the mediator's report. Within 10 days after the
second public hearing, the Planning Commission may receive
-7-
Criteria for Issuance of Geothermal Resource Permit
Expenses. The oarties shall each bear their respective
costs, fees and expenses.
The Planning Commission shall.grant a geothermal resource permit
if it finds that the applicant has demonstrated [by a
preponderance of evidence] that:
••
additional written comment on the unresolved mediation
issues raised at the second public hearing by any party.
If a second hearing is held, the Planning Commission shall
consider the comments raised at the second hearing before
rendering its final decision. The Planning Commission
shall then determine whether a geothermal resource eermit
shall be Qranted for qeothermal development activitles
described in the application.
12.6
(a) The proposed geothermal development activities would not
have unreasonable adverse health, environmental, or
socio-economic effects on residents or surrounding
property; and
(b) The proposed geothermal development activities would not
unreasonably burden public agencies to provide roads and
streets, sewers, water, drainage, school improvements, and
police and fire protection; and
(c) There are reasonable measures available to mitigate the
unreasonable adverse effects or burdens referred to above.
12.7 Action
(a) Unless there is mutual agreement [by the Planning Director,
the applicant, and, if applicable, any intervenors in a
contested case hearing] to extend the period of time for
the Planning Commission's action, the Planning Commission
shall take action on a properly filed and complete
application within six months (180 days) of the date a
[properly filed] complete application is [officially
accepted] filed; provided that [if a contested case hearing
is held, the Planning Commission shall take action within
nine months (270 days) of the date a properly flled
application is officially accepted.] the time limit may be
extended by aqreement between the applicant and the
Planning Commission.
(b) The Planning Commission's action shall either:
(1) Grant the geothermal resource permit as requested by
the applicant based upon the satisfaction of criteria
in section 12.6 above and stating the reasons
-8-
therefore, subject to performance, reporting and other
appropriate conditions imposed by the Commission.
(~) Grant the geothermal resource permit as may be
modified from the applicant's request and stating the
reasons therefore, sUbject to performance, reporting,
and other appropriate conditions imposed by the
Commission.
• •
(3) Grant the geothermal resource permit in phases or
increments dependent upon the timely and progressive
completion of a precedent phase or incremen~ and
stating the reasons therefore, subject to p~rformance,
reporting, and other appropriate conditions imposed by
the Commission.
(4) Deny the geothermal resource permit and stating the
reasons therefore.
(c) The Chairperson of the Commission shall issue official
written notification to the applicant of the Commission's
action including any performance, reporting, and other
appropriate conditions imposed by the Commission.
12.8 Recruirements Prior to Initiating Construction
Prior to initiating construction of an approved project or any
phase of an approved project, the applicant shall submit the
following to the Planning Director:
(a) Copies of approved permits and other applicable approvals
for the project or any phase of the project from other
County, State or Federal agencies as applicable.
(b) Final plans or provisions for monitoring environmental
effects of the project or any phase of the project such as
noise, air and water quality as may be required to insure
compliance with County rules and the rules of the State's
Department of Health and Board of Land and Natural
Resources, and other permit-issuing agencies.
(c) A final plan of action to deal with emergency situations
which may threaten the health, safety, and welfare of the
employees and other persons in the vicinity of the proposed
project site. The plan shall include procedures to
facilitate coordination with appropriate State and County
officials and the evacuation of affected individuals.
(d) A final site plan and elevations of proposed temporary
and/or permanent structures for the project or any phase of
the project.
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(a) For any amendments to the geothermal resource permit or its
conditions the permittee shall set forth in writing:
(b) ·In the case of any amendment concerning a time extension to
the permit or its conditions, the permittee shall file the
request not less than ninety days prior to the deadline for
performance of the condition, setting forth:
(1) The specific amendment requested:
(2) The reasons for the request, including statements
addressing the criteria listed under section 12.6(1)
through (3) of this rule: and
(3) Any other applicable information requested by the
Planning Director.
••12.9 Amendments of Permit and Conditions
(1) The affected condition:
(2) The length of time requested: and
(3) The reasons for the request.
If either the Planning Director or the Planning Commission
is not able to act on a properly filed time extension
request prior to the deadline for a time extension, the
geothermal development activities allowed by the Geothermal
Resource Permit may be continued by the Planning Director.
(c) All of the procedures set forth in sections 12.4 through
12.12 of this rule and the procedures set forth in other
applicable Planning Commission rules shall apply.
12.10 Enforcement of Permit and Conditions
(a) If the Planning Director determines that there is
noncompliance with the geothermal resource permit or its
conditions, the Planning Director shall so inform in
writing the permittee and, if applicable, other appropriate
County, State or Federal agencies, setting forth the
grounds of his determination. Upon receiving notice of the
determination of noncompliance, the permittee shall have
i,ive days to provide a -written response to the notice of
determination of noncompliance.
(b) Notwithstanding any written response submitted by the
permittee, if the Planning Director affirms the
determination of noncompliance, he shall so advise th~
permittee in writing. The permittee shall have five days
thereafter to correct the noncompliance; provided that the
Planning Director may allow a longer period u?on a finding
-10-
•of good cause, suchpermittee's control
five-day period.
as where circumsttltes beyond the
will prevent compliance within the
I-
r--
(c) The permittee may request a hearing with the Planning
Commission to amend the permit, should compliance be
impossible or impractical to meet.
(d) If the permittee fails to correct the noncompliance within
the required time period, the Planning Director shall refer
the matter with ·his recommendations to the Planning
Commission for further disposition, which may include, but
is not limited to, either the revocation or the
modification of the permit.
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section,
pending a hearing by the Planning Commission the Planning
Director may immediately and temporarily suspend the permit
and operations al+owed thereunder. Notice of a temporary
suspension shall be provided in writing or orally with
subsequent written confirmation within three days to the
permittee and shall set forth the reasons for the temporary
suspension. The Planning Director may reactivate the
permit upon a subsequent finding of the permittee's
compliance with the permit condition. Subject to the
Planning Commission rules, the permittee may at any time
request a hearing before the Planning Commission for its
review and action with regard to the permit's temporary
suspension or any subsequent refusal of the Planning
Director to reactivate the permit. Referrals by the
Planning Director to the Planning Commission and reviews by
the Planning Commission of the Planning Director's action
shall be heard at the Commission's next meeting when the
matter can be placed on the Commission's agenda.
12.11 Penalties
If a permittee, its successors or assigns do not comply with any
provision of a permit or its conditions issued under this Rule they
may be subject to a civil fine not to exceed those provided for by
applicable statutes.
12.12 Aooeals
[Any person aggrieved by the action of the Planning Commission
in the issuance of a geothermal resource permit or an amendment of
condition or permit under Section 12.9 shall be entitled to appeal
such decision to the applicable court of the State of Hawaii.)
~ Anv decision made by the Plannino Commission oursuant to a
public hearing or hearings under this rule mav be apoealed
directly on the record to the SUDreme court for f.ina1
decision and shall not be subject to a contested C3se
-11-
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hearins. ~ctions 91-14(b) and (O)'~Waii Revised
Statutes, as amended, shall govern the appeal,
notwithstanding the lacK of a contested case nearinq on the
matter. The Planninq Commission shall provide a court
reporter to produce a transcript of the proceedings at all
public hearings under this rule for purposes of an apoeal.
(b) For the
hear lng,
a decision from a oublic
:.;..
-'..:.
,
':.
12.13
Staff recommendations from Countv aqencies submitted
to tne plannlng Commlsslon In consloeratlon of tne
application.
Oral and written pUblic testimony received at the
public hearIngs.
written transcripts of the proceedings at the pUblic
hearings.
The written recommendation received by the Planning
Commission from the mediator with anv mediation
agreement.
A statement of relevant
annlng ommlSSlon
pUblic hearings.
The written decision of the Planning Commission issued
in connection with the aoplication and pUblic hearings.
Other documents required by the Planning Commission.
Severability
If any portion of this rule, or its application to any person or
circumstance, shall be held unconstitutional or invalid, the
remainder of this rule and the application of such portion to other
persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
-12-
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•APPROVED AS TO FORM AND LEGALITY:
_. '._, ?crly)rgYtUK.. f)\.~ !.,,~; ;Corporatlon Counsel
J-t#Jday of
......,=~;:.,.:.:~.:.....;f:.-_--' 1988.
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I, THOMAS A. KRIEGER, Chairman of the Planning Commission, do
hereby certify that attached hereto is a copy of a document
entitled, -Rule 12, Geothermal Resource Permits," the original of
which is on file with the Commission, and that the requirements as
prescribed in Section 91-3 of the H~_;;~~Oll;.~
THOHAS A. KRIEGER,
Planning Commission
County of Hawaii
RECEtyED THIS;L ttl day of
1-£8W~v , 1988 •
County Cler
-14-
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Planning Commission
2J Avpam sa-t. R& 10' • ana. HawUi "7'10 • (SOl) "1~2.I'
CE?TIFIED fl!AIL
Dr. sa rry Olsen
BEl/Spark Mat~unaqa Pellow
in Geotbermal Research
Bawaii Natural Energy Institute
Holmes Ball 240
2540 Dole Street
Honolulu, 81 96822
August lS, 1989
.....
"-,.,
-oear Dr. Olsen:
G.cthermal'Resource Permit Application (~~ e9~1)
Ravaii's Scientific Ob.ervation Bole (SOB) Program
Lilev., K~pobo, and Halekamahina, Bavaii
TMX: 1-2-10: 01, ·1-4-01: 2: and 1-4-02: 32
.
The Planning Commisaion at its duly held meeting on .
August 8, 1989, considered this Geothermal Re~ource Permit
Application and approved this request based on the followinq
findings: :
(1) The proposed geotherMal development activities would not
bave unreasonacle adverse bealth, environmental, or socio-economic
effects on residents·or surrounding property.
Approximately a quarter acre of land will be cl@ared anc
leveled tor each drill site. taco drill site will be
constructed so that surface water runoff is contained within t~e
site and vill drain into the mud pit.
There are no surface streams or ponds in t~e vicinity of
the proposed drill sites. Groundwater vill be protected by
cementing easing into the. bole to depths below sea level •
.. , .
There ~r. no habibats'for aquatic lit. in the area:
however, other wildlife and natural resources will be affec~ed
by loss of habitat at the drill site and along any access roacs
that vill be constructed. This habitat loss wi:l be limited ~~
the duration of drilling, testinq, and monitorinq operations,
after Which the site will be restored. ~he area at soa 4 w:::
APPENDIX B-1
A
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be surveyed for rare and endangered species and arc~aeologica:
remains prior to clearing activity, and, it necessary, the site
will be relocated to avoid undesirable impact. Similarly, the
area affected by SOB 1 and SOB 2 will be surveyed by an -
ornitbologist. To minimize any adverse impacts to the
endangered '1'0, the ornithologist's recommendations will be
sought.
Geothermal emissions will not be vented to the atmosphere,
and no other aspects ot drilling should affect public health.
The sites have been located in agricultural areas away from
urban popUlation concentrations. The sites will also be located
to take advantage of existin9 vegetation to mutfle or-block
noise from the drilling operations. Tbe drilling area will be
within an area designated as a ~bard bate area. The general
pUblic will. ·not be.. p,erll! tt~d within' this area.
0. . . . .
The drill operator will brinq into-the area three c:e~s
composed of two men each plus a drilling foreman. Other
technical pe~sonnel associated with the project will include a
drilling superVisor, a mud technician, various suppliers and
sUbcontract~rs, the principal investigator, and several
researcbers and field supervisors. These people will rent
housing in the Silo-Pahoa-Kalapana area. The maximum number of
persons a~ the project at one time should not exceed twenty.
Local suppliers and contractors will be used Wherever possible.
Orilling tbe SOB's should take approximately twelve to six~een
months to complete, depending upon drilling concitions and the
depth to wbich the holes are drilled.
A~ previously stated, the socio-economic impacts of t~is
activity would no~ be unreasonable. The economic benefits and
security implications ot redUcing Sawaii's dependence on
imported fuels for energy production have been recognized for a
long period of time at all levels ot government. This has
resulted in a general policy of support for alternative energy
research and development. The establishment of Geothermal
aesource Subzones, where exploration and development are
allowable activities, acknOWledges ~he potential higher use of
. t~e lands in volcanic ·rift,~ones which are generally of marginal
value for 4qriculture and otber cultural uses. Results of these
scientific observations could lead to development of indigenous
geothermal resources for the general social and economic
well-being of the residents of aa~aii.
i rvnimz tzaz-
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(2) The proposed geothermal development activities wo~ld not
unreasonably burden pUblic ,gencies to provide roads and streets,
sewer~, water, drainage, school improvements, and police and fire
protection.
There should be ue9liqible impact on pUblic infrastructure
and serVices. Personnel associated vitb the drilliDq operations
vill be temporary and small in number. Most of the personnel
vill be on temporary duty and will not bring their families.
These people w11~ utilize existinq facilities and will not
require additional services tbat are not already prOVided by the
County. .
Pire ext:inqui~hers are standard equipment on drilling rigs
to control fire. ~sociated vi~h drilling operations. !~e.rig
vill :utili:e eith~r a pipel~ne or wa~er haulage tru~k to supply
water to.r, ·tbe, drilllnq fluids. Tbi~ vater can b'e' usea, to
extinguish any fires,that ·may develop. In.additio~, drilling
muds can be pumped onto any fire that may develop in the
Vicinity of the ri9_
, .'
'Drillinq operations vill require no provisions from public
agencies in the form of roads or stre.ts, sewers, drainage, or .
school enlargement or improvements, and only the normally
afforded police and fire protection'vill be expected. Any
necessary' access roads will be constructed by the applicant, and
water tor drillinq vill be purchased and supplied by temporary
pipeline or transported to the sit. in tank trucks by the
drilling contractor.
() ~here are reesonable measures available to mitigate the
unreasonable adverse effects or burdens referred to acove.
Hydrogen sulfide monitors will be operable at the drill
site durinq rotary and core drillinq operations. The applicant
will comply witb all tederal, state, county, or local rules
re9ardinq environmental monitorinq.
Du~in9 drillinq ope~ations, noise levels will be monitored
at several sites at and ad~ac.nt to the drilling rig, and
mitiqatinq measures vi~l·b.'taken if noise levels exceed
acceptable levels.
The drillers will r~eive safety instructions and
in~tructions on how to contact emergency facilities in the
--~--- '---'--
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area. Phone numbers for police, fire department; hospital, and
other emergency services will be posted in a prominent place at
the drill rig, toqether with phone numbers for the drill
supervisor, principal investigator, field manager, and
appropriate state and county regulators.
As drillinq will be conducted on a 24 hours-a-day, 1
days-a-week basis once the core dr illing commences,' the dr ill
site vill be lighted dur1nq the hours ot darkness to permit
continuous operations and to prOVide sate worki~ conditions.
Tbe rig will be sited so as to be as unobtrusive as possi~le and
Vill conforll to all Hawaii outdoor ligbting regulations. Copies
of Hawaii Outdoor Lightinq R89ulations will be prOVided to the
drillinq contractor to insure compliance. Atter the rig 1s
operational, a lighting ~urv.y vill be 'made, and lights adjuste'd
or abielded as necas.sary te;t cause tbe· minimum impact.
... .
Approval of this request i.t SUbject to the fo·1Iowing conditions:
1. the petitioners, 1ts successors, or assigns shall be
responsible for complyinq with all of the stated conditions
of approval.
2. Prior to the commencement of any grubbing or grading
activi;y, the petitioner shall: . ,
,
a. Mark the boundaries of the designated SOB site(s), and
the access road riqht-of-way(s), and no construction
or transportation equipment shall be permitted beyonc
the prescribed boundaries ot the said SOB site(s) anc
road right-of-way(s):
COnduct an archaeological reconnaissance survey and an
endangered flora and tauna survey at all S08 Boles and
the access road rigbt-of-way leading to them and
SUbmit the results of the surveys to the County
Planninq Department for review: and
c. Comply with all requirements of the County grading
. ordinance. ' .. , . .
J. Prior to any drilling activity, the petitioner shall sUbmi~
and secure approval from the Planning Department or i~s
designee a noise monitoring plan to be impleme~ted When t~e
SOB dri~ling and testing period begins. :his Flan shal:
Or. garry Olsen
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include the monitoring of noise at the specific siees at
least one week prior to the start of drillinq to establish
a site specific baseline. This plan should allow the
coordination of noise complaints with noise measurements,
the meteorological conditions, and the type ot operations
wbich occurred at the SOB site. The data obtained shall be
available upon r~est by the appropriate governmental
agencies includinq the Planninq Oepartment. 'The noise
monitoring program shall be in operation during all active
pbases of tbe project. "
The applica.nt. shall meet. t.he gUidelines for' noise included
as COndition No. 12 below for all aspects' of this project
includinq all rigs u-ed at the respective sites; however,
the applicant shall also make every attempt to make
drilling as quiet a•. possible to zeduce noise to me9t
c01lUlluni ty ,eoncerns.. The applicant: ,shall. schedule cabl e r i q
drillinq durinq daylight bours Which is defined as the
bours between 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m •
•
The applicant shall make available one mobile noise
monitoring staJ:ion to do site specific monitoring.
Prior to any drillinq activity, t.he petitioner shall subm~~
and s~cur. approval trom the Planninq Depaztment or
designee an air qualit.y monitoring plan to be implemented
wben the SOB drilling period beqins. The plan shall
include provisions tor installation, calibration,
maintenance, and operation ot recording instruments to
measure air contaminant concentrations. The specific
elements to be monitored, the number ot stations involved,
and t.he frequency of samplinq and reporting shall be
specified by the Planning Department or its designee. ~~e
air quality monitoring prograa shall be in operation during
all pbases ot the project •
.
5. Prior to any drilling activity, the petitioner shall subm~:
and secure· approval trom t.he Hawaii County Civil Defense
Agency a plan of actio~ to deal with emergency situations
Which may threaten the bealth, safety, and welfare of the
employees/persons 1~ the vicinity of the proposed projec:.
The plan shall include procedures to facilitate
coordinat.ion vithappropriate State and County of!icia:s as
well as t.he evacuation of affected indiViduals. The plan
shall also include provisions for the applicant to pcov::e
Dr. Harry Olsen
Auqust 15, 19.89
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alternate transportation from the area for those affected
in the event of a bazard associated with well drilling
operations, for training tbe drill crews to handle
emergencies, and to have available on site cement batching
to pluq the soa in the event of an emergency.
~h. petitioner sball maintain a record in a permanent form
suitable for inspection and five (5) copies shall be filed
with the Planning Department on a monthly basis during
drillinq and for six (6) months after the completion of
drillinq to establish a hole specific baseline and such
record shall be available to the community. The record
shall include:
a. Occurrence and duration of any start-up, shut-down,
and oper~~ion ~o~e of any SOB/facility.
b.
• • 1" ,. •
Performance testing, evaluation~ calibration checks,'
and adjustment and maintenance of the continuous
emission .onitor(s) that bave been installed.
c. Emission measurements reported in units compatible
with applicable standards/guidelines.
1. The petitioner, its successors, or assigns shall apply t~e
-Best Available Control Technology· (aAC:) with respect eo
geothermal emissions during all phases of the project,
including soa drilling and testing. -Best available
control technology· means the maximum degree of control for
noise and air quality concerns taking into account what is
known to be practical but not necessarily in use. BAC~
shall be determined by the Planning Department in
consultation vith recognized experts and other appropriate
governmental agencies involved in the control or regulation
of geothermal development. Should it be determined that
BACT is not being employed, the Planning Oepartment is
authorized to take any appropriate action including
suspension ot any further activities at the project site or
referral of the matter to the Plannin9 Commission for·
review and dispositiori •.
. , .
8. Onabated open venting of qeothermal steam shall be
prohibited.
9. The petitioner shall provide, install, calibrate, maintain,
and operate a meteorological station and conduct continuous
meteorological monitoring at tbe site(s) or at another
location as may be mutually agreed to by the petitioner and
the Planning Department. The data shall be provided in a
format agreeable to the Planning Oepartment on a monthly
basis and shall include temperature, wind velocity, wind
direction, and other information de~med necessary by the
Planning Department.
10. Tbe petitioner shall publish a telephone number for use by
local individual. in case o~ noise or odor co'mplaints and
have an employee available at the drill site, 24 bours a
cay, to respond to any local complaints.
11. 'tbe petitioner, shall ,submit fi ve, (5) copies Qt "a status
, . raport ',to tbe' Planninq pepartment on a qU,a~terly ..basis (by'
the first day ot January, April, July, and October ot each
year), or, Within 30 days ot the completion ot any SOE.
The status reports shall be available to the public. The
status report shall', include, but not be limited to:
a. A detailed description ot the work undertaken during
the current reporting period inclUding drilling
activity report;
,
,t
b. A description ot tbe work being proposed over the next
reporting period,
•
Or. garry Olsen
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c. The results ot the environmental/noise monitoring
activities ,
d. A log ot the complaints received and the responses
thereto,
e. The current status ot exploration actiVities in the
context ot long-range program goals; and
t.' Any other inf~rmation that tbe Planning Oepart~ent may
require whieh'viIl address environmental and,
r&9ulatory eon~erns involvinq the requirements of the
Geothermal Resource Permit.
g. This condition shall remain in effect until all of the
conditions ot approval have been complied with, then
Or. ear:y Olsen
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13.
14.
after which these reports shall be every six '(6)
months tor tbe duration of the project.
These reports sball include a tinancial accounting ot
the resources expendec by the project.
Ontil such time as Doise r~ulations are adopted by the
state or COunty, the petitioner shall comply with'the
following qUidelines which shall be entorced by the
Planning Department:
a. A general noise level at 55 dba during daytime and 4S
dba at night shall not be exceeded except as allow~d
under b. Por th. purposes at these guidelines, night
is defined as tbe hours between 7:00 p.m. and 7:00
•.••• 1 '",.. .. .'
. .
Tbe allowable Daise levels may be .xceeaed by a
maximum of 10 dbal however, in any event, the
generally allowed noise level should not be exceeded.
a~re than 10'~ of the time Within any 20 minute period:
e. ~he noise level guidelines shall be applied at the
eXistin~ residential receptors which may be impacted
.by the geothermal operation, and
'f
d. Sound level ••asurements shall be conducted using
standard procedures with sound level meters using the
·A- weighting and ·slow· meter response unless
o~~erwis. stated.
A disposal site or sites approved by the State Department
of S.alth, prior to any disposal activity covered by this
permit, shall be prOVided for sump contents and other waste
m.ter~als to be disposed at from the drilling activity.
All sumps/ponds shall be purged in a manner meeting with
the approval of the State Department of aealth. In the
event there are no DQa r~irem.nts, the applicant and the
Planning Departme~t ~ball .request tor quidelines from the
DOS tor the purging of sumps and ponds. Said guidelines
shall be available to the community.
• 15. When soa's are completed or abandoned, all denuded areas on
and around the dr111inq site shall be reveqetated in a
acu57uerM....e'ft we, sowe
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manner meeting with the approval of the Planning O~?a:~~ent
upon consultation with the Porestry Division of the
Department of Land and Natural Resources and the property
owners.
15. The petitioner shall grant unrestricted access to the
SUbject property(ies) to authorized governmental
representatives or to consultants or contractors hired by
gQvernmental agencies for inspection, enforcement, or
monitoring activities. A designated employee shall be
available at all times tor purposes ot supplying
1nfo~tioa and responses deemed necessary by the
authorized governmental representative in connection witb
such work.
11.' Large vehicle .~eliveries to "the· drill site sball be limited
to daylight.bouts. Pot tbe purposes ot this condition;
dayligbt bours is defined as the bours b.tween 7:00 a;m and
7:00 p... Tbe applicant sball make every attempt to
contine water deliveries between the bours of 8:00 a.m. and
5:00 p.a. ~his condition shall Dot apply for vehicles
re.pond1ng to emergencies.
18. ~be lighting used shall not 1nterfere'with the operations
at the observatories located On "auna ~ea. To meet this
requirement, the petitioner shall comply with the
reqUirements ot Chapter 14, Article 9 of the cawaii Countj1
COde, relating to outdoor lighting.
19. ~bis Geotnermal Resource Permit shall be effective until
December 31, 1991.
20. All other applicable rules, regulations and requirements,
includin9 the•• ot the Hawaii County Department of Water
Su~Ply, State Department of Health and the State Oepar~ment
of Land and Natural Resources shall be complied wita.
21. An extension of time ~or the performance of conditions
vit~in the perMit m~y be granted by the Planning Director
upon the following 'ei~eumstances: 1) the non-performance
is the result of conditions that could not have been
~or.s.en or are beyond the control of the applicants,
successors or assiqns, and that are not the result of tte::
fault or negliqenc.: 2) qrantinq of the time extension
would not be contrary to the qeneral plan or zoning c~de:
••
23.
J) granting of the time extension would not be contrary to
the original reasons tor the granting of the Geothermal
Resource Permit: and 4) the time extension granted shall :e
for a period not to exceed one (1) year and 5) it the .
applicant should require an additional extension of time,
the Planning Dir.e~or shall submit the applicant's request
to the Planning Commission for appropriate action.
22. Should the Depa~ment of Water Supply's water well near SOE
2 be u8ed as a vater source during the dr~lling of SOB 2,
the water well shall he monitored for inc:eases 1n the
aalin. level of the vater.
Within 48 hours alter an earthquake registering 6 or above
on the Richter Seale andl.or within 48 bours after an
eruption h... occurred, all· SOB! s wi thin 10. kilometers ot
the 'epicenter' or· eruptive canter, ..shall. be examined to r any
physical cbanq4s·vhich would alter 'its downhole integrity;
A report of this examination sball be tiled with tbe
Plannin9 Departm~nt within 48 hours of the examination •
Or. Barry Olsen
AUCJust 15, 1989
raqe 10
..
. .
.
%4. As each SOB is drilled, each SOB will ~e precisely logged
to determine the precise location of the pipestring to
facilitate its plugging in the event ot a blowout •
.
25. SOS 4 sball be the first drill site. A status report for
the completion of the aecond stage (of three stages) of
SOB 4 shall be SUbmitted to Planning Commission prior to
drilling more than 200 feet below ground level at either
SOB 1 or SOB 2. Within thirty (30) days afeer submission
of said report, the Planninq Commission shall meet to
review said status report to verify compliance of the
1nitial drillin9 activities related to the first and secone
stages with all above conditions. The Planning Commision
reserves the riqht to call a pUblic hearing, if necessa:y,
to gather additional input regardinq the impact of the
activities at soa 4.
26.Shou14 any of the fore-goinq conditions not be met or
substantially co~li.d with in a timely fashion, ~~e
Planninq Director .may 1 immed1ately and temporarily suspend·
the permit and operations allowed thereunder. Notice of a
temporary suspen.ion shall be prOVided in writi~9 or ora:::
with subsequent written confirmation within tr.:ee days to
the permittee and shall set forth the reasons for the
temporary suspension.
Dr. Harry Olsen
August IS, 1989
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cc: Dee Dee Letts
Kem Lowry
Christine Batista
Jim Blakey
Department of Business and Economic Development~
Energy Division (Attn: Maurice Kaya) .
Civil Defense Agency (Attn. Harry Kim)
W. R. Craddick
Jane Hedtke
Richard F. and Lou Ann K. Jones
Kapoho Community Association (Attn: Lou Rankin)
Kapoho Community Association (Attn: Barbara Bell)
Kapoho Grown (Attn: Delan Perry)
Kapoho Grown (Attn: Jennifer Perry)
Fernando Javier/Lois J. West
David Laughlin
Alice Medeiros
Pele Defense Fund (c/o Paul W. Y. Takehiro)
Steve Philips
Gregory C. Pommerenk
Puna Community Council, Inc. (Attn: Ronald C. Phillips)
Helene Shinde
Yoshio Shinde
Ralph Matsuda
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A Iqislative II:t predela'mines whalthe law shaU be for the regulation
of future cues fallina under its provisions. A non-legislative act executes or
administm III"" already in eltistence.
ZONING AND PLANNING - pemUls. cmiflCous aNI approvaU - proceed-
ill,s to proclIn - ill geMTtJJ.
Approval of I Special Management Area~ permit application consti-
lUtes I non-Iegislative, not I legislative acL
STATUTES - corutructiort DNJ operaliort - gDWraJ ruks of construction.
Where there is no mtbipity in the IlJ1Iuage of I statute. and the literal
application of the Ilnguaae would not produce an absurd or unjust result.
clearly inconsistent with the pwposes and policies of the swute. there is no
room for judicia1 consttuetion and interpretation. and the statute must be
given effect accordina to its plain and obvious n\eaninl.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE - ill gmotU - agencia
a1td f"oceediJtgs ~«1bL
~ City Council, • the legislative b'anch of the county. is not In
....ency.. within the meaning of the Hawaii Adminislruive Procedures Act
(HAPA).1nd is therefore exempt from HAPA when acting in either Ilegisla-
tive or non-1egislative c:af*:ity.
SAME - SQIfV -IMW.
ZONING AND PLANNING - ~f1f'IiU. cert~alu. and approvaLs. proceed.
ill,s to procIITe - ill getV1'tU.
Provision of Coastal Zone Manqement Act. requiring each county
authority to establish "pursuant to Chapter 91" procedures for processing spe-
cial manaaement Irea use permit applications. does not subject the City
Council. otherwise exempt from the requirements of Hawaii Administrative
Procedures Act. to conduct "contested cue" proceedings when acting upon
individual permits.
SAME - J4IPW - $/2/N.
City Council. olherwiJe exempt from the requirements of the Hawaii
Administtative Procedures Act. nevertheless complied with the II:t' s role-
making provisions when it adopted an ordinance establishing procedures for
proc:essina special management uea use pennit applicuions, and therefore
did not vioille provision of Coastal Zone Manqement Act requiring each
county IUthority to establish pursuant to Chapter 91 its special mlnagement
uu permit procedwes.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - du process of law - proputy aNI righJs pro·
tected - ill ge1t6tU.
In order to 155m a right to procedural due process. a party must make a
preliminary showing that he has a propeny interesl within the meaning of the
due process clause.
SAME - SQIM - SMW.
•
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To have a property inlCrest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more
than III abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than I unilateral
expectation ofit; he must, instead. hive Ilegitinwe claim of entitlement to it.
SAME - SQIIIW - dqriWJIiott. tfpropcfJ ill fDlUtU - rtOtice and Jtearjf18 re-
qMirOl'Wlll.
The baic: elements orprocedural due process or IIW require notice and
an opportunity to be hen atl meaningful time and in I meaningful manner
before govemmerual deprivation or I signiflCll1t property interest.
SAME - SQIIIW - tJdmUWtrtJlive procudiJqs - ill geMTaJ.
Due process is not I faxed concept requiring I spe<:iflC procedural COlD'Se
in ~ery situation. Due procesJ is flexible and calls for such procedural pro'
tections IS the puticular situation demands.
SAME - 101M - $tJIM - SQIrV.
Determination of the specific p-ooedures required to satisfy due process
requires. balancing or 5eVt'Zal facton: 0> !he private interest which wiD be
affected; (2) !he risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures actually used, and the probable value. if any, or additional or alter·
native procedural safeguards; md (3) the governmental interest, including
the burden thalldditional procedural safegtWds would entail.
SAME - StJIM - $QfM - parricMltv proceedillts.
Even assuming Appellants' visual and environmental inlCrests inoppos-
ing I special manqemcmt area use permit for development within the coutal
zone constitute property interests protected by the constitution. their rights to
procedural due process were satisned by notice and an opportunity to be
heard.
SAME - eqllQ/prot«tioft oflaws -Ixuulor dUcrimillaJioft o/feeted illgeMTaJ
- ratioNlJ or retlJOfltJb~btui.J.
Unlest fundamenlal rights or suspect cluaiflCations are implicated. we
will apply the rational basis standard ofr~iew in examining adenial or equal
protection.
SAME - $QIfW - ItJIM - $ilMII.
To prevail. I p8rty challenaina the constitutionality of I statutory classi·
fication on equal protection grounds has the burden of showinl. with con·
vincin& clarity, that the classifICation is not rationally related to StllUlOt'y pur-
pose or that the challenaed classifICation does not rest on some grC>\D\d of die·
ference having fair and substantial relation to the object of legislation. and is
therefore, arbitrary and clprkious.
SAME - 101M - ItJIM - StJIM.
Discrimination between classes is not per Ie objectionable so long as any
state of facts reasonably can be conceived to sustain it.
SAME - $tJIM - zorUllg t11tdplmvtUtg regll1atioru - particular proceedings.
City Council's decision to p-ovide for public hearings when acting upon
spe<:ial management area use permit appl~. while other coW\ties pro-
vide amtested cue hearings punuant to the Hawaii Administrative Proce·
".. .:.
.~.
.';.;.
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dures Act., "". not clearly ubitrary and lhe:refore did not violate equal protec·
tion clause.
OPINION OF THE COURT BY LUM. CJ.
This appeal involves a challenge to the validity of the procedures
employed by AppeUee, the City and County of Honolulu (County) when
acting upon applications for Special Management Area (SMA) use per-
mits pursuant to the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), Hawaii Re-
vised Statutes (HRS). ChaptU 20SA. Appellants, residents and commu-
nity groups. challenge the County's issuance ofan SMA use pennit to Ap-
pellee Kaiser DevelopmentCo. (Kaiser). They contend that the Honolulu
City Council was required to hold a "contested case" I hearing pursuant
to the Hawaii Administrative Procedures Act (HAPA), HRS Chapter 91.
when it issued the permit. and that the Council's failure to do so violated
the CZMA and deprived Appellants of their constitutionaJ rights to due
process and equal ~tion. The coon below dismissed the case. rmding
no conslitutionaJ violation and ruling that the CZMA does not require a
legislative body, otherwise eltempt from HAPA. to conduct "contested
case" hearings in issuing SMA use pennits. We agree and therefore af-
rum the judgment of the court below.
I.
This case arises from the issuance ofan SMA use pennit to Kaiser by
the Honolulu City COWlCil. Kaiser sought to develop approximately 200
single-family homes in the vicinity of Sandy Beach Park on Oahu. Be-
cause a portion of the project was located within the boundaries of the
"Special Management Asea" (SMA) I established by the County pur-
I
"Contested case" is defmed in HRS § 91-1(5) as "a proceeding in which lhe
legal rights. duties. or privileges of specific pmies are required by law to be deter-
mined after In opponunity for agency hearing." HRS §§ 91-9 through 91-14
specify the ~ural requirements for contested cases.
I
"Special Management Areas" encompass critical coastal lands immediately
adjacent lO lhe shoreline requiring special management attention because of
unique coutal values or characteristics. HRS §§ 20SA-21. -22(4).
:.'.: •
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.-', suant to the CZMA. Kaiser was required to obtain an SMA use
permiL HRS § 20SA-28.
Because this appeal in\lOlves achallenge to the procedures adopted
by the County pursuant to the CZMA for administering the "Special Man-
agement Area" on Oahu. we tum first to a briefexamination of the regula-
ta'y scheme before discussing the facts perticuIar to the permit issued in
this case.
The CZMA imposes speciaJ conb'Ols on the development of real
property along shoreline areas in order·'to preserve. protect, and where
possible. to restore the naun1 resources of the coastal zone of Hawaii."
HRS § 20SA-21. 01apter 20SA designates the counties as the "author-
ity" to administer the permit system and requires the counties to adopt
procedures for issuing permits. HRS §§ 2OSA-22(2). -29. The HonoluJu
City Council designated itself as the "authority" for the City and County
of Honolulu unlike the other counties of Maui. Kauai. and Hawaii which
delegated this function to their respective county planning commissions.
S~~ HRS § 205A-22(2).
The Honolulu City Council processes permit applications under rro-
cedures set forth in Revised Ordinances of Honolulu (Revised Ordi-
nances). Chapcer 33. Pursuant to this ordinance. initial processing ofsuch
applications is delegaJed 10 the Department of Land Utilization (DLU).
DLU holds a public hearing on the application. and transmits its findings
and recommendations to the City Council. Revised Ordinances § 33-5.3.
-5.4. The Council generally refers SMA use pennit applications to its
Committees on Pianning and Zoning which make a recommendation to
the Council as a whole. The Council grants. denies. or conditions the per-
mit by resolution. Revised Ordinances § 33-5.5.
In processing permit applications. DLU and the Council are
guided by the policies. objectives. and guidelines of the CZMA.' HRS
§ 2OSA-26. The "authority" must make findings that the proposed
~ policies snd objectives of Chapter 205A encompass seven major areas
of legislative concern: (l) provision and protection of recreational resources; (2)
protection and restoration of historic and cultural resources; (3) improvement of
J.
development (a) will not have any substantial adverse environmental or
ecological effects; (b) is consistent with the objectives, policies, and
guidelines of Chapter 20SA; and (c) is consistent with the county general
plan and roning. HRS § 20SA-26(2).
In the instant case, the County accepted Kaiser's application for a
permit on February 3, 1986. OnAprill,1986,DLUheldapublichearing
which was auended by twelve persons. Subsequently, the agency trans-
mitted its findings and recommendation ofapproval to the Council, which
referred the application to its Planning and Zoning Committee for consid-
eration. During the following year, the Council as a whole or in commit-
tee publicly reviewed and discussed the application at least ten times.
In response to growing concerns over the potential impact of the pr0-
posed development, the Council held a public hearing on April I, 1987, at
which over 80 persons offered written and oral testimony both for and
against the projecL Those testifying e'lpressed concerns regarding the de-
velopment's impact on coastal views, preservation of open space, traffIC,
potential flooding, and sewage tre3b11enL Severa] of the Appellants testi-
fied at the public hearings. Appellants include individuals and organiza-
tions whose members reside in the area or use the shoreline and open
space resources near the proposed developmenL
The published notice advertising the hearing stated that speakers
would be limited to a three minute presentation; however, many persons
testifying, including Appellants, were allowed to speak at length. At the
close of the April 1,1987 hearing, the Council deferred action on Kaiser's
application to allow consideration of the e'ltensive testimony received
and to permit the preparation of findings. Further public testimony was
permitled at the City Council neeting held on April IS, 1987, at which
time the Council adopled Resolution No. 87~5 granting the permit and
made e'ltensive findings of facL
70 HAW
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scenic and open space areas; (4) protection of coastAl ecosystems; (5) provision
for coastal-dependenl economic uses; (6) reduction of coastal hazards; and (7)
improvement of the process for managing development of coastal resources. in-
cluding public participation. S" HRS § 205A-2.
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On May 12. 1987, Appellants med two nearly identical lawsuits in
the circuit coun challenging the issuance of the pennie (1) an administra-
tive appeal pursuant to HRS § 91-1400 which provides for judicial re-
view of agency decisions in "contested cases"; and (2) an action under
HRS § 205A~. which accords a person aggrieved by a county agency's
failure to comply with the CZMA a right thereunder to initiate a civil ac-
tion against the ~omplying agency.4 Appellants claimed in both ac-
tions that their personal. economic. and aesthetic interests would be in-
jured and adversely affected by the projecL Appellant Elizabeth Mat-
thews. who resides in the closest pro'limity to the proposed development,
directly across a golf course from the development, claimed the project
would affect her view of the ocean and decrease the value of her property.
Both suits further alleged that the failure of the City Council to hold "con-
tested case" hearings in SMA use permit proceedings violated HRS
§ 20SA-29, Chapter 91, and the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and anicle
I. section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution, AppeUees Kaiser Development
Company and Kaiser Hawaii Kai Development Company intervened as
defendants aJ:ld the two cases were consolidated.
On December 29, 1987, the coon issued an order denying
Appellants' motion for summary judgment. The coun held that HRS
§ 205A-29(a) does not require a legislative body, otherwise exempt from
HRS Chapter 91, to conduct a contested case hearing on SMA use pennil
applications. Appellees moved to dismiss, arguing that the sole issue in
the case, whether the Council was required to hold a contested case hear-
ing, had already been decided by the coun in its order denying the motion
4
HRS § 2OSA~ reads in pertinent pllt:
(a) Subject to chlplcrs 661 and 662. any person or agency may com·
mence I civil action alleging thal any agency:
(1) Is not in compliance with one or more of the objectives. policies.
and guidelines provided or authorized by this chapter within the
speciaJ management area and the waters from the shoreline to the
seaward limit of the Slale'S jurisdiction; or
(2) Has failed to perform any let or duty required 10 be performed un-
der this chapter; or
(3) In eltercising any duty required to be performed under this chapter.
has not complied with the provisions of this chapter.
?"'f'f!""'1 I al ....
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for summary judgmenL The lower cowt granted the motion to dismiss on
January 29, 1988. and this appeal followed.
n.
We fmt consider Appellants' contention that the City Council, al-
though not an "agency" within the meaning of HAPA, is required by the
CZMA to conduct "contested~.. hearings pursuant to HRS Chapter 91
when it act! upon SMA use permit applications. We conclude that the
Council. as the IegislaLive body of the County, is not subject to HAPA.
and that the CZMA does not require the COWlCii to conduct contested case
proceedings in issuing SMA use permits.
A.
Turning fIrSt to an examination of the Hawaii Administrative Proce·
dmes Act. we fmd that HRS § 91-1 specifICally exempts legislative and
judicial bodies from its purview. Section 91-1 defines "agency" as fol-
lows:
F<r the purpose of this chapter.
"Agency" means each Stale or county board, commission, de-
partment. or officer authorized by law to make rules or to adju-
dicate contested cases. uetpl tJuJu ill 1M kgisl4dJ1t orj~
eiGI brruteluJ. (Emphasis added).
Article mof the Revised Charter of the City and County of Honolulu
(Charter) vests the legislative power of the City and County of Honolulu
in the City Council. Stt Charter § 3-101. Therefore. the Council clearly
falls within the exception created by HRS § 91-1.
Appellants concede that HAPA does not apply to the "legislative"
functions of the City Council; however. they argue thallhe Council acts in
a "quasi-judicial" or "administrative" capacity when issuing SMA use
permits, and therefore, seek to invoke HAPA's procedural requirements,
specifically the provisions relating to "contested cases." HAPA mandates
a 1riaI-type hearing in contested cases before administrative agencies.5
, .
HRS n 91-9 d J~" set forth the procedures to be afforded the partIes to I
"conlesled case" including: (l) reasonable notice. (2) the opportunity 10 present
evidence and argument, (3) an agency decision on the record. (4) rules of
gE s:r'rmrm zmrs:wz:zrov =
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It is well established that the City Council has both legislative and
no~legislative powers. Section 3-201 of the Charter provides: "Every
legislative act of the council shall be by ordinance. Non-legislative acts
of the couocil may be by resolution[.]" In Lilt oillu Uvulv. City COIlII-
cil,61 Haw. 390,423-24,606 P.2d 866, 887 (1980), we recognized \.hat
the Council has both legislative and non-legislative powers and distin-
guished between them as follows:
A legislative act predetermines what the law shall be for
the regulalion of fwure cases falling under its provisions.
A non-legislative act executes or administers a law al-
ready in' existence. (Citations omiued).
The issuance of an SMA use permit involves the application of genen1
standards to specific parcels of reaJ propeny. Therefore, the City Coun-
cil's approval of Kaiser's SMA use permit application was a n~legisla­
tive act because it administered a law already in existence, the Coastal
Zone Management Act.
We find no indication in the language of Chapter 91 thallegislalive
bodies are excepted from the statutory defmition of "agency" only when
they are performing "legislative" activities, but are otherwise included in
that defmition. Section 91-1 clearly excludes the legislative bnJlICh from
the definition of"agency" and therefore, from compliance with the proce-
dural requirements conlained in Chapter 91. It is well settled that
where there is no ambiguity in the language ofa statute, and the
literal application of the language would not produce an absurd
or unjust result., clearty inconsistent with the purposes and poli-
cies of the swwe, there is no room for judicial construction and
interpretation, and the SWute must be given effect according to
its plain and obvious meaning.
SIQU •• PaklIM, 62 Haw. 159, 161,612 P.2d 1168. 1170 (1980).
The legislative history of HRS § 91-1 provides further support for
the exclusion of the City Council from HAPA. In adopting HRS Chapter
91, the House Judiciary Committee stated:
evidence. including the right of cros~xamination.(5) a written decision accom-
putied by findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. and (6) prohibition againsl ex
parte commWlications.
-g
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It is also the intention of your Committee that the definition of
agency does not include the state legislature, city COUMil and
board of supervisors of the state and county government as well
as the various couns including lhosewhich by statute the Su-
preme Court of the Stare of Hawaii is given ruJe-ma.lcing
authority over. (Emphasis added).
Hse. Stand. Camm. Rep. No.8. in 1961 House Journal, at 656.
Moreover, thiscoun has previously recognized HAPA's express ex-
emption of the City Council In KtdllUl COlflmullity COUMU". City &
COU"", 60 Haw. 428, 591 P.2d 602 (1979), we found that where the chief
planning officer and the planning commission of the county acted in a
purely advisory capacity 10 the Council in fulfilling its legislative func-
tion. their actions were not subject 10 HAPA. We noted that "[t)o hold
otherwise wouJd. by indirection. extend the application of the HAPA 10
the actions of the city council which by its tenns the Act has excluded
from its operation." ltL at 434.591 P.2d at 606 (citing HRS § 91-1(1».
We conclude, therefore. based upon the plain language of HRS
§ 91-1 and its legislative history, that the City Council, as the legislative
branch of the County, is not subject to the procedural requirements of
HAPA when acting in either a legislative or non-Iegislative capacity.
B.
Appellants further conrend that the CZMA overrides the exemption
for legislative bodies set forth in HRS § 91-1 by requiring the county
"authorities" which administer the permit process to comply with HAPA
regardless of whether the "authority" is a legislative or administrative
body. They claim that the CZMA incorporates Chapter 91, thus subject-
ing all "authorities" administering SMA use pennits, including the City
Council. to the requirements of HAPA. Appellants rely on several provi-
sions of the CZMA to which we now twn.
HRS § 205A-27 designates an "authority" in each county to carry
out the objectives. policies. and procedures for Special Management
Areas set forth in Chapter 20SA. Section 20SA-22(2) defines "author-
ity" to include both legislative tuUI administrative bodies:
"Authority" means the county planning commission, except in
counties where the county planning commission is advisory
only, ill which cas, "alUhorily" lMallS the county council
•
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or such body as the council may by ordinance designate. The
authority may, as appropriate, delegate the responsibility for
administering this pan. (Emphasis added).
Accordingly. the Honolulu City Council designated itself as the "author-
ity" pursuant to § 33-1.3 of the Revised Ordinances of Honolulu.'
The CZMA defmes "agency" as foUows:
"Agency" means any agency. board. commission. department.
or officer of acounty government or the state government. ill-
chulbt, ~ alllltorit] tU defUud ill part II{.) (Emphasis
added).
HRS § 2OSA-1.
AppeUants argue !hal because the "aulhority" is included within the
definition of "agency." the legislalW'e intended 10 designate the City
Council as an "agency" subject to the procedural requirements of HAPA.
We disagree. Section 20SA-l defines "agency" for the purposes ofChap-
ter 2OSA. not for the purposes ofChapter 91. As discussed above. Chapter
91 provides its own definition of "agency" which excludes the legislative
branch. .
AppeUants rely primarily on HRS § 20SA-29(a). arguing !hal
this provision of the CZMA specifically requires the City Council to
comply with HAPA in adopting rules and in conducting hearings. HRS
§ 20SA-29(a) reads in pertinent part
The authority in each county. upon consultation with the essen-
tial coordinating agency, sluUl tsl4bllsll tUtd may alMM par-
s'"',.,UJ C1I4pur 91, by ruk or I'tflllGdolllM s~cuu1JUUUIf~­/M'" tutti IUt ~,.".il appllctUioll proctduns. conditions un-
der which hearings must be held. and the time periods within
which the hearing and action for special management area use
pennirs shall occur. The authority shall provide for adequate
notice to individuals whose property rights may be adversely
affected and to persons who have requested in writing to be no-
tified of special management area use pennit hearings. or
,
Revised Ordinances t 33-1.3 defines "Council" as "the city council of the
city and county of Honolulu. which body shall act as the •authority' under chapter
20SA. Hawaii Revised Statutes."
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applications. The authority shall also provide written public
notice once in a newspaper of general circulation in the State at
least twenty days in advance or the hearing. (Emphasis added).
Appellants contend that by employing the language "pursuant to chapter
91," the legislature contemp1aled that the City Council would provide
"contested case" hearings as defined in Chapter 91 rather than public
hearings as required by the County's current procedures. See Revised Or-
dinances § 33-5.3.
While the plain language or HRS § 205A-29(a) can be construed to
require the "authority"l0comply with Chapter 91 in establishing ruJes for
administering its Shoreline Management Areas, we find that the statute
does not require the City Council, otherwise exempt rrom HAPA. to con-
duct "contested case" hearings when acting upon individual pennits. As
we noted in CIuuI, v. PlilIlnln, Co",,"'n ojCOll1lt1 0/Malli. 64 Haw.
431.441 n.ll.643 P.2d55. 63 n.11 (1982), "HRS § 20SA-29(a) refers the
county aUlhority 10 chapter 91 in its promulgation or ruJes governing
SMA use pennit hearings but is otherwise silent on the manner in which
the hearings must be conducted...
Furthermore. the legislative history of the original act and its amend-
ments does not indicate any intent by the legislaLure to require a contested
case hearing. as defined in Chapter 91. in SMA use pennit procedures. On
the contrary. Senate Committee Repcxt No. 143 reflects that the legisla-
ture was concerned with providing "public" hearings:
Improved means ror participation by the public in decisions af-
recting the coastal zone are necessary and desirable. Although
public hearings afford the opportUnity ror public panicipation
in certain agency decisions. many agency actions on pennits af-
fecting the coastal zone may now occur without the require-
ment for a public hearing. To afford the public an adequate op-
ponunity to participate in all major decision making affecting
the c~taI zone during the interim until the program is imple-
mented. provision should be made for publk /leari",s on re-
quired pennits where such hearings would otherwise not be re-
quired. (Emphasis added).
Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 143. in 1975 Senate Journal, at 917. Further-
more, when the CZMA was amended in 1979. the legislature stated:
Your Committees heard testimony that present procedures
regarding public /ltarinfJ in connection with SMA pennit
•
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applications are adequate. Therefore. the bill has been
amended to allow the county aulhorities to determ me the condi-
tions under which hearings must be held. instead of requiring
hearings in cases where they are requested by any person or
agency. (Emphasis added).
Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 629. in 1979 House Journal. at 1442.
The pattern and purpose of the CZMA lead to the conclusion that the
legislature intended the hearing held by the county authority in conjunc-
tion with the application for an SMA use permit be informational in na-
tlD"e in order to permit members of the public to present their views and
relevant data as an aid to the adminisuative decision on the particular ap-
plication as weU as long-term planning policy for the entire coastal area.
We find. therefore. that neither the language nor the legislative his-
tory of the CZMA supports Appellants' contention that the City COlUlCil
is required to conduct contested case hearings in SMA use permit pr0-
ceedings. ~,it is apparent that the legislature in HRS § 205A-29
allowed each authority to decide for itself the nature of the hearings it
would conduct in reviewing SMA use permit applications.
In support of their argument that SMA use permit proceedings are
"contested cases" within the meaning of Chapter 91, Appellants rely on
decisions of this cowt in which we recognized that the hearings held by
the planning commissions of the counties 0( Maui and Kauai in issuing
SMA use permits were "contested cases." CluJ"". PID""i", CO".". 'II,
64 Haw. 431, 436, 643 P.2d 55, 60 (1982); MohuiJd ,. P1DII1Iin,
CO""" 'II, 65 Haw. 506, 513.654 P.2d 874, 879 (1982).
As noted previously. while the City Council of the City and County
of Honolulu appointed itself the "authority" to administer the Shoreline
Management Area. the counties of Maui, Kauai. and Hawaii have dele-
gated this function to their respective planning commissions. St, HRS
§ 20SA-22(2). County planning commissions are clearly "agencies" as
defined by HAPA. Sit HRS § 91-1(1). Therefore. the permit application
proceedings we considered in CIuJ"g and Mohuiki fell within the defini-
tion of"contested case" as "a proceeding in which the legal rights, duties,
or privileges of specifIC panies are required by law to be determined after
anopponunity forogtrlqhtori",." HRS § 91-1(5); Mahuiki, 65 Haw.
at S13. 654 P.2d at 879 (emphasis added). These decisions, therefore. are
•
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not dispositive of the question in this case. whether a legislative body is
subject ~ the contested case procedures of HAPA.
c.
While we find that HRS § 2OSA-29 does not subject the City Coun-
cil to Chapter 91 contested case procedures when acting upon SMA use
permits. we recognize that § 20SA-29(a) can be int.erpret.ed to require the
Council's adherence toChapter91 in establishing a regulatory scheme for
administering SMA use permit application procedures. SpecifJCa11y. the
farst sentence of § 2OSA-29(a) provides that
The authority in each county. upon consultation with the central
coordinating agency. sIuJJl tstablJ.sll alld maytuMlidpunlUl1ft
to c1l4pUr 91. by rule or regulation the speciaJ management
area use permit application procedures. conditions Wlder which
hearings must be held. and the time periods within which the
hearing and action for special management area use pennit
shall occur. (Emphasis added). .
Thus. while the City Council is not an "agency" as defmed by Chapter 91.
§ 2OSA-29(a) nevertheless appears to require the "authority" to comply
with the rule-rnaking provisions of Chapter 91 in adopting its SMA use
permit application procedures. We therefore tum to an examination of the
manner in which the County adopted its procedural scheme for issuing
SMA use permits.
In 1984. the City Council adopted Ordinance No. 84-4. subse-
quently codified as Revised Ordinances of Honolulu Chapter 33.
setting forth a regulalory scheme for processing SMA use pennit
applications.' Because the promulgation of rules governing SMA
procedures was a legislative act. the Council was required by the Revised
,
The CZMA wu enacted by the legislature in 1977. and replaced the Shore·
line Protection Act of 1975. an interim act. Prior to 1984. the County apparently
processed SMA use permits undeT Ordinance No. 4529 which was repealed by
Ordinance 84-4. For the purposes of this case. Ordinance 84-4 is the operative
law.
----_._----
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Charter of the City & County of Honolulu (Charter) 10 adopt an ordi-
•nance.
The procedure for the adoption of rules by agencies is set fonh in
HRS § 91-3(a):
Prior to the adoption of any rule audlorized by law. or the
amendment or repeal thereof. the adopting agency shall:
(1) Give at least 20 days' notice for a public hearing.
Such notice shall include astatement of the substance
of the proposed rule. and of the dare. time and place
where interested persons may be heard thereon. The
notice shall be mailed to all persons who have made a
timely written request or the agency for advance n0-
tice of its rulemaking proceedinp, and published at
leastonce in anewspaper ofgeneral circulation in the
Swe Cor state agencies and in the county for county
agencies.
(2) Afford all inrerested persons opportUnity to submit
data. views, or arguments. orally or in writing. The
agency shaH fully consider all written and oral sub-
missions respecting the proposed rule. The agency
may make its decision at the public hearing or an-
nounce then the dale as to when it inrends to make its
decision. Upon adoption. amendment. or repeal of a
rule. the agency shall. if requested to do so by an in-
teresled penon. issue a concise statement of the prin-
cipal reasons for and against its derennination.
HRS § 91-3(c) provides that in the case ofcounty agencies. the rule shall
be subject to the approval of the mayor.
The record indicates that the City Council conducted a public hear-
ingonJan'*Y 17, 1984.priorloadoptionofOrdinanceNo.~. Notice
was published on December 27, 1983 and January 6, 1984. specifying the
•The City Council does not "mae rules"; rather. it "adopts ordinances." The
Charter provides lhll"[elvety legislative let of the council shall be by ordinance."
Charter § >-'201.
---~--------
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dale. time and place of the hearing. The notice explained in some detail
the contents of the proposed ordinance. It provided that persons wishing
lO speak at the hearing should sign up at the City Clerk's Office. that their
presentations would be limited lO three minutes, and requested them lO
submit fifteen copies of their statement The notice further provided for
the ming ofwriuen statements with the City Cleric up lO the day before the
subject mauer was discussed in committee. The ordinance was adopted
by the Council on February 10, 1984, and was subsequently signed by the
mayor.
Weconclude, based upon the facts outlined above, that the procedure
followed by the Council in adopting Ordinance 84-4 was in accordance
with the ruI~ing provisions of Chapter 91. Consequently, the
Crnmty complied with HRS § 205A-29(a) in establishing "pursuant lO
Chapter 91" its SMA use permit application procedures.
III.
We next consider Appellants' contention that the procedures em-
ployed by the City Council in issuing the SMA use permit to Kaiser vio-
lated their constitutional right lO procedural due process under the four-
teenth amendment lO the United Slates Constitution and artic Ie I. section 5
of the Hawaii Constitution. Appellants claim thal. even if the City Coun-
cil was not SUbjectlO the requirements ofHAPA, the Council nevertheless
had a constitutional responsibility lO afford them a trial-type adjudicatory
hearing because they possess constitutionally protected "property" inter-
ests. Therefore, Appellants argue. they were entitled lO the full panoply of
contested case procedures including cross-examination of wimesses.
findings of fact and conclusions of law limited to the evidence, and prohi-
bition on ex pane communications by decisionmakers. We disagree that a
trial-type adjudicatory hearing was mandated by the constitution in this
case and conclude that the hearings provided Appellants were consistent
with the requirements of procedural due process.
InA.ruiGl',. Hawaii Hous. Auth•• 55 Haw. 478,495. 522 P.2d 1255,
1266 (1974), we set forth a two-step analysis for claims of a due process
right to a hearing: (1) is the particular interest which claimant seeks lO
protect by a hearing "propeny" within the meaning of the due process
clauses of the federal and Slate constitutions, and (2) if the interest is
"propeny," what specific procedures are required lO protect it Therefore,
•
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in orda' to assert a right to procedural due process, Appellants must p0s-
sess an interest which qualifies as "property" within the meaning of the
constitution.
"To have a property interest in a benefit. a person clearly must have
more than an abstract need or desire for iL He must have more than a
unilateral expectation of iL He must. instead. have a legitimate claim of
entitlement to it" 8tHIt'd0/Rttelll! ,. RotJa, 408 U.S. 564, S77, 92 S. CL
2701,2709.33 L. Ed. 2d 548. S61 (1972). In Al""". we concluded that
the plaintiffs" inlereSt in continuing to receive low-eost public housing
benefits was a "property" interest.' SS Haw. at 496. S22 P.2d at 1267. In
SIIv",. Castk MtMOrl/IJ Hos,.. 53 Haw. 475. 497 P.2d S64 (1972), we
found that a medical doctor's interest in his continued practice of medi·
cine in a federally-funded private hospital rose to the level of a constitu·
lionally procected property interest
The property interests in A",uu and Silv" involved basic needs of
housing and employment to which the plaintiffs had"a legitimate cIaim of
entitlement" In contrast, the property interests assened by the Appellants
who oppose the SMA use permit in this case are of an aesthetic and envi-
ronmental nature. While we have recognized the imporWlCe ofaesthetic
and environmental interests in determining an individual's standing to
contest the issue.U/t 0/'''' lAIUI,lne. ,. lAIUI Us, Co".".'", 61 Haw. 3.
8,594 P.2d 1079. 1082 (1979), we have not found lIlat such interests rise
to the level of "property" within the meaning of the due process clause,
and Appellants refer us to no authorities so holding.It
,
Since the governmental body involved. the Hawaii Housing Authority. was
an "aaency" as defined by Chlpler91. HAPA procedures were statutorily invoked
and it WIS unnecessary for us 10 determine wtw procedures were constitutionally
required. 55 HIW.1l49S-96. 522 P.2d llI267.
It The California Supreme Coon has recognized that land use decisions which
subst.antially affect the property rights of ownen of adjacent parcels may consti-
tute depivations of propeny within the context of procedural due process. S~~,
'.r.. Horw Y. Co•., 01 y~,.,.,... 24 Cal. 3d 605. 156 Cal. Rptt. 718.596 P.2d
1134. 1139 (1979); StMl Y. ClqofllUll4lt W,lIs. 6 Cal. 3d 541, 99 Cal. Rptt. 745.
492 P.2d 1137 (1972). None ofl!\e Appellants in this case are owners of property
contiguous 10 the development whiclt is the subject of the SMA use permit appli-
cation.
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Even if we assume, tU'flUtuJo, lha1 Appellants' visual and environ-
mental inlerests ConsblUte "property" interests within the meaning of the
due process clause, no due process violation appears.
Due process is not a fixed concept requiring a specifIC procedural
course in every situation. "[Dlue process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Morriss~J II.
B,,",,408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2600. 33 L. Ed. 2d 484. 494
(1972). The fuD rights of due process present in acoun of law, including
presentation ofwitnesses and cross-examination. do not automatically at-
tach to a quasi-judicial hearing. SIt Go" ,. Lo,.t. 419 U.S. S65, 95 S.
CL n9, 42 Led. 2d 72S (1975); ArM"'. KtIlMdJ, 416 U.S. 134,94 S.
CL 1633, 40 L Ed. 2d 15 (1974). The basic elements of procedural due
process of law require notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaning-
fuJ time and in a meaningful manner before governmental deprivation ofa
signifICant property interest. MtIlluws '. EIdrid", 424 U.S. 319,333,96
S. CL 893, 902, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18,32 (1976); Nortlr Gto",", F1lIIslt'llf,
1M. ,. Dl-CIu..,1M., 419 U.S. 601,6054)6,95 S. Ct. 719,722,42 L.
Ed. 2d 751, 756-57 (1975).
Determination of the specifIC procedures required to satisfy due
process requires a balancing of several facta'S: (l) the private interest
which wiD be affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures acwally used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or alternative procedural safeguards: and (3) the gov-
emmenlal interest. including the burden that additional procedural safe-
guards would entail MGlMws,. EIiIrldt',424 U.S. 31335, 96 S. CL al
903,47 L. Ed. 2d at 33; SUN". CtUtk MllfIOrl4l Hosp., 53 Haw. at484,
497 P.2d al 571.
Assuming for present purposes lha1 Appellants can demonstrate
protectible propeny interests sufficient to lrigger procedural due process
protection, we must weigh those interests against the risk of enoneous
deprivation through the procedures actually provided by the Council, the
probable value of providing an adjudicatory-type hearing, and the Coun-
cil's interest in adhering to its current procedures. We find, in considering
these factors, that Appellants' rights to procedural due process were satis-
fJed by notice and an opportunity to be heard. and that the due process
clause does not require the additional procedures sought by Appellants.
An examination of the record in this ease reveals that the Council
provided ample noticeof the public hearings and in fact Appellants do not
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complain that they did not receive adequare notice. The Council complied
with its own notice procedures which require notice be given to aU pr0p-
erty owners within 300 feet of the affected property as well as to all
owners of all ptopetty described in the permit application. Published n0-
tice was also provided. S.~ Revised Ordinances § 33-5.3.
The record also reveals that Appellants were afforded numerous 0p-
portUnities to be heard. City Clerk Raymond Pua submitted an affidavit
listing sixtH" separate public meetings or hearings in which members of
the public were permined to address the DLU or City Council regarding
Kaiser's SMA use permit application. In substance, all inrerested persons
were given the opportunity to present their positions orally and in writing
for the purpose of adding to the information and data available to the
COlmCil in evaluating the application and deciding whether CI' not to grant
the permit
Thus. Appellants were afforded numerous opportunities to present
argument and testimony before the DLU. the Zoning Committee. and the
Council as a whole. Several of the Appellants participated in the proceed-
ings by presenting oral and written testimony. At no time during the pr0-
ceedings were they denied the opportUnity to address the Cooneil or to ask
questions of other witnesses. There is no evidence of procedural imp-o-
priety or other corruption of the hearing aDd decision-making processes.
We conclude. based on the record.lhat the proceedingsconductedby
the City Council in acting upon Kaiser's SMA use permit application sat-
isfied the requirements of procedural due process. Therefore. we find no
violation of the due process clause.
IV.
Finally, we tum to AppeUants' contention that the City Council's de-
cision to provide for public hearings. while other counties have chosen to
provide contested case hearings pwsuant to (..l1apter 91 , resulL'i in a denial
of the equal protection of the laws. Appellants' equal protection argu-
ment appears directed at HRS § 205A-29(a) as it has been applied by the
City and COlDlty of Honolulu in adopting its own SMA use permit proce-
dures. We conclude that the City Council's practice of holding public
hearings rather than contested case hearings does not violate the equal
protection clause.
_
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We recognize that. unless fundamental rights or suspect classifICa-
tions are implicaled. we will apply the rational basis standard of review in
examining adenial of equal protection claim. NtI1uJJto II. MGltIlOShi, 68
Haw. 140, 151-52. 706 P.2d 814, 821 (1985). Under this standard, 10
prevail, a party challenging the constitutionality of a statutory classifica-
tion on equal protection grounds has the burden ofshowing, with convinc-
ing clmty that the classiflCalion is not rntionally related 10 the statutory
purpose, or that the challenged classification does not rest upon some
growMI of difference having a fair and substantial relation 10 the object of
the legislation, and is therefore not arbitrary and capricious. Washi""oll
•. Fin...,,·' FIUUlIu. COl., 68 Haw. 192, 199, 708 P.2d 129, 134
(1985). Thus. discrimination between classes is not per se objectionable,
so long as any sw.e of facts reasonably c. be conceived 10 sustain iL
S"", •• FrriJaJ, 61 Haw. 262, 212, 602 P.2d 914, 922 (1979).
As we have recognized.
equal proteCtion does not mandate that all laws apply with uni-
versality 10 all persons: the Slate "cannot function without clas-
sifying its citizens for various purposes and treating some dif-
ferently from others." The legislature may not. however, ... do
so arbilJ'arily. The classifteation must be reasonably related to
the purpose of the legislation.
Fin...,,', F.IfII, 68 Haw. at 199, 7~ P.2d at 134 (quoting Joshll4 ...
MTL, I••, 65 Haw. 623,629, 6S6 P.2d 736, 740 (1982».
The legislanft in HRS § 2OSA-29 allowed each county "authority"
10 decide for itself the nature of hearings it wouJd conduct in reviewing
SMA use permiuppUcations. In so doing, the legislature was most likely
concerned thai imposition of the CZMA review process not disrupt the
general Sb"UCtUre ofcounty govemmenL The legislative history reflects a
deliberate choice by the Iegisla1ure 10 utilize existing county authorities in
the coaslll1 zone permit process rather than aeating a slatewide coastal
zone commission to manage coastal areas. S" Sen. Comm. Rep. No. 143,
in 1975 Senate Journal, at 916. The Commiuee also declared:
Rather than implement a new permit system to achieve in-
terim control of development in the coastal lone, such control
could be achieved expeditiously by requiring existing agencies
to adopt guidelines pursuant to a policy established by the leg-
islature. Such guidelines wouJd apply to all agency actions
including the granting of pennits for actions within the coastal
zone.
Iii. at 917. Each county has its own unique resources, problems. aDd con-
sidetalions to evaluate in decidina whlll bemnI procedure will best suit
its needs. Any resulting difTe:ences between the procedures adopted by
the various counties do not result in a denial of equal proteCtion unless
they are cae.ty nttar)'.
The Honolulu City Council's decision 10 provide public hearings
ratha than contested case hearings was not clearly arbilr8J)'. The legw..
tive history of the CZMA indicares that !be legislature desired 10
facilitate public participation in the decisioo-mating process. SH sm-
are Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 143, ,,,,,.. at 917. Furthef1l1Cft, the
CZMA itself enunciates a policy to "[c]ommunicate the po4ential sboIt
and long-tmn impacts of proposed signiflCaDt coastal developments
early in their life-cycle and in tenns understandable 10 the general public
to facilitate public participali<ln in the planning and review process.to
HRS § 2OSA-2(c)(7)(C).
Thus, the City Council's decision 10 provide for public hearings may
weD have. been directed towards serving the legislablre's goal of maxi-
mizing public penicipalion in managing the coasra1 zone. In the instant
case, over 100 individuals presented testimony at public meetings before
the Council. thus allowing a full airing of public views regarding the
proposed development's consistency with CZMA objectives, in particu-
lar the ~tion and presel'Vation of coasaal scenic and open space roe-
~ SIt HRS § 20SA-2(b)(3).
Thus, thereexists in this case a~nable stale of facts 10 support the
County's procedure on equal proIt:Ction grounds. Consequently, we fmd
l.hat the difference in procedures between Honolulu and the othez counties
does not constilWe a violation of the equal proteCtion clause.
I .
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In conclusion, we hold that the Honolulu City Council, as the legisla-
tive branch of the City and County of Honolulu, is exempt from the proce-
dural requirements of HRS Chapter 91 when acting upon SMA use permit
applications. FW1hermore, we fmd no violation of Appellants' rights of
due process or equal procection. Accordingly, we affinn the judgment of
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the court below upholding the validity oC the SMA use pennit issued to
Appellee Kaiser.
RoNJld A. Alb" (Gerard A. Jervis with him on the brieCs) Cor Appel-
lants Sandy Beach Defense Fund.
JQM H. Howell. Deputy Corporation Counsel. for Appellee City
COWKil oC the City and County oC Honolulu.
KtfIMlhR. KupcltoJc (R. CharlesBocunarwJRo/)e" H. Thomas with
him on the answering brieC. and KamokJ J. wsen with them on the sup-
plemental brieC; oC counsel. Damon. Key, Char cl Boeken) fer Appellees
Kaiser Hawaii Kai Development Co. and Kaiser Development Co.
Slnttll S. MichMls. Deputy Auomey General, on the brief Cor
Amicus Curiae State oC Hawaii.
DISSENTING OPINION OF NAKAMURA. J.
"This appeal." as the court notes at the outset. "involves achallenge
to the validity oC the procedures employed by ... the City and County oC
Honolulu ... when acting upon applications for Special Management
Area (SMA) use permits pursuant to the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA). Hawaii Revised Stabltes (HRS), Chapter 205A." The disposi-
tive question on appeal. put bluntly and succinctly, is whether procedures
essentially "politicaJ" in nab.U"e satisCy the demands ofdue process as they
apply to administrative proceedings. The coon concludes the procedures
do so and affmns the judgment of the circuit court. I cannot join my col-
leagues because their decision and opinion maniCest a"talismanic reliance
on labels" rather than a "sensitive consideration oC the procedures re-
quired (in the circumstances] by due process." BOtUd of CUralOn ,.
Horowil:.. 435 U.S. 78, 106 (1978) (Marshall. J.• dissenting) (foomote
omiued).
I.
A.
The Coastal Zone Management Act represents "a comprehensive
State regulatory scheme to protect the environment and resources oC our
shoreline areas." MalruW v. P14nnill,Comm'lI. 65 Haw. 506. 517. 654
1·!O'rtr9 fJ m
•
70 HAW
•
SANDY BEACH DEFENSE FUND
v. CITY COuNCIL
Nakamura. J., dlssentinl
P.2d 874. 881 (1982). And any development of rea! property in areas des-
ignated as special management area.1 must be consistent with the objec-
tives and policies of the Act. The implementation of its provisions. how-
ever. "has been delegated in large part to the counties, and they are respon-
sible for the administration of the special management area use permit
procedure and requirements." ltL "State primacy nevertheless has been
retained as HRS §§ 2OSA-4 and 2OSA-28 make clear, and the legislature
has sought 10 maintain the integrity of its declared policy by providing
guidelines in HRS § 20SA-26 to be followed by the counties in reviewing
applications for SMA use permits." ItL at 517-18,654 P.2d 81881 (foot-
note omiued).
By virtue of HRS § 20SA-26(2) no development in a special man-
agement area can be approved unless the county permit-granting author-
ity fU'St fmds:
(A) That the development will not have any substantial
adverse environmental or ecological effect, except as
such adverse effect is minimized to the extent practi-
cable and clearly outweighed by public health,
safety. or compelling public interests. Such adverse
effects shall include. but not be limited 10. the poten-
tial cumulative impact of individual developments.
each one of which taken in itself might not have a
substantial adverse effect, and the elimination of
planning options:
(B) That the development is consistent with the objec-
tives, policies. and special management area guide-
lines ofthis chapterand any guidelines enacted by the
legislawre; and
(C) That the development is consistent with the county
general plan and zoning.
The City and County of Honolulu's legislative arm designated itself
as the county permit-granting authority pursuant to HRS § 20SA-22; it
also adopted procedures governing the consideration of special manage-
ment area use permit applications pursuant 10 HRS § 20SA-29. These
procedures are delineated in chapter 33 of the Revised Ordinances of
Honolulu. Section 33-S.3 of the relevant ordinance. consistently with
HRS § 20SA-29, provides for public hearings on permit applications: but
"-
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it is silent on whether the contesaed-case procedures of the Hawaii Ad-
ministrative Procedwe Ac.t. HRS chapter 91, or other procedures are to be
foUowed. Section 33-9.1 of the ordinance further states that "[a)ppeaJs
shall be in accordance with section 2OSA~, Hawaii Revised StatuleS(,J"
which "affords an interested party aD alternative remedy for an agency's
noncompliance wilh the CZMA by authorizing a civil action in which a
circuitcourt •shall have jurisdiction to provide any relief as may be appro-
priate.' HRS § 2OSA-6(c)." KolUI Old Hawtliilllf Traib GrollP ...
L,I1ftU1,69 Haw. _,_, 734 P.2d 161, 169 (1987).
B.
The developer's application fa a pennit was received in February of
1986, and the Citr's DepartmentofLand Useconducted a hearing thereon
in AJ:ril of 1986. The department's recommendation of approval of the
proposed development was forwarded to the City Council shonJy thereaf-
ter. The Council reviewed the matter on a numberofoccasions and sched-
uled a public hearing appro~imately a year after receiving the depan-
ment's recommendation. The hearing was attended by over eighty per-
sons who were allowed to e~press their objections to or suppon for the
proposed development In format. the hearing was no different from bear-
ings conducted by the Council in considering propoSals for legislative ac-
tion. Further testimony was received at a COW'lCiJ meeting held on April
IS, 1987 and the development pennit was granted on the same day.
Several organizalioos and individuals who voiced objections to the
development challenged the Council action by filing two suits in the cir-
cuitcounon May 12, 1987. They invoked thecQUrt'sjurisdiction under
HRS § 91-14(g) inane and WIder HRS § 2OSA-6 in the other. Thecircuit
court dismissed the suits on January 29, 1988, agreeing with the City and
the developer that the sole issue in the case, whether the Council was
obliged to conduct a contested case hearing before issuing a development
permit. had been decided earlier when the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment was denied. The plaintiffs perfected a timely appeal thereafter.
I
The department's role in lhe ~ocessing of pennit applications is merely ad·
visory. Thus. the hearing it conducted was not acontested~e hearing within the
meaning of lhe Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act S" HRS § 91-1(5).
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In affinning the judgment of the circuit court. this court concludes:
(1) "the City Council. as the legislative branch of the County. is
not subject to the procedural requirements of [the Hawaii Ad·
ministrative Procedure Act] when acting in either a legislative
or non-Iegislative capecity[;]"
(2) "the legislature intended the hearing held by the COMty
authority in conjunction with the application for an SMA use
pennit [to] be infonnational in nature in order to permit memo
bers of the public to present their views and relevant data as an
aid 10 the administrative decision on the particular application
as well as long-tenn planning policy for the entire coastal
area[;]"
(3) the interests Appellants sought to protect did not "rise to the
level of •property, wilhin the meaning of the due process
clauser;]" and
(4) assuming "that Appellants can demonstrau~ proteetible
property interests suffICient to trigger procedural due process
protection." the proceedings before the Council "satisfied the
requirements of procedW'llJ due process."
Unlike my colleagues, I conclude:
(I) the exemption of the legislative branch from coverage un·
der the Administrative Procedure Act is of no consequence;
(2) the hearing conducted by the Council could not have been
"informational in nature";
(3) the Appellants have standing to chaJlenge the Council ac·
tion in court; and
(4) the hearing conducted by the Council did not meet the de-
mands of due process.
The court's opinion, in my view, exhibits an insensitivity 10 the ob-
jectives and policies of the Coastal Zone Management Act. the public and
private interests protected thereby, and the demands of due process.
Moreover, the opinion in no way explains how the procedures followed
by the Council could possibly meet the requirements of due process in a
•
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case where a propeny owner's permitapplication is denied after a council
"hearing" and he "appeals" from the resolution denying the application
"in accordance with section 20SA~. Hawaii Revised StalUtes(,J" as di-
recled by section 33-9.1 of the Revised Ordinances of Honolulu.
B.
Inasmuch as the City Council "administered a law already in exis·
tence" when it issued the use permit, our concern in this appeal is with
adminisuative law, the branch of the law that "sets forth the powers lhat
may be exercised by administrative agencies. lays down the principles
governing the e:tlercise of those powers, and provides legal remedies 10
lhose aggrieved by administrative action." B. Schwartz, Administradv.
Law § 1.1. at 2 (2d ed. 1984). Among the basic principles that hold ad-
ministrative action 10 the rule of law are the following:
(I) government must practice fairness in its dealings with lhe
citizen: and
(2) an administrative agency does not have the last word on any
action taken by iL
Stt B. Schwartz. Fashwninr An AdminislnJlive Law5yst.",. 40 Admin.
L. Rev. 415. 419-31 (1988).
"Fundamental fairness" or "due process" is "a flexible concept."
WalUrs v. NaJiolUJl Ass'n 01 RtJdlotioll Survivon. 473 U.S. 305. 320
(1985).
When the courts had to deal with the applicability of pro-
cedwal due process 10 administrative agencies. they based their
answer upon the distinction between legislative and judicial
powers. If the case involved rulemaking. the courts naturally
treaJed the administrative exercise of legislative powers simi-
larly to the direct exercise of power by the legislature. The
agency was no more bound by constitutional procedural reo
quirements than the legislature itself when it enacts a statute. If
adjudication was involved, the courts had a ready analogy in the
judicial process.
B. Schwartz. Administrative Law § 5.6, at 211.
At bouom, in proceedings designed to apply policy-type standards
in particular situations, the persons whose protecled intereslS will be af·
fecled by the forthcoming administrative action "must be given notice and
--------~-~---'
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an opponunity to present their side of the case in a full and fair hearing."
B. Schwanz, slIpra, 40 Admin. L. Rev. at 424; stt a/so Mol1ensen v.
BOdI'd o/TrlUlNs, 52 Haw. 212,473 P.2d 866 (1970) (An applicant for
disability retirement benefits from the Stale Employees' Retirement Sys-
tem is entitled to a trial-type hearing). And the impanial decisionmaker' s
ruling must "rest solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at the
hearing." Go/dMrg v. KIa" 397 u.s. 254, 271 (1970).
Obviously lOO, the decisionmaker cannot have the last word on
whether his decision is consistent with the statUIe that authorized him ro
act and whether there was fairness in the procedures he followed. "'The
supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity to have some
coon decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied; and whether
the proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly."
SI. JOStplt Stod Yards Co• •. UniUd Smits, 298 U.S. 38, 84 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
III.
A.
The coun recognizes that "the City Council's approval of Kaiser'!
SMA use permit application was a non-Iegislative act because it admin-
istered a law already in existence, 'the Coastal Zone Management ACL..
.Relying on "the plain language of HRS § 91-1 and its legislative history,"
it nonetheless concludes "the City Council, as the legislative branch of the
COW1ty, is not subject to the procedural requirements of HAPA when act·
ing in either a legislative or non-legislative capacity."
Granted, an "agency" within the meaning of the term as defined by
HRS § 91-1 does not include "those in the legislative or judicial
branches." But the "exception" from coverage under the Administrative
Procedure Act by no means freed the Council from lhe fundamental re-
quirement that any power it possesses, legislative or administrative, "be
exercised in subordination to law." B. Schwartz, su,ra, 40 Admin. L.
Rev. at415. It is immaterial whether the Council is subject to the proce-
dural requirements of HAPA or noL The Council acted in a quasi-judicial
----_.----~---
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capacity in administering a State law; it therefore was subject to the reo
quirements of due process.
B.
Procedural due process demanded that the Council conduct a full and
fair hearing in the judicial sense. The court, however, concludes "the
hearing held by the county authority in conjunction with the application
for an SMA use permit [was only intended to] be informational in nature."
In its view, this justified the legislative-type hearing conducted by the
COWlcil. But protected rights and inlet'eSts were at stake, and a hearing
more in !.he nature of a judicial, rather than a legislative, hearing was in
order.
C.
The court. however. rules a :riaI-type adjudicatory hearing" was
not necessary. "[I1n order to assert a right to procedural due process," it
states, one "must possess an interest which qualifies as 'property' within
the meaning of the constitution." Aesthetic and environmental interests,
it holds, do not "rise to !.he level of 'property' within !.he meaning of the
due process c1ause[.)" Yet as the coUrt observes, "due process is flexible
and caBs for such procedural protections as the particular situation de-
mands." Morriss".". Brt,.",, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
The particular situation involved an application for a permit to de-
velop land in an area where the legislature has declared special controls on
developments "are necessary to avoid permanent losses of valuable reo
sources and the foreclosure of management options, and to ensure that
adequate access ... to public owned or used beaches, recreation areas, and
natural reserves is provided." HRS § 205A-21. Implicated in the pr0-
ceeding in question were the rights and interests of a property owner who
owns land in the special management area extending inland from the
shoreline, a developer who has contracted to develop the land, owners of
nearby property, persons residing in !.he area of the proposed develop-
ment. and the general public. The Council action was one "authorizing
development., the valuation of which [far] exceeds 565.000 [and] which
may have a substantial adverse environmental or ecological effect[.J"
HRS § 205A-22(7). It escapes me why Appellants were not entitled to
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invoke procedural protections consistent with due process in lhe judicial
sense.
11lat the "rights" of the landowner and the developer were subject to
protection, of course, is beyond cavil: no one would question that they
could "assert a right to procedural due process" in the processing of their
permit application. While they have no need to invoke such right under
the circumstances, the court's decision consigns anyone seeking aspecial
management area use permit, as well as anyone objecting to its issuance,
to the vagaries o,f the political process where the decision will not "rest
solely on the legal rules and evidence adduced at hearing." GoIdHrg ...
KtU" 397 U.S. at 271.
But I believe the Appellants also have protected interests that al-
lowed them to invoke procedural due process. These interests are those
established and made judicially cognizable by the legislature under the
statutory scheme designed "to preserve, protect, and where possible, 10
restore the .natural resources of the coastal zone of Hawaii." HRS
§ 20SA-21. Among the natural resources designated for preservation,
protection, and restoration are "recreational resources," "historic re-
sources," "scenic and open space resources," and "coastal ecosystems."
SIt HRS § 205A-2. In my view lhey constitute propeny "owned" by the
public.
The mandate to the counties is that in implementing the foregoing
objectives of the coastal zone management program "full consideration
shall be given to ecological, cultural, historic, and esthetic values as well
as to needs for economic developmenL" HRS § 205A-4. And "any per-
son or agency" is given a right to "commence a civil action" seeking to
remedy an agency's failure to comply wilh lhe Coastal Zone Management
ACL HRS § 205A-6. I can only conclude lhis vested concerned members
of lhe public wilh protectible interests related to lhe natural resources of
the coastal zone of Hawaii.
The coun acknowledges that "we have recognized lhe importance of
aeslhetic and environmental interests in determining an individual's
standing to contest the issue[.]" But since "we have not found that such
interests rise to the level of 'property' wilhin lhe meaning of the due proc-
ess clause," it implies the Appellants were not subjected to deprivation
they can complain about. Still, we are expounding legislatively created
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interests in nawral resources deemed worthy of protection through judi-
cial processes invocable by "any person or agency."
D.
Though it finds no grounds for the assertion by Appellants ofa right
to due process, the court gratuitoUSly concludes "the proceedings con-
ducted by the City Council in acting upon Kaiser's SMA use permit ap.
plication satisfied the requirements of procedural due process." What the
Council did was aptly described by the circuit court when it said:
They're acting as a legislature; they have legislative hearings.
People are given notice, they're allowed to show up and be
heard. and then the politics decide the issue, whichever way
they go.
This court characterizes the hearing before the Council as being "informa-
tional in nawre in order to permit members of the public to present their
views and relevant dala as an aid to the administrative decision on the par-
ticular application as well ~ long-tenn planning policy for the entire
coastal area."
But as we observed. a legislative or informational hearing does not
satisfy the requirements ofdue process where legal rights and interests are
to be determined by "the administrative decision on the particular applica.
tion" ofa Slatute enacted by the legislature. A particular application of the
guidelines the Council was bound by law to follow turned on facts.
"[W]here imponant decisions tum on questions of fact. due process re-
quires an opponunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses."
GOIdNt'f v. Ken,. 397 U.S, at 269 (citation omitted). Just being "allowed
to show up and be heard" is not enough.
Due process fun.her requires that the evidence proving an opponent's
case be "disclosed to the individual so that he has an opponunity to show
... it is untrue." GrteM v. McElTo" 360 U.S. 474. 496 (1959). "A hear-
ing is not judicial, at least in any adequate sense. unless the evidence can
beknown," WtSIOltioGasCo.,. Pub/kUtiL Comm'If(No./). 294 U.S.
63,69 (1935). It was conceded at oral argument that there were ex parte
contacts between members of the Council and persons interested in the
outcome of the proceeding. If the Council were acting in its customary
role. this would have posed no problem: but it was not
..{
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Ex parte co,uacts breach a fundamenlal principle of administrative
law, "eltclusiveness of the record." Thereunder, the "decisionmaJcer's
conclusion must rest solely on the evidence adduced at !.he hearing." B.
Schwartz, AdtrlWstrallH 1.4'111 § 7.13, at 367 (footnote omiued).
The eltclusiveness principle and its foundation were well stared
by ChiefJustice Vanderbilt: '''Where a hearing is prescribed by
stablte, nothing must be taken into account by the administra-
tive bibunaJ in arriving at its delennination that has not been
introduced in some manner into the record of the hearing.' ..•
Unless the principle is observed. the right to a hearing itselfbe-
comes meaningless. Of what real wonh is the right to present
evidence and to argue its signifacance at a formal hearing, if the
one who decides the case may stray at wiu from !.he record in
reaching his decision? Or consult another's findings of fact, or
conclusions of law, or recommendations ..• 7"
Id. at 361-68 (footnote omiued).
Ptevention of ex parte contacts, however, is not the only purpose
served by the principle. There are other sound reasons why it is followed
in administrative law:
First. it helps ensure that the agency does not make decisions
without an adequate basis in fact; second, it gives opposing par-
ties the opportunity to challenge the agency's reasoning process
and the correctness of its decision; and third, it affords review-
ing coons full opportUnity to evaluate the decision.
Id. at 368 (footnoee omitted).
Since the Appellants were not afforded due process, I would vacate
the judgment and remand the case to the circuit court with instructions to
void the permit issued to Kaiser Development Company.
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